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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2012-2013 term, the Supreme Court of the United States considered
two cases about access to marriage by same-sex couples in which Romer v. Evans1
played a central role. In United States v. Windsor,2 Justice Kennedy employed
Romer as a template in an opinion on the merits, in which the Court affirmed the
Second Circuit judgment that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
was unconstitutional.3 Hailed as a landmark opinion by supporters of marriage
equality and condemned as judicial overreaching in a national “debate” over
marriage by dissenting justices Scalia and Alito4 and by DOMA’s supporters,
Windsor provided the Obama Administration the final judicial resolution it
sought so that it could cease enforcing Section 3 and implement a policy change,
under which federal government officials would treat marriages of same-sex
couples that were valid under state law as valid for purposes of federal law.5
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,6 the Court declined to reach the merits of whether
Proposition 8 (Prop 8) offended the constitution, concluding that its proponents
were private parties who lacked Article III standing to appeal the federal district
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (stating that “[i]n determining whether a law is motived by
an improper animus or purpose, “‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’” especially require
careful consideration” (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633) and that “DOMA cannot survive under these
principles.”)
3. Id.
4. See id. at 2710, 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the Court’s opinion will result in a
“judicial distortion of our society’s debate over marriage” and arguing that the Court should “have
let the People decide”); id. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Our Nation is engaged in a heated debate
about same-sex marriage”; he also states that the Constitution “does not dictate” the choice between
understandings of marriage).
5. See Michael R. Gordon, New U.S. Policy Gives Equal Treatment to Same-Sex Spouses’ Visa
Applications, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at A8 (quoting Secretary of State John Kerry’s announcement:
“Effective immediately, when same-sex spouses apply for a visa, the Department of State will
consider that application in the same manner that it will consider the application of opposite-sex
spouses.”)
6. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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court ruling, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,7 that Prop 8 was unconstitutional. The
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,8 which relied heavily on Romer in
affirming the district court’s conclusions about Prop 8. While there was some
initial controversy over the precise impact of the Court’s decision not to decide,
the practical effect has been that the Ninth Circuit swiftly lifted its stay of the
district court ruling, the governor instructed clerks to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples and such couples began to marry on June 28, 2013.9
Romer was not about marriage, as such, and yet, it proved an extremely
important precedent in both the DOMA and the Prop 8 litigation.10 The aim of
this article is to reflect on Romer when it was decided and now as it bears on the
use of law as a vehicle to express morality, in particular, “moral disapproval of
homosexuality” and moral approval – and the defense and nurture – of
“traditional, heterosexual marriage.”11 Looking back to Romer, the article will
examine arguments made by the parties and their various friends of the court
before the U.S. Supreme Court – nearly twenty years ago – about whether or not
Amendment 2 was a constitutionally permissible expression of moral
disapproval of homosexuality and of support for traditional heterosexual
marriage. As Lisa Keen and Suzanne Goldberg observe, in their account of the
Romer litigation, “[t]he extraordinary array of organizations filing briefs in this
case underscored the intensity and scope of the debate prompted by the case.”12
The article will then move forward in time, examining how a far greater number
of amici and the courts deployed Romer in the recent successful challenge to
Section 3 of DOMA.
Both Romer and DOMA date back to 1996. Congress enacted DOMA just a
few months after the Court decided Romer, striking down Amendment 2. As this
article elaborates, both proponents of Amendment 2 and of DOMA justified
these measures as needed to ward off a threat to traditional morality posed by an
aggressive gay rights agenda; in the case of DOMA, the agents to curb were
activist courts, while, in Colorado, the problem was successes at the level of
municipal anti-discrimination ordinances.13 The Justice Department advised
Congress, even after Romer, that DOMA was constitutional.14
DOMA’s
7. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012).
8. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Proposition 8 violated
the Equal Protection Clause, after comparing Proposition 8 to Amendment 2, which was invalidated
in Romer).
9. Nanette Asimov, Same-Sex Couples Flock to SF for Weekend Weddings, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 29,
2013,
http://www.sfgate.com/lgbt/article/Same-sex-couples-flock-to-SF-for-weekend-weddings4638139.php.
10. Because the Court did not reach the merits in the Prop 8 appeal, this article focuses only on
Romer’s role in challenging DOMA.
11. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 12, 15-16 (1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt664/pdf/CRPT-104hrp664.pdf.
12. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 196
(1998).
13. See infra Part III for discussion.
14. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, supra note 11, at 34 (“Romer v. Evans does not affect the
Department’s analysis (that H.R. 3396 is constitutionally sustainable)”) (letter from Ann M. Harkins,
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supporters similarly concluded it was “plainly constitutional under Romer,” even
as they criticized Romer as “difficult to fathom” in light of Bowers v. Hardwick,
which upheld “criminalizing homosexual behavior” on a belief that “homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”15
The intertwined fates of DOMA and Romer in the most recent Supreme
Court term highlight, on the one hand, how the societal and constitutional
landscape has changed since 1996. On the other hand, they illustrate some basic
continuity both in cleavages over homosexuality and in forms of argument about
law, morality, and homosexuality. The Romer litigation, and its precursor in the
Colorado court system, Evans v. Romer I and II,16 took place when Bowers v.
Hardwick,17 rather than Lawrence v. Texas,18 reflected constitutional jurisprudence
about the permissible scope of legal regulation based on homosexuality or
homosexual conduct. In Romer, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion famously (or
infamously) never mentioned Bowers, which narrowly cabined the scope of Due
Process liberty. Instead, his opinion sounded an Equal Protection theme of
critical importance to the recent litigation over both DOMA and Prop 8. Through
Amendment 2, Colorado “classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,” making the class “a
stranger to its laws.”19 United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno20 and City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center21 provided a template for this argument, as I
elaborate in Part II. Since Romer, the trio of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer features
centrally – including in the DOMA litigation – in challenges to legislation that
singles out a historically disfavored group.
In 2003, seventeen years after Bowers, Lawrence, in an opinion also authored
by Justice Kennedy, drew on Romer in overruling Bowers, declaring it “was not
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”22 Lawrence held the
Texas law, which criminalized “sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not
identical behavior by different-sex couples,” invalid under the Due Process
Clause, stressing analogies between the liberty of homosexuals and other
protected forms of liberty;23 however, it noted important links between
“[e]quality of treatment” and the “due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty.”24
Seventeen years proved similarly fateful for DOMA. Edith Windsor, the
United States, and Windsor’s amici successfully enlisted Romer and Lawrence as
highlighting the constitutional wrong of singling out and demeaning
United States Department of Justice, to Hon. Charles T. Canady).
15. Id. at 32-33 (“A Short Note on Romer v. Evans”) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986)).
16. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 610, 635 (1996).
20. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
21. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
22. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
23. Id. at 564. 578.
24. Id. at 575.
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homosexuals because of moral disapproval and as providing a template, an
architectural structure, within which to locate the demand that same-sex couples
validly married under state law be accorded the same status – the same dignity
and respect – as validly married opposite couples. Those defending DOMA had
to work around Romer and Lawrence, distinguishing, for example, DOMA from
Amendment 2; some, by contrast, took issue with those decisions, insisting that
Justice Scalia, in his dissents in Romer 25 and Lawrence,26 had the better view about
the relationship between law and morality. In Windsor itself, the Court enlisted
both Romer and Lawrence to hold Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.
Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor now make a trio of significant Supreme Court
decisions, all authored by Justice Kennedy, that forge important contours of
liberty and equality for gay men and lesbians in the federal constitutional order.
They set constitutional limits to appeals to moral approval and disapproval and
the promotion of “traditional heterosexual marriage” to restrict that liberty and
equality.27
On the other hand, a look back at Romer and a comparison with the recent
Windsor litigation reveals a continuity of certain controversies and forms of
argument. This article explores those themes by analyzing several strands of
argument appearing in party and amicus briefs in Romer and in Windsor. These
include: (1) the constitutional limits of using law to signal moral disapproval of
homosexuality and moral approval of traditional marriage and Judeo-Christian
values; (2) whether Amendment 2 or DOMA reflected animus or antipathy
toward homosexuals; (3) rationales for both laws rooted in protecting religious
liberty; (4) appeals to freedom of association as a justification for both laws; (5)
arguments about a “clash of rights” posed by challenges to Amendment 2 and
DOMA, for example, between the expanding rights of gay men and lesbians and
the right of “the People” to use law to reflect and protect their moral and
religious convictions; and (6) arguments about whether sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, by analogy to race and sex, and which level of
review courts should employ when laws classify based on sexual orientation.
This backward glance at themes then and now is also informative as to
unfinished business and what may be the next generation of constitutional
controversies. Two examples are illustrative. First, in Windsor, Justice Kennedy
declined to announce that classifications based on sexual orientation warranted
intermediate scrutiny, a position urged by the Obama Administration and Edith
Windsor and accepted by the Second Circuit. Instead, as in Romer, the Court
invalidated Section 3 after applying what has come be called a “rational basis
plus” or “rational basis with bite” test: “[D]iscriminations of an unusual
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are

25. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 610, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Carlos Ball includes Romer and Lawrence among several LGBT rights lawsuits that “worked
in conjunction with political mobilization and social protests to remake our nation’s political, social,
and moral landscape.” CARLOS A. BALL, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE COURTROOM: FIVE LGBT RIGHTS
LAWSUITS THAT HAVE CHANGED OUR NATION 1 (2010).
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obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”28 Indeed, one issue in sharp
contention between the parties – and the Justices – in Windsor was whether, in
fact, Romer had introduced a new, more intensified form of rational basis review,
following on Moreno and Cleburne, or whether it simply employed traditional,
highly deferential review. Second, in the Romer litigation, defenders of
Amendment 2 made arguments concerning the authority of “the people” to
structure the political process and urged the Court not to intrude upon the
democratic process. In Windsor, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which
defended DOMA before the Court, and their amici urged that the Court should
let “the people” decide about marriage and not take sides in an ongoing cultural
debate. These arguments, then and now, raise questions about who the relevant
people are who should decide. Windsor involved the additional issue of the
respective authority of states versus the federal government to define marriage.
In a powerful rhetorical turn, Justice Kennedy, for example, contrasted New
York’s decision, “after a statewide deliberative process,” to remedy a
“perceived” injustice and “eliminate inequality” in its marriage laws with
DOMA’s “writ[ing] inequality into the entire United States Code.”29
This article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I look back at Romer. I begin with
the successful challenge to Amendment 2 brought in Colorado state court. I then
turn to the proceedings before the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on arguments
made in party and amicus briefs. The Colorado Supreme Court struck down
Amendment 2 under a different rationale than that adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court: Amendment 2 violated a fundamental right to participate in the political
process.30 Thus, much of the briefing before the Supreme Court argued for or
against this political right. My focus, however, is on an alternate strand of
argument made by challengers to Amendment 2 more pertinent to the recent
marriage equality litigation: that Amendment 2 lacked a rational basis.
Moreover, also pertinent are those arguments that, under United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno31 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,32 it was the singling out of one group, making them strangers to the law,
that deeply offended the Constitution. These briefs also stressed the role of
stereotypes and falsehoods about homosexuals in the campaign for Amendment
2. Conversely, proponents of Amendment 2 asserted that it had several rational
bases, including protecting and preserving traditional morality, protecting
religious and associational liberty, protecting the privacy of the family, and
preserving the liberty of parents to instruct their children. A basic premise in
these briefs was that (on the authority of Bowers) the people may express moral
disapproval through law. Moreover, they may avoid threats to religious liberty
posed by antidiscrimination law simply by barring such laws entirely unless they
are obtained through constitutional amendment. I analyze the Court’s decision

28. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
29. Id. at 2689, 2694.
30. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-82 (Colo. 1993); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-41
(Colo. 1994).
31. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
32. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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in Romer and Justice Scalia’s blistering and often-quoted dissent. I note some
contemporaneous reactions to the Romer decision by conservatives and by
proponents of gay and lesbian civil rights.
In Part III, I turn back again to 1996, when Congress enacted, and President
Clinton signed DOMA. I analyze the House Report to give readers a sense of the
types of rationales offered for DOMA and the sense of urgency and threat that
lawmakers perceived because of a challenge to state marriage laws proceeding in
Hawaii. I also consider accounts of why President Clinton and Democrats in
Congress supported DOMA. In Part IV, I turn to the recent legal challenges
brought to Section 3 of DOMA by same-sex couples lawfully married under state
law. Since the Court granted the petition for certiorari in and reviewed the
Second Circuit case, Windsor v. United States,33 I focus primarily on that case.
However, because the federal district court in Windsor looked to the First
Circuit’s application of a Romer-like heightened rational basis as a helpful
template for how to evaluate DOMA, I briefly discuss the First Circuit’s
reasoning.34 The rest of Part IV analyzes several themes in the party and amicus
briefs filed with the Supreme Court as it considered Windsor and then evaluates
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and the three dissenting opinions. The article
concludes with some observations about the next likely steps in the debate over
law, morality, homosexuality, and marriage, including the import of Windsor for
challenges to state marriage laws.
II. ROMER V. EVANS
In this Part, I recount the successful challenge to Amendment 2 brought in
state court. The trial about Amendment 2 was “not the first trial” assessing an
“antigay attack,” but was “the most comprehensive in its attempt to sift through
all that was known about gay people—from ancient history through the latest
scientific research—to determine where and how gay people fit into the body
politic.”35 Informative accounts by scholars and activists capably tell the story of
the enactment of Amendment 2, the trial, and the legal victories in Colorado’s
high court and the U.S. Supreme Court.36 My focus is on the forms of argument
made. Thus, I examine the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
opinions by the Colorado Supreme Court. I then analyze several themes in the
friend of the court briefs filed before the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing
particularly on arguments about Amendment 2 as a vehicle for preserving
morality and expressing moral disapproval. Then, this Part discusses whether
and how those themes featured in the majority and dissenting opinions in Romer.
A. Amendment 2
The Colorado voters approved Amendment 2, on November 3, 1992, by a

33. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
34. Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2012); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
35. KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at ix.
36. Id; BALL, supra note 27, at 99-149.
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margin of 53.4% to 46.6%.37 Amendment 2 provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.38

What was the impetus for Amendment 2? The ballot information provided
to Colorado voters stated: “the proposed amendment arises in the context of
three decades of increased governmental activity in the areas of civil rights.”39
Within Colorado, “three home rule cities – Aspen, Boulder, and Denver” had
ordinances protecting individuals from “job, housing, and public
accommodations discrimination” when based solely on sexual orientation. The
Denver law “entirely exempts religious institutions;” the Boulder ordinance had
a Mrs. Murphy type housing exemption; and the Aspen ordinance “does not
exempt religious institutions.” 40 There was also an executive order, issued in
1990, prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the “hiring, promotion,
and firing of classified and exempt state employees.” No federal civil rights laws
protected against sexual orientation discrimination, although several states
included sexual orientation in their antidiscrimination laws. If enacted,
Amendment 2 would invalidate these laws and policies within Colorado, but
also bar future enactment or enforcement of “civil rights laws and policies”
protecting on the basis of sexual orientation. In the future, only voters could
enact an antidiscrimination policy through another constitutional amendment.
The ballot information summarized “arguments for” and “arguments
against” Amendment 2. Notably absent are arguments about protecting
marriage, the traditional family, and public morality – arguments that featured
prominently in the litigation. The third argument “for” comes closest: “Granting
protected status to homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual persons may compel some
individuals to violate their private consciences or to face legal sanctions for
failure to comply. For some individuals, homosexuality, or bisexuality conflicts
with their religious values and teachings or their private moral values.” For
example, a landlord may be asked to “condone a lifestyle of which they do not
approve or to be in violation of a local ordinance.”41 Additional arguments “for”
Amendment 2 included the following: (1) “There is no evidence that
homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual individuals are sufficiently disadvantaged to
warrant designation as a protected class;” (2) “homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual

37.
38.
39.

Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993).
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338-39 (Colo. 1994) (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
LEGIS. COUNSEL OF THE COLO. GEN. ASSEMB., AN ANALYSIS OF 1992 BALLOT PROPOSALS, GEN.
ASSEMB. 58-369, at 9 (1992).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id. at 11.
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persons” have recourse to other sorts of laws, including tort laws, and receive
antidiscrimination protection based on other traits they share with others, such
as race, gender, age, and ethnicity. Two other arguments that featured in the
litigation were that “a wider spectrum of individuals than just municipalities”
should consider civil rights matters and that Amendment 2 avoided dilution of
the “original purpose of legislation enacting civil rights protections.”42
The “arguments against” appeal to the wrong of discrimination and that
“all individuals should be accorded the same basic dignity, right to privacy,
privileges, and protections guaranteed to every citizen.”43 They explain that,
without the ordinances that Amendment 2 would overturn, “existing laws
inadequately protect” homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual persons from
discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodation.44 Especially
pertinent to the subsequent litigation is the argument that the Amendment may
violate the Equal Protection clause “[b]y singling out homosexual, lesbian, and
bisexual persons in the state constitution and effectively denying them potential
remedies for discrimination.” That Clause, the document explains (implicitly
referencing Cleburne), “prohibits any state from adopting a law which singles out
a group for unfavorable or discriminatory treatment without a sufficient basis, or
due to prejudice or irrational fears.”45 The arguments rebut the claim that
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals seek “minority status” or “quota
preference,” rather than basic protection against discrimination.46 Finally,
countering the argument that such matters should be decided at a state-wide
level, the document asserts that “[U]nder the Colorado Constitution home rule
cities are empowered to address the needs of their residents as they see fit.”47
B. The Legal Challenge to Amendment 2 in Colorado State Court
1. The Preliminary Injunction.
On November 12, 1992, several individual plaintiffs along with several
governmental plaintiffs filed suit in Denver District Court to enjoin Amendment
2 as violating the state and federal constitution.48 On January 15, 1993, the
Honorable H. Jeffrey Bayless, in the District Court of Denver, issued a
preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs after a four-day hearing. His task,
he explained, was not to rule on Amendment 2’s constitutionality, but on
whether plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of success on the merits and
whether there would be real, immediate, and irreparable harm if the court
denied their motion.49 He concluded, based on his reading of the Supreme
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993).
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039, app. E, Transcript
of Court Proceeding at E-5; Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (No. 92 CV 7223) [hereinafter
Transcript]).
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Court’s precedents, that “there is a fundamental right” involved with
Amendment 2, which he defined as “the right not to have the State endorse and
give effect to private biases.”50 Judge Bayless quoted from Palmore v. Sidoti, the
famous case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a court could not base a
custody ruling on racial considerations: “The Court [says] the Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot directly or indirectly give
them effect.”51 He discerned evolution in the Court’s approach: Palmore, decided
in 1984, was a 9-0 opinion, while Reitman v. Mulkey, a 1967 opinion striking down
a California law passed to permit racial discrimination in housing, was 5-4.52
Bayless also cited Cleburne, which struck down zoning restrictions concerning
persons with mental retardation, to show the right was not confined to
“instances of racial discrimination reviewed under strict scrutiny.”53
Judge Bayless ruled that the identifiable class whose right was violated was
homosexuals, a class defined principally by status, rejecting defendants’
argument that the class be defined by homosexual conduct – under Bowers,
“behavior which can be criminalized.”54 Thus, because there was a fundamental
right, strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard in evaluating
Amendment 2. Under Colorado’s law, however, plaintiffs would have the
burden of showing Amendment 2 was unconstitutional “beyond reasonable
doubt.”55
The court made a few statements about the political process and
defendants’ arguments, to which the parties recurred in briefing before the
Colorado and U.S. Supreme Court. First, Judge Bayless described the efforts
made by “Coloradans for Family Values and the Religious Right and the Political
Right” as “exactly in keeping with the political process that this country is based
on.”56 Thus, should that process be attacked, he “would vigorously defend those
persons” involved in it, since they “followed exactly what democracy urges.”57
Second, he reported defendant’s argument that all Amendment 2 does is “make a
part of Colorado law that which is existing in the federal law in terms of the
treatment of homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals” and that is the “true intent” of the
Amendment.58 Third, defendants argued that it is not always a denial of equal
protection to adopt a law-making procedure that disadvantages a “particular
group.” Further, defendants asserted that “there is no necessity for the Court to
intrude on the private and moral values of citizens, and that is what is [at] the
heart of Amendment 2.”59

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at E-17.
Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
Id. at E-15 (comparing vote in Palmore with vote in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)).
Id. at E-17.
Id. at E-11.
Id. at E-18.
Id. at E-10.
Id.
Id. at E-10 to E-11.
Id. at E-10.
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2. Evans v. Romer (Evans I): The Colorado Supreme Court Affirms
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the lower court’s issuance of a
preliminary injunction because Amendment 2 “may burden fundamental rights
of an identifiable group,” but identified a different fundamental right at issue,
“the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process.”60 The
district court, the Court notes, did not address or rely on this or other of
plaintiff’s First Amendment claims.61 The plaintiffs now repeated their previous
equal protection argument, contending that the right identified by the trial court
was “best construed” – in light of “the arguments actually presented to” the trial
court – to mean that Amendment 2 violates the plaintiffs’ fundamental right of
political participation.”62 The Colorado Supreme Court read the U.S. Supreme
Court’s precedents in various equal protection cases to “demonstrate that the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the fundamental right to participate equally
in the political process and that any attempt to infringe on an independently
identifiable group’s ability to exercise that right is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.”63 The court invoked language from those cases about statutes
impermissibly “fencing out” or “singling out” certain classes, and thus offending
Equal Protection.64 It evaluated Amendment 2 in light of this rule: “the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects the fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process, and . . . any legislation or state
constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by ‘fencing out’ an
independently identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.”65 The court rejected defendants’ argument that the right “applies only
to traditionally suspect classes.”66
The court then considered whether “amendment 2 has been shown, to a
reasonable degree of probability, to infringe on the fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process beyond a reasonable doubt.”67 It
evaluated Amendment 2 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey) “in light of its immediate
objective, its ultimate effect, its historical context, and the conditions existing
prior to its enactment.”68 Its objective was “to repeal existing statutes,
regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that barred
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”69 Its effect was “to prohibit any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes,
regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is
first amended to permit such measures.”70 This, the court concluded, “clearly”
affects the “right to participate equally in the political process,” because it “bars
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273, 1282 (Colo. 1993).
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277, 1282.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id. (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967)).
Id. at 1284-85 (noting specific laws and orders that would be repealed).
Id. at 1285.
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gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from having an effective voice in governmental
affairs insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek legislation that would
protect them from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.”71 To wit: a
“targeted class,” under Amendment 2, may not obtain protection or redress from
discrimination “absent the consent of a majority of the electorate through the
adoption of a constitutional amendment.”72
The court explained that, “[r]ather than attempting to withdraw
antidiscrimination issues as a whole from state and local control, Amendment 2
singles out one form of discrimination and removes its redress from,
consideration by the normal political process.”73 It “fences out” an independently
identifiable group: “that class of persons (namely gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals) who would benefit from laws barring discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. No other identifiable group faces such a burden.”74 The court
explained the political options of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals “prior to”
Amendment 2 and how those would be reduced by the Amendment, and
concludes there is a “reasonable probability” that Amendment 2 “infringes on a
fundamental right” protected by Equal Protection.
The court concluded that “the defendants and their amici have not
proffered any compelling state interest to justify the enactment of Amendment 2
at this stage of the proceedings as required under the strict scrutiny standard of
review,” and thus plaintiffs had met their burden.75 The court invoked the
stirring anti-majoritarian rhetoric of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.76 Granting that Amendment 2 “was passed by a majority of voters
through the initiative process as an expression of popular will” and thus
“mandates great deference,” Barnette nonetheless teaches “that ‘[o]ne’s right to
life, liberty, and property . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”77
The court declined to address plaintiffs’ second alternative argument, that
Amendment 2 “lacks a rational basis for the burdens it imposes on gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals.”78
In dissent, Justice Erickson looked to Bowers v. Hardwick as “instructive of
the type of analysis” the U.S. Supreme Court uses to “address the substantive
due process question of whether a fundamental right exists.”79 That
methodology, he argued, does not support the district court’s identification of a
fundamental right and its application of strict scrutiny.80 To the contrary, neither
the Supreme Court nor any other court had every identified or recognized a

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1286.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Romer, 854 P.2d at 1286 (quoting West Virginia Bd., 319 U.S. at 638).
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1291 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1291-92.
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“fundamental right not to have the state endorse and give effect to private biases
with respect to an identifiable class.”81 Palmore, Erickson argued, was about a
racial classification – a traditional suspect class, not a fundamental right.82
Cleburne did not apply strict scrutiny and “stands only for the proposition that
irrational biases cannot, in and of themselves, qualify as a legitimate
governmental interest to satisfy rational basis review.”83
The dissent also rejected the majority’s gleaning of a “common thread” of a
fundamental right to participate in the political process from Supreme Court
precedents.84 Those cases concerned either the right to vote – an established
fundamental right – or racially-conscious legislation fencing or singling out for
“peculiar and disadvantageous treatment” racial minorities – a traditional
suspect class.85
3. The Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions of Law
After a nine day bench trial,86 Judge Bayless issued a permanent
injunction.87 He explained that Evans I provided “the guidelines” for his decision:
because Amendment 2 expressly fenced out an independently identifiable group
and violated a fundamental right to participate equally in the political process,
the “burden of proof at the trial” was that defenders of Amendment 2 must
demonstrate that it was supported by a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve the purpose in the least restrictive manner.88
Defendants presented “six alleged ‘compelling state interests,’” none of
which referred expressly to promoting morality or signaling moral disapproval:
1) Deterring factionalism;
2) Preserving the integrity of the state’s political functions;
3) Preserving the ability of the State to remedy discrimination against suspect
classes;
4) Preventing the government from interfering with personal, familial, and
religious privacy;
5) Preventing government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special
interest group; and

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1294-98, 1300 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
See BALL, supra note 27, at 122. For accounts of the trial, see id.; KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note

12.
87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), app. C,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, at C-1 to C-20; Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993).
88. Id. at C-2 to C-3, C-4 (quoting Evans I, 854 P. 2d at 1275 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982)).

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor

365

6) Promoting the physical and psychological well-being of our children.89

Most of these asserted interests, the trial court found, were not compelling.
With respect to the fourth asserted interest, the court found that defendants
“presented evidence of only two compelling state interests that Amendment 2
serves, the promotion of religious freedom and the promotion of family privacy,”
but failed to carry their burden to show that Amendment 2 was drawn narrowly
to serve those interests “in the least restrictive manner possible.”90 First I will
discuss the court’s rejection of several asserted compelling interests and then
focus on his conclusion about narrow tailoring.
Defendants argued Amendment 2 “deters factionalism” because it “simply
seeks to ensure that the deeply divisive issue of homosexuality does not serve to
fragment Colorado’s body politic.”91 Settling things at the statewide level
“eliminates city-by-city and county-by-county battles over the political issue of
homosexuality and bisexuality.”92 Thus, Amendment 2 “serves a compelling
interest by ending political fragmentation and promoting statewide uniformity
on this issue.”93 (As I discuss in Part IV, promoting national uniformity was an
asserted rationale in litigation over DOMA.) The district court concluded that the
U.S. Supreme Court cases defendants cited to show that “‘factionalism’ means
‘political fragmentation’ over a controversial political issue” actually treated this
supposed “factionalism” as “a great strength of the American political process.”94
Thus, given the Court’s language about how “‘competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process”95 and First
Amendment freedoms, “the opposite of defendants’ first claimed compelling
interest is most probably compelling.”96
The gist of the defendants’ second asserted compelling state interest –
preserving the State’s political function – was that Colorado’s political functions
were at risk of being “overrun” by the “homosexual agenda” and “the
homosexual push for ‘protected status.’”97 (In Part III, I explore parallel
arguments made about the need for DOMA.) Tony Marco, founder of Colorado
for Family Values (CFV), testified that Amendment 2 “was his idea” and “was a
defensive measure to fend off state-wide militant gay aggression.”98 Marco used
the term “militant gay aggression,” the court noted, “no less than six times in his
direct testimony alone.”99 Other CFV officials testified to Amendment 2’s
purpose of preventing government from declaring homosexuals are entitled to
protected class status, out of concern that, “absent Amendment 2, affirmative

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at C-4 (citing Defendants’ Trial Brief pp. 3-4).
Id. at C-14.
Id. at C-4 to C-5 (quoting Defendants’ Trial Brief, pp. 60-61).
Id. at C-5 (quoting Defendants’ Trial Brief, pp. 60-61).
Id. at C-4 to C-5 (quoting Defendants’ Trial Brief, pp. 60-61).
Id. at C-5.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 802, (1983)).
Id. at C-6.
Id.
Id. at C-7.
Id. at C-6.
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action programs for homosexuals would somehow be implemented in
Colorado.”100 Defendants contended that the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution gave them the power to amend their state constitution and, once the
people voted for Amendment 2, “that vote should end the discussion.”101
Judge Bayless concluded that while Article II of the Colorado Constitution
vests political power of the state in the people and gives them the right “to alter
and abolish their constitution and form of government whenever they may deem
it necessary to their safety and happiness,” there is a limit to that power:
“provided, such change be not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.”102
Here Judge Bayless quoted the portion of Evans I in which the Colorado Supreme
Court invoked Barnette and stated that while voter initiatives as an expression of
popular will are entitled to “great deference,” fundamental rights “may not be
submitted to vote” and do not depend on “the outcome” of elections.103 The
Colorado Supreme Court had also cited to a U.S. Supreme Court case involving a
Colorado measure, in which the Court stated: “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights
can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that
i[t]be.”104
Applying this framework, Judge Bayless found that “the evidence presented
does not satisfy this court that there is a militant gay aggression in this state
which endangers the state’s political functions,” or that “homosexuals and
bisexuals are going to be found to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class and
afforded protections based on these classifications.”105 Thus, defendants failed to
establish that their second asserted interest was compelling.106
The third asserted compelling state interest, preserving the ability to
remedy discrimination against groups “which had been held to be suspect
classes,” also failed. Defendants presented two witnesses “to testify that without
Amendment 2 there would be a dilution of protections afforded to existing
suspect classes;” another witness testified that adding “gays” to civil rights
ordinances “would lessen the public’s respect for historic civil rights
categories.”107 (This appeal to public respect has some resonance for arguments
in 2013 (discussed in Part IV) that allowing same-sex marriage would harm the
status of marriage as an institution by changing its meaning.) The court,
however, found more credible testimony by anti-discrimination law compliance
officers who stated that enforcing Denver’s ordinance “does not detract from
enforcing other aspects of the same ordinance.”108 Moreover, evidence from
Wisconsin, the first state to “enact statutory prohibitions against discrimination
100. Id. at C-6 to C-7 (describing testimony of Kevin Tebedo, paid executive director of CFV).
101. Id. at C-7.
102. Id. at C-7 (quoting Evans I, 854 P.2d. at 1272) (quoting the Colorado Constitution, Art. 2 § 2).
103. Id. at C-8 (quoting Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1286 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 US 624, 638 (1943))).
104. Id. (citing Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1286 (citing Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377
U.S. 713, 736 (1964))).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at C-9.
108. Id.
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based on sexual orientation,” was that “sexual orientation cases” under
Wisconsin’s statutes “are a very small percentage of the total case load and have
not limited enforcement of other parts of the . . . statutes in any way.”109 By
contrast, defendants offered “opinion and theory as to what would occur if a
Denver type ordinance were adopted as a state statute,” yet, no such statute
existed in Colorado or was proposed, and evidence of actual experience with
civil rights ordinances contradicted their claims.110 Judge Bayless also noted “a
very real question as to whether fiscal concerns may rise to the level of a
compelling interest,” given prior Supreme Court cases rejecting appeals to fiscal
concerns as a rationale for denying fundamental rights and even – in Plyler v. Doe
– for denying less than fundamental rights (e.g., education) to a nonsuspect class
(e.g., undocumented aliens).111
Of particular interest for subsequent reliance on Romer is the trial court’s
disposition of defendants’ fourth alleged compelling interest: “prevention of
governmental interference with personal, familial and religious privacy.”112 On
the religious privacy claim, the court noted testimony by a pastor from Boulder’s
Second Baptist Church about the “possible impact of Boulder’s ordinance on his
church in view of the fact that there is no religious exception under that
ordinance.”113 A director of a boys’ ranch in Wisconsin testified about his
experience under Wisconsin’s antidiscrimination law “as it related to
employment by homosexuals.”114
The district court stated that “preserving religious freedom is a compelling
state interest,” evident in protections in the federal and Colorado constitutions.115
Defendants “urged” the “religious belief” that “homosexuals are condemned by
scripture,” so that “discrimination based on that religious teaching is protected
within freedom of religion.”116 Plaintiffs, however, had a “competing interest,”
the fundamental right to participate in the political process, upon which
Amendment 2 infringed. In Bob Jones University v. United States, Judge Bayless
observed, the Supreme Court discussed “protecting religious freedom in the
context of competing governmental interests,”117 ruling that government had a
compelling interest in ending racial discrimination that outweighed any burden
denial of a tax exemption posed to a university with racially discriminatory
policies.118 Judge Bayless concluded the two rights at issue could co-exist by
adding a religious exemption to the Boulder ordinance, such as those already in
the Aspen and Denver ordinances. Thus, Amendment 2 was not narrowly drawn
to protect religious freedom.119
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at C-10 (citing Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at C-11.
Id. at C-10.
Id. at C-10 to C-11.
Id. at C-12.
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Family privacy was another asserted compelling interest. This interest also
lost because Amendment 2 lacked narrow tailoring. In so ruling, the court made
some intriguing observations about family definition, family values, and “profamily” measures. It first notes testimony by Robert Knight, Director of Cultural
Studies of the still-active Family Research Council, a “pro-family lobbying
organization.”120 Knight, an “opponent of the gay rights movement,” testified
that “gay rights advocates are seeking to destroy the family by, in part, seeking
to remove special societal protections from the family.”121 The court observed
that Mr. Knight neither offered a definition of “family” nor was asked to provide
one.122 Assuming the family consists of a married mother and father and their
children, what other forms, the court asked, are a “family”? “More importantly,”
the court questioned whether Amendment 2, which infringed upon a
fundamental right, “narrowly promote[s] the goal of promoting family values,”
suggesting that “if one wished to promote family values, action would be taken
that is pro-family rather than anti some other group.”123 Because defendants
failed to tie denying gays and bisexuals their right to political participation to
protecting the family, they failed to meet their burden on this alleged interest.
Defendants’ personal privacy interest also failed. They did not adequately
establish whether it was a compelling state interest, explain what it meant, or
how Amendment 2 threatened it, leaving the court to speculate.124
The fifth proffered compelling interest was preventing government from
“subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group.”125 The court
observed that defendants’ “strongest argument” was that if a landlord “is forced
to rent an apartment to a homosexual couple, the landlord is being forced to
accept, at least implicitly, a particular ideology.”126 However, the defendants
offered “no authority. . . for this fairly remarkable conclusion” and this “claimed
compelling interest” was not supported by “any credible evidence or “any
cogent argument.”127 Finally, the court considered the sixth interest, “promotion
of the physical and psychological well-being of children.”128 This asserted
interest, I elaborate in Part IV, recurs in contemporary debates about marriage
equality. The court quoted defendants’ argument: “The state has a compelling
interest in supporting the traditional family because without it, our children are
condemned to a higher incidence of social maladies such as substance abuse,
poverty, violence, criminality, greater burdens upon government, and
perpetuation of the underclass.”129
The court first observed that, “if the compelling interest relates to protecting
120. Id. FRC has been an active opponent of marriage equality. See infra Part IV for discussion of
its amicus brief filed in Windsor.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at C-13.
125.Id.
126. Id. (citing Defendants’ Trial Brief p. 69).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Defendants’ Trial Brief p. 74).
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children physically from pedophiles” (a concern raised in the campaign for
Amendment 2), then testimony by a witness for plaintiffs that “pedophiles are
predominantly heterosexuals not homosexual” is “more persuasive than
anything presented by defendants.”130 The court also failed to discern how
Amendment 2 promotes the psychological well-being and welfare of homosexual
youth by “allowing discrimination against them by virtue of the Colorado
Constitution.”131
Given that only two of the defendants’ asserted interests were compelling
and that Amendment 2 was not narrowly drawn to promote those two interests
“in the least restrictive manner possible,” the court therefore concluded that
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional.
The court went on to note that plaintiffs requested it to rule on two
additional matters still pertinent today: (1) their argument that homosexuals and
bisexuals are either a suspect or quasi-suspect class and entitled to strict or
heightened scrutiny for that reason; and (2) that Amendment 2 could not survive
a rational basis test.132 The court noted that, “in order to persuade the court” on
the first matter, “plaintiffs filled the witness stand with doctors, psychiatrists,
genetic explorers, historians, philosophers, and political scientists. Having
chosen to present these types of witnesses, defendants felt obliged to respond in
kind.”133 The court turned to the 9th Circuit opinion, High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office, and Supreme Court precedents for guidance
about whether a class is suspect or quasi-suspect.134 It found: “in applying these
standards to homosexuals and bisexuals, no appellate court has yet found them
to be either a ‘suspect’ or quasi-suspect class.”135
Turning to the evidence presented, the court observed that all of the
“suspect and quasi-suspect classes . . . are inborn,” while defendants countered
that homosexuality or bisexuality is “either a choice, or its origin has multiple
aspects or its origin is unknown.”136 The court concluded, however, that “the
ultimate decision of ‘nature’ vs. ‘nurture’ is a decision for another forum, not this
court, and the court makes no determination on this issue.”137
Drawing on similar conclusions in High Tech Gays, the court concluded that
“there is a history of discrimination against gays,” but it could not conclude,
however, “that homosexuals and bisexuals remain vulnerable or politically
powerless and in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process’ in today’s society.”138 As evidence, the court pointed out that

130. Id. (citing testimony by Dr. Carole Jenny, Denver’s Children’s Hospital).
131. Id. at C-13 to C-14.
132. Id. at C-14.
133. Id. at C-15.
134. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Bowen v. Giliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-603 (1987)).
135. Id. at C-16 (citing numerous cases, including High Tech Gays and Ben-Shalom v. March, 881
F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989)).
136. Id. at C-17.
137. Id.
138. Id. at C-17 to C-18.
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46% of Coloradans voted against Amendment 2.139 Since “testimony placed the
percentage of homosexuals in our society at not more than 4%,” the court
reasoned that “if 4% of the population gathers the support of an additional 42%
of the population, that is a demonstration of power, not powerlessness.”140 In
brief: “Failure to prevail on an issue in an election, such as Amendment 2 is not a
demonstration of political powerlessness.”141 Further, trial evidence showed
“there is no identifiable majority in American politics. . . . [P]olitical majorities
are formed through the process of coalition building” issue by issue, or election
by election, and “gays and bisexuals though small in number are skilled at
building coalitions which is the key to political power.”142 Thus, “[n]o adequate
showing has been made of the political vulnerability or powerlessness of
gays.”143
The court briefly dispensed with plaintiffs’ argument that homosexuals and
bisexuals are a quasi-suspect class. Judge Bayless noted that “[c]ase law has not
clearly differentiated between the elements” for suspect and quasi-suspect status,
and that plaintiffs failed to show the application of these elements to
homosexuals and bisexuals.144
Finally, the court declined to honor plaintiffs’ request to evaluate
Amendment 2 using the rational basis test. Given the Colorado Supreme Court’s
ruling that Amendment 2 “invades a fundamental right of an identifiable
group,” triggering strict scrutiny, the court “declines to apply a legally
inappropriate test.”145 Although plaintiffs pointed out that, in two recent cases,
federal courts concluded there was “no rational basis for excluding homosexuals
from the military,”146 “[t]hese cases do not impact on the present decision
because of the fundamental right involved in the present case and the necessarily
different standard of review.”147
4. The Colorado Supreme Court Affirms the Permanent Injunction (Evans II)
After Governor Romer and the other public defendants appealed Judge
Bayless’s issuance of a permanent injunction against Amendment 2, the Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed in Evans v. Romer (Evans II). It reiterated (as in Evans
I) that Amendment 2 violated the fundamental right to participate in the political
process. The court again cited United States Supreme Court precedents to stress
that Amendment 2 offended Equal Protection by fencing out or singling out an
identifiable class of persons.148 Thus, it declined defendants’ invitation to
reconsider its holding that strict scrutiny was the proper standard by which to
139. Id. at C-18.
140. Id. at C-18.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at C-18 to C-19.
145. Id. at C-19.
146. Id. (discussing Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993) and Steffan v.
Apsin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
147. Id. at C-20.
148. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-41 (Colo. 1994) (en banc).
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review Amendment 2. 149 It observed that because plaintiffs had not appealed
the trial court’s rejection of their argument that gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
should be found to be either a suspect or quasi-suspect class, “we do not address
it.”150 Noting that the trial court also declined plaintiffs’ request to apply a
rational basis test, the reviewing court simply observed that because it reaffirmed
its conclusion about strict scrutiny, it would not analyze the law under rational
basis.151
Turning to defendants’ assertion that several compelling state interests
would sustain Amendment 2 from constitutional invalidity, the Colorado
Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s rulings on these interests de novo.152
The court began with defendants’ asserted interest in “protecting the sanctity of
religious, familial, and personal privacy.”153 Echoing the trial court, the high
court acknowledged that “ensuring religious freedom is a compelling
governmental interest,” protected in the federal and Colorado constitutions, but
that Amendment 2 lacked narrow tailoring.154 Including “exceptions for
religiously-based objections” in antidiscrimination laws (as Denver did) would
be “an equally effective, and substantially less onerous way” of protecting
religious liberty.155 Even a witness for defendants testified that exemptions
“would be less restrictive than Amendment 2 and would adequately address any
concerns about religious liberty.”156
Defendants’ asserted compelling interest in “familial privacy” characterized
such privacy as “the right ‘of some parents to teach traditional moral values’ to
their children,” citing “authority recognizing the sanctity of the family and the
central role the family plays in society.”157 Antidiscrimination laws, defendants
argued, “‘severely undermine[]’” familial privacy because “‘[i]f a child hears one
thing from his parents and the exact opposite message from the government,
parental authority will inevitably be undermined.’”158 Essentially, this argument
is that the values promoted by government and by families must be congruent
and that parents are entitled to have the state reinforce parental values through
public laws and education.159 The court, however, concluded that “this argument
fails because it rests on the assumption that the right of familial privacy
engenders an interest in having government endorse certain values as moral or

149. Id. at 1341.
150. Id. at 1341 n.3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1341.
153. Id. at 1342.
154. Id. at 1342-43.
155. Id. at 1343.
156. Id. at 1343.
157. Id. (citing, for example, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) and
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
158. Id. The claims resonate with the parental and religious liberty objections to marriage
equality, discussed infra in Part II.D.
159. See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
VIRTUES 116-45 (2013) (discussing congruence between the values promoted by government and
those promoted by families in the context of education).
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immoral.”160 While parents have a constitutionally protected interest in
“inculcating their children with their own values,” defendants cited no authority
giving parents “the corresponding right of insuring that government endorse
those values.”161 Instead, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the individual’s right to profess or practice certain moral or religious beliefs
does not entail a right to have government itself reinforce or follow those beliefs
or practices.”162 Further, government “does not burden an individual’s
constitutional rights merely because it endorses views with which that
individual may disagree.”163
The court concluded that, “fully recognizing that parents have a ‘privacy’
right to instruct their children that homosexuality is immoral, . . . nothing in the
laws or policies which Amendment 2 is intended to prohibit interferes with that
right.”164 Parents “retain full authority” – with or without Amendment 2 – to
“express their views about homosexuality to their children.” Thus, Amendment 2
is “neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to preserve familial privacy.”165
The meaning of the “‘personal privacy’” defendants assert as a compelling
interest is “not entirely clear,” the court next observed, but seems to refer to the
“right of ‘associational privacy’ which will be impaired,” without Amendment 2,
“because individuals may be forced to associate with gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals in the rental of housing.”166 The court looked to Roberts v. Jaycees for
guidance as to what type of associations this right protects, noting that they are
“distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in the decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”167 The court concluded that
“while preserving associational privacy may rise to the level of a compelling
state interest, Amendment 2 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”168
The amendment “would forbid governmental entities from prohibiting
discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals (because they are gay,
lesbian, or bisexual) in all aspects of commercial and public life, no matter how
impersonal.”169 Further, it “affects a vast array of affiliations” that lack the
qualities Roberts noted and seem “remote from the concerns giving rise” to
constitutional protection.170 A narrower way to avoid a conflict between
antidiscrimination laws and associational privacy rights “would be to exempt the
sort of intimate associations identified in Roberts from the scope of such laws,”

160. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1343.
161. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) for the parental interest in
inculcating values in children).
162. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) as an example of such a holding).
163. Id. at 1344 (citing Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1312–14 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) and Ry.
Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945)).
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e.g., give landlords a “Mrs. Murphy Boarding House” exemption.171 The court
observed that Denver’s antidiscrimination ordinance exempts certain dwelling
units.172
The court next considered, and rejected, defendants’ assertion that
Amendment 2 serves a compelling interest because it “is an appropriate means
whereby the people sought to focus government’s limited resources upon those
circumstances most warranting attention.”173 The court stated: “[i]t is well-settled
that the preservation of fiscal resources, administrative convenience, and the
reduction of the workload of governmental bodies are not compelling state
interests.”174 Nonetheless, even assuming some “legitimate” state interest in
“preserving fiscal resources” for enforcing civil rights laws “intended to protect
suspect classes,” and recognizing that “combating discrimination against racial
minorities and women may constitute a compelling governmental interest,”
Amendment 2 is “not necessary to achieve these goals.”175 As evidence, the court
cited testimony by the chief enforcement officers of Denver’s and Wisconsin’s
civil rights laws.176 Finally, the court concluded that “[e]ven if protecting gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination has some fiscal impact,”
Amendment 2 is “not narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” since measures,
such as ear-marking funds, could offer some protection without “denying the
right of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from participating equally in the
political process.”177
The court next evaluated an asserted compelling interest with considerable
resonance for the marriage equality debates discussed in Part IV: Amendment 2
“‘promotes the compelling governmental interest of allowing the people
themselves to establish public social and moral norms.’”178 Defendants “define[d]
two related norms” promoted by Amendment 2: it “preserves heterosexual
families and heterosexual marriage and, more generally, it sends the societal
message condemning gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals as immoral.”179 The court
noted that there was “some dispute” between the parties about whether the
interest in “public morality” was properly before the court since “morality” was
not listed either “in the state’s disclosure certificate or the state’s opening
statement at trial as a separate interest supporting Amendment 2.”180 However,
the court found “sufficient” to raise the rationale below and on appeal the
mention, in defendants’ trial brief, that “‘the issue of public morality . . .
permeates the discussion of compelling interests and indeed, can be regarded as

171. Id. at 1345.
172. Id.
173. Id. (internal citations omitted).
174. Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) and other cases). Reed was the first case in
the Court’s modern sex discrimination jurisprudence.
175. Id. at 1345–46.
176. Id. at 1346.
177. Id.
178. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (internal citations omitted)..
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1346 n. 11.
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a compelling interest in its own right.’”181
In support of this public morality interest, defendants cited to Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, where the United States Supreme Court upheld a public indecency
statute that prohibited nude dancing.182 The court rejected the reliance on Barnes,
since it referred to a “‘substantial government interest in protecting order and
morality’” and the fifth vote was provided by Justice Souter, who disavowed
reliance “‘on the possible sufficiency of society’s moral views to justify” the law,
instead defining the relevant “substantial interest” as “‘combating the secondary
effects of adult entertainment establishments.’”183 The Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that, “at most,” Colorado’s promotion of “public morality” was a
“substantial interest,” not compelling; thus, it was “not sufficient to render
constitutional a law which infringes on a fundamental right.”184
The fit between Amendment 2 and “protecting public morals” was another
problem. The court’s reasoning warrants quotation, given a newer generation of
arguments about public morality in marriage equality litigation:
[I]t is clear to us that Amendment 2 is not necessary to preserve heterosexual
families, marriage, or to express disapproval of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals.
First, we reject defendants’ suggestion that laws prohibiting discrimination
against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals will undermine marriages and
heterosexual families because married heterosexuals will “choose” to “become
homosexual” if discrimination against homosexuals is prohibited. This assertion
flies in the face of the empirical evidence presented at trial on marriage and
divorce rates.185

The court also rejected defendants’ “endorsement” argument: that
antidiscrimination laws undermine “marriage and heterosexual families
because” they “implicitly endorse that conduct which is deemed an improper
basis for discrimination.”186 The court countered that “antidiscrimination laws
make no assumptions about the morality of protected classes – they simply
recognize that certain characteristics, be they moral or immoral – have no
relevance in enumerated commercial contexts.”187 The court gave the example of
a law prohibiting “employers from discriminating against anyone engaged in
off-duty, legal conduct such as smoking tobacco.”188 Rather than “an
endorsement of any particular sexual orientation or practices,”
antidiscrimination law’s message is that certain refusals, denials, and sanctions
undertaken “in commercial contexts based on sexual orientation are not

181. Id.
182. Id. at 1347 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) to support the view that
“protection of morality constitutes a compelling governmental interest”).
183. Id. (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring)) (emphasis added by Colorado
Supreme Court).
184. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 437 U.S. 202, 217 (1982)).
185. Id. (noting that the divorce rate in Wisconsin declined after the state enacted the “oldest ‘gay
rights’ law in the nation”).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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appropriate ways of advancing even valid moral beliefs.”189 This argument about
the message law sends takes new forms by the time of the Windsor litigation.
The court considered and rejected two proffered interests concerning the
political process: Amendment 2 “‘prevents government from supporting the
political objectives of a special interest group’” and “‘serves to deter factionalism
through ensuring that decisions regarding special protections for homosexuals
and bisexuals are made at the highest level of government.’”190 On the first
interest, the court interpreted the defendants’ argument to be that the
antidiscrimination laws that Amendment 2 was “intended to prohibit” were “an
implicit endorsement of homosexuality” and thus “somehow vitiates the right of
individuals ‘to make their own judgments on this question’”191 The court again
rejected the argument that antidiscrimination laws “constitute an endorsement of
the characteristics” deemed “an unlawful basis upon which to discriminate
against individuals.”192
More importantly, defendants lacked supporting authority for their “rather
remarkable proposition that government has a compelling interest in seeing that
the state does not support the political objectives of a ‘special interest group.’”193
To the contrary, “the state exists for the very purpose of implementing the
political objectives of the governed so long as that can be done consistently with
the constitution.”194 Further, since “virtually any law could be regarded as a
benefit to a ‘special interest group,” if the court found defendants’ argument had
merit, then “the compelling state interest defined would justify striking down
almost any legislative enactment imaginable.”195
The factionalism argument also failed. As did the trial court, the Colorado
Supreme Court reasoned that although defendants justified Amendment 2 as
ending political fragmentation and shutting down political debate on a “deeply
divisive issue” city-by-city and county-by-county by resolving matters, political
debate is not an evil but “the foundation of democracy.”196 Thus, “[w]e fail to see
how the state, which is charged with serving the will of the people, can have any
legitimate interest in preventing one side of a controversial debate from pressing
its case before governmental bodies simply because it would prefer to avoid
political controversy or ‘factionalism.’”197
Defendants unsuccessfully employed Bowers v. Hardwick to attempt to sever
from Amendment 2 the provisions pertaining to “sexual orientation,” on the
evident logic that Hardwick upholds the use of criminal law to ban homosexual
conduct.198 The court instead held that the four characteristics listed in

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
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Amendment 2 – “sexual orientation; conduct; practices, and relationships” – are
“not truly severable from one another because each provides nothing more than
a different way of identifying the same class of persons.”199 It is irrelevant that,
pursuant to Hardwick, “there is no constitutionally recognized right to engage in
homosexual sodomy.”200 It does not follow that if it is constitutional to
criminalize homosexual sodomy, then government may also deny “an
independent fundamental right” of “an identifiable group (who may or may not
engage in homosexual sodomy) to participate equally in the political process.”201
Defendants also unsuccessfully appealed to the Tenth Amendment,
contending that, even if Amendment 2 conflicted with the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was a “constitutionally valid exercise of the people’s reserved
powers under the Tenth Amendment.” The court reiterated: “States have no
compelling interest in amending their constitution in ways that violate
fundamental federal rights.”202 In support, the court cited to United States
Supreme Court cases rejecting (in Reitman) any “reserved power” by the state to
make a “right to discriminate a part of the state’s basic charter” and asserting (in
Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly) that: “A citizen’s constitutional rights can
hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”203
In concurring, Justice Scott argued that the permanent injunction should be
upheld under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a ground asserted in plaintiffs’ initial complaint, because
Amendment 2 “impermissibly burdens the right ‘peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances,’ a right guaranteed to every
citizen.”204 Particularly striking is that Justice Scott quoted Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy, which will later appear as the opening line in Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Romer: “every individual is promised full citizenship under a
written Constitution which, as Justice Harlan opined, ‘neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.’”205
Justice Erickson dissented, as he did in Evans I, and on similar grounds: the
majority had “crafted a new fundamental right that had never been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court” and rested, instead, on a misreading of
Supreme Court precedent confined to cases about racial minorities and racial
classifications.206 The majority also overlooked that it was reviewing “a
constitutional Amendment adopted by the people of the State of Colorado.”207

199. Id. at 1349–50.
200. Id. at 1350.
201. Id.
202. Id. The court also distinguishes the case on which defendants rely, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991), because it “applies only to cases involving federal interference with the qualification
of constitutional officers.” Id.
203. Id. (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) and Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 736–37 (1964)).
204. Id. at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
205. Id. at 1351-1352 (Scott, J., concurring (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1895))). See
Part II. F.
206. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1356–57 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1356.
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Instead, he would have used a rational relation standard, under which
Amendment 2’s classification should be “upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”208 Erickson drew on Supreme Court
precedents to emphasize the heavy burden of succeeding on a rational basis
challenge.209 He cited Heller v. Doe by Doe to assert that a classification “cannot
run afoul of the Equal Protection clause if there is a rational relationship between
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”210
In light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Romer, it is notable
that, to his many citations supporting deferential review, Judge Erickson added a
parenthetical “but see” reference to Cleburne, where the Court, using “rational
basis review,” struck down the zoning law in question “because the law was
based on the ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”211 He also
quoted Supreme Court precedent explaining the reason for the great deference
accorded to articulated reasons: “The Constitution presumes that, absent some
reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified
by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has
acted.” 212 The quoted passage continues: “[w]e will not overturn such a statute
unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination or legitimate purposes that we can only
conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.”213 In briefing before the
U.S. Supreme Court, both sides appealed to this same language about antipathy
and legitimate purposes, making different arguments as to whether “some
reason to infer antipathy” or “irrational” legislative actions existed.214
Judge Erickson then concluded that “at least three interests” put forth in
support of Amendment 2 satisfied the legitimate state interest/rationally related
test: (1) preventing government from interfering with religious privacy; (2)
promoting state-wide uniformity; and (3) allocating resources.215 On the first
interest, Justice Erickson began with encomiums to religious freedom.216 Then,
recognizing that “not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional,” since “[e]ven
the highest values, including religious freedom, must sometimes give way to the
greater public good,” he argued that substantial burdens on religious practices

208. Id. at 1357–60 (citing Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 307
(1993)).
209. Id. at 1361 (citing, inter alia, Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) and Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
210. Id. at 1360 (citing Heller, 509 U.S at 320).
211. Id. at 1361 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985)).
212. Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
213. Id.
214. Compare Brief for Petitioners, Romer v Evans at 19, 39, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 17008429 (citing
Vance, 440 U.S. at 97) with Brief for Respondents, Romer v Evans at 17, 36, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL
417786 (citing Vance, 440 U.S. at 97).
215. Romer, 882 P. 2d at 1362–66.
216. Id. at 1363.
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require a “compelling governmental interest.”217 He found that Amendment 2
bears a rational relationships to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting
religious freedom, noting that the state gave several examples (from Aspen and
Boulder) where individuals or groups “were forced to set aside their religious
beliefs based on legislative enactments protecting homosexuals” in hiring
decisions and in opening their facilities to homosexual organizations.218
The dissent also concluded that statewide uniformity is a legitimate interest
rationally advanced by Amendment 2, given that “the public is deeply divided
over the issue of homosexuality,” a “matter of statewide concern.”219 In a
footnote, the dissent distinguished matters on which there is a “national
consensus” that discrimination is wrong – race and sex – from “the issue of
homosexuality and bisexuality,” which is “deeply controversial and divisive.”220
While “a series of constitutional amendments and acts of Congress have
authoritatively settled the place of race and sex in American life,” the “same
simply cannot be said of non-traditional sexual orientation.”221
The dissent also argued that “civil rights has never been the type of concern
reserved exclusively for local governments,” and that the voters of Colorado,
through Amendment 2, indicated they “wanted a statewide resolution of the
issue that had formerly only been locally regulated and subject to great
debate.”222 The dissent spoke of a “right” of citizens “to the initiative process” to
resolve “conflicts between municipal and local governments when the issue is a
matter of statewide concern and the process is not repugnant to the
constitution.”223 Indeed, the Supreme Court “has noted that ‘referendums
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.’”224
Moreover, Professor Harvey Mansfield testified that using the initiative process
to enact Amendment 2 “supported stability and respect for the political process,
by giving ‘the people a sense that . . . government is not alien to them, and that
they can get together by their own initiative . . . to produce a result that gives
them a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment.’”225
On the issue of scarce resources, the dissent cited evidence of “steadily
increasing demands upon a shrinking budget,” and “complaints from the black
community that claims were not being thoroughly investigated and
prosecuted.”226 Thus, “the state . . . reasonably postulates that law requiring the
protection of an additional group would further stretch scarce resources, and
Amendment 2 protects the civil rights enforcement for traditionally suspect
groups.”227
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990)).
Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1364 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id. (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
Id. at 1364 n.8.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
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Erickson also referred to testimony that adding homosexuals to civil rights
statutes or ordinances “would lessen the public’s respect for historic civil rights
categories,” and thus, Amendment 2 furthered the state’s legitimate interest in
“ensuring that the traditionally suspect classes remain respected.”228 Erickson
cited testimony by a former civil rights commission chairman that by contrast to
the “traditionally suspect classes, “homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals are a
relatively politically powerful and privileged special interest group,” and, thus,
including them “would represent a ‘drastic departure’ from the historical aims of
the civil rights laws.”229 This theme of power and privilege returns in Justice
Scalia’s Romer dissent, as well as in much of the briefing in support of the State of
Colorado.
C. Proceedings before the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the certiorari petition of the Colorado
public defendants. In this section, I analyze several prominent themes in the
friend of the court briefs submitted to the Court in support of petitioners and
respondents. Because the U.S. Supreme Court did not rely on the fundamental
right to participate in the political process as the rationale for invalidating
Amendment 2, arguments about this right are not my central concern. Instead, I
highlight arguments about law as a vehicle to express moral disapproval and
promote morality and family and how they bear on related arguments, such as
appeals to religious liberty and disputes over whether sexual orientation is a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. This discussion will set the stage for a comparison
of amicus briefs submitted in the recent Windsor litigation.
D. Arguments Made in Amicus Curiae Briefs Filed in Support of Petitioners
(Supporting Amendment 2)
Petitioners’ amici articulated several lines of argument, which I will discuss
thematically, rather than brief-by-brief.230 Supporters of petitioners rejected the
Colorado Supreme Court’s argument that Amendment 2 violated a fundamental
right to participate in the political process and contended that the strict scrutiny
test was not appropriate, since Amendment 2 did not classify based on race or
any other traditionally suspect class. Amici focused especially on the rights of
Colorado voters to establish their own laws – and promote moral values –
through the political process. Bowers featured as a support for this argument. A
corollary to this right was a fear that LGBT groups were gaining too much
political power in Colorado. Amici argued that Amendment 2 served several
legitimate state interests and, thus, could survive constitutional scrutiny.
1. Promoting Morality and Protecting the Family against Homosexuality
Colorado for Family Values (CFV) was, as it explained its interest in its

228. Id. at 1365-66 (citing to testimony by Professor Joseph Broadus).
229. Id. at 1366 (citing testimony of Ignacio Rodridguez, former Civil Rights Commission
Chairman).
230. There were nine amicus briefs filed in support of petitioners.
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amicus brief, “the grassroots organization which initiated and campaigned for
the passage of Colorado’s Amendment 2.”231 CFV “believes that states have the
power to pass a wide variety of laws to protect the family and community
morality . . . .”232 Thus, after CFV successfully kept a local ordinance “conferring
minority status upon homosexuals” from passing in Colorado Springs:
CFV turned its attention to a movement in the State of Colorado to legitimate
homosexuality through pro-homosexual municipal ordinances. Concerned with
the effect that government legitimization of homosexuality would have on the
traditional family and community morality, CFV began a campaign to put on the
ballot an initiative which would prevent the state, its agencies, or political
subdivisions from granting special protections to homosexuals.233

The brief does not elaborate on the “why” of this Amendment beyond the
initial assertion that CFV acted to protect the family and morality from the
“legitimization” of homosexuality. Other amicus briefs filed in support of
petitioners elaborated the argument that the aim of Amendment 2 was to
promote or protect traditional morality and the family and that the U.S.
constitutional scheme amply supports such use of the law. For example,
Concerned Women for America (CWA) argued that Amendment 2 protects
public morality because homosexuality encourages “‘irresponsible liaisons
beyond the bonds of marriage,’” and a majority of Coloradans believes that
homosexual behavior is immoral.234 Government, CWA argued, may voice
approval and disapproval of both conduct (liaisons) and of ideas (quoting Scalia,
it may “praise the monogamous family”).235 Homosexuality cannot be divorced
from homosexual conduct, CWA argued, comparing the anti-sodomy law
upheld in Bowers to laws regulating other actions considered to be immoral, such
as prostitution.236 CWA’s logic will recur in Justice Scalia’s Romer dissent: “It
follows that if Colorado may criminalize sodomy, and may criticize the morality
of homosexual conduct while praising heterosexual marriage, it may
constitutionally preclude the adoption of special homosexual rights laws.”237
CWA relied on the contention of Professor John Finnis (an expert witness in
the Amendment 2 trial) that the “special homosexual rights laws” that
Amendment 2 repealed would “preclude any government disapproval of
homosexual behavior, with significant consequences for heterosexual marriage

231. Brief for Colorado for Family Values as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter CFV Brief].
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2.
234. Brief for Concerned Women for America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15
–16, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter CWA Brief]. The quoted language in text is from
the Supreme Court’s famous case, Weber v. Aetna Casualty, 406 U.S. 164 (1972), which involved
classifications based on illegitimacy. This is an odd choice since Weber ruled that the state could not
pursue that goal of discouraging irresponsibility by punishing children who bore no responsibility
for the circumstances of their birth!
235. Id. at 15 (citing Black v Meese, 793 F. 2d 1303, 1313 D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021
(1986) (Scalia, J.)).
236. Id. at 10–11.
237. Id. at 15.
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and other state policies, such as adoption.”238 They quoted Finnis’s elaboration of
this claim, which has reverberations in the more recent debates over changing
marriage laws:
[T]he adoption of a law framed to prohibit “discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation” would require the prompt abandonment of all attempts by the
political community to discourage homosexual conduct by means of educational
policies, restrictions of prostitution, non-recognition of homosexual marriages,
and so forth. It is judged (and in my view soundly) that the law itself would
perforce have changed from teaching, in many ways, that homosexual conduct is
bad to teaching, massively, that it is a type of sexual activity as good as any other
(and per se much less involved with onerous responsibilities than is the sexual
union of husband and wife or, in perhaps other ways, the life of those who live in
unmarried chastity).239

CWA asserted the state’s interest in “protecting public morality” is not only
“legitimate,” but “substantial” and “compelling.” It invoked Supreme Court
precedents upholding the police power of the states to provide for public health,
safety, and morals, including through bans on polygamy, obscenity, and public
indecency. It quoted at length from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Barnes v. Glen
Theater on society’s prohibition of activities not because they are harmful but
because they are considered “immoral,” “contra bonos mores” (offering the
examples of “sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use,
prostitution, and sodomy”).240 CWA also cited to Lord Devlin as among other
“legal philosophers” who have “reached the same conclusion.”241 Thus, it
concluded, “conduct cannot be viewed in isolation from its effect on society’s
moral consensus.”242
Turning to laws specifically concerning homosexuality, CWA argued that
Bowers found law based on “moral determination” not only “rational” but
“necessary” and concluded that “moral disapproval” was sufficient to sustain
Georgia’s criminal ban on sodomy. 243 CWA cited the majority opinion’s famous
statement that the “presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” was a rational basis for
Georgia’s sodomy law, since “the law . . . is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed.”244
CWA argued that an Equal Protection review of Amendment 2 should yield
the same result as in Bowers. Quoting a Judge Bork opinion, CWA asserted that
238. Id.
239. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Finnis, professor of law and legal philosophy at Oxford University).
240. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added) (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
241. Id. at 12 (citing P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 8, 13 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959)).
242. Id. at 12-13.
243. Id. at 12.
244. Id. at 13 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196). Georgia’s law banned all forms of sodomy, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, but the Court construed the law and the moral disapproval
rationale as if it specifically expressed condemnation of homosexual sodomy. .
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“much of our most valued legislation” reflects “legislative majorities [that] have
made moral choices contrary to the desires of minorities,” and that the “ultimate
justification” for most laws “rest upon the society’s morality.”245 CWA argued
(relying on Finnis) that “disapproving homosexual conduct” is a legitimate
interest and one threatened by “special homosexual rights laws.”246 It is an
“empirical fact,” CWA asserted, that “a majority of Americans, and obviously a
majority of Colorado voters, believe homosexual behavior is immoral.”247 That
Amendment 2 passed evidences that the “majority of Colorado voters . . . found
it [homosexuality] lacking morality.”248 As discussed below, CWA distinguished
characteristics like race or sex from homosexuality because the latter involves a
“characteristic or behavior that is subject to moral assessment.”249
Finally, CWA argued Amendment 2 furthered a “legitimate interest in
promoting marriage and heterosexual families,” again citing Weber’s language
concerning a society’s “right” to condemn “irresponsible liaisons beyond the
bonds of marriage” and to attach negative consequences to such liaisons.250
CWA also cited to cases upholding less favorable treatment of unmarried
couples than married ones.251 Given that same-sex couples were, at that time,
precluded from entering into civil marriage throughout the United States,
including in Colorado, the analogy is strained. Strikingly, CWA also cited to a
California Supreme Court case that that court later cited in its decision holding
that California’s constitution required allowing same-sex couples to marry: “The
State’s interest in promoting the marriage relationship is not based on
anachronistic notions of morality. The policy favoring marriage is ‘rooted in the
necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental
relational rights and responsibilities of persons in an organized society.”252
To explain how civil rights for homosexuals “undermine” state policy “in
favor of heterosexual marriage and family,” CWA cited a Minnesota Supreme
Court decision identifying the “major public policy questions” involved in
“determining . . . under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to
accord some type of legal status to claims arising from [same-sex and oppositesex cohabiting] relationships.”253 The Minnesota court raised some questions still
pertinent to whether to give marriage-like rights to the unmarried or create an
equivalent status: “Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising

245. Id. at 14 (quoting Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
246. Id. at 15-16.
247. Id. at 16. CWA cites to Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 405 n.41 (1994) (referring to a 1992
Gallup Poll and a 1970 Kinsey Institute Survey).
248. Id. at 17.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 21.
251. Id. at 21-23.
252. Id. at 22–23 (citing Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988). Compare In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (2008) (citing Elden, 758 P.2d 582 to explain the significance of marriage as an
institution). See also FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 159, at 195 (discussing use of this language in In
re Marriage cases).
253. Id. at 23 (citing Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn.1990)).
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from conventional marriages be acquired by those who deliberately choose to
enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred to as ‘illicit’ or
‘meretricious’ relationships encourage formation of such relationships and
weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society?’”254 The
question of what rights to accord cohabiting couples who “deliberately” choose
illicit relationships over marriage assumes a baseline of the availability of
marriage and a decision to eschew it for something else. This was not the same
set of options available to same-sex couples; by definition, their attempted
marriages would be “void.”
The Family Research Council’s (FRC) brief warned the Supreme Court
about the “perilous task” of “usurp[ing] the legislature as the vehicle for
expressing the people’s moral consensus on matters ‘having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution,’ or matters which
are not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty” (citing Bowers).255 It used Roe v. Wade as a primary
example, suggesting that while it and capital punishment “were milestones for
the Court in decades past,” homosexuality is “the issue of the moment.”256 Thus,
the Court should not threaten its “legitimacy” by discovering (as the Colorado
Supreme Court purported to do) a fundamental right in the U.S. constitution that
would invalidate Amendment 2:
The people of Colorado, by exercising their constitutional rights, have expressed
their consensus on homosexuality. And, while surely the Court can claim
expertise on learned constitutional matters, the plain fact of the matter is that the
public cannot be convinced that the Court knows more than the people of
Colorado about the proper response to homosexuality in that state. This
credibility gap, which relates directly to the perception of the Court’s legitimacy,
is even wider when the mechanism for overcoming the people’s common sense
on a moral matter is the discovery of a new fundamental right.257

Roe, FRC contended, “is the paradigm of the social division and disruption
in representative government that results when the judiciary forecloses political
choice.”258 Creating new “rights” and exempting more subjects from “democratic
control” causes democracy, the social contract, or “‘the common moral
universe,’” and democracy’s institutors to “shrink.”259 The FRC contended the
“analogy” between the aftermath of Roe and the “instant case” is “unavoidable”
because the right “discovered” by the Colorado Supreme Court has “no firm
grounding in the Constitution” and overturns “positive law” and “precludes
political choice.”260 It warned that “the Court can avoid repeating and

254. Id. at 23 (citing Cooper, 460 N.W.2d at 10).
255. Brief for Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1986))
[hereinafter FRC Brief].
256. Id.
257. Id. at 10.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 10-11.
260. Id. at 12.
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exacerbating the public policy mistakes that have harmed the reputation of the
law,” and must do so by declining “to tell the people of Colorado, or any other
state, that they are forbidden from expressing in law their social and moral
consensus on homosexuality.”261
FRC further analogized to the abortion issue by noting that “the moral
dynamic of abortion perhaps was the part of the social equation given shortest
shrift in Roe,” even though a “prescient” state court judge warned several years
earlier that the centrality of ethical and religious assumptions in arguments
about abortion would make the Court’s “incursion” into the abortion issue the
most “flammable issue in our society.”262 FRC contended: those “in favor of
homosexuality” are tempted to “dismiss the importance, indeed the enduring
power, of the moral dynamic.”263 By contrast, the lower court in Evans v. Romer
found that “antidiscrimination law [and presumably anti-antidiscrimination
laws] make no assumptions about the morality of [homosexuality].”264 To the
slogan by one “homosexual advocacy group,” “[W]e’re here, we’re queer, get over
it,” FRC counters, “As the history of public reaction to Roe demonstrates,
however, people do not ‘get over’ moral principles.”265 To the contrary, Roe
indicated that “allegiance to personal moral principles may solidify in the face of
a judicial fiat to ‘get over it.’”266 FRC acknowledged that social mores may
change in the future. However, “such changes ‘must arrive through the moral
choices of the people and their elected representatives, not through . . . this court.’”267
Thus, those judges who have ruled (often in dissent) that moral condemnation of
homosexuality is of no legal significance are engaged in “rebellion” against
precedent (e.g., Hardwick’s observation that law “‘is constantly based on notions
of morality’”) but also “in rebellion against the legitimate expression of the
legitimate will of the people.”268 FRC cited Robert Bork on the point that modern
constitutional interpretation seeks to be “free of democracy in order to impose
the values of an elite upon the rest of us.”269
FRC charged that, on the one hand, the lower court denied Amendment 2
had a moral dynamic, but, on the other, held it “was neither necessary to, nor
effective in, promoting public morals.”270 “Uncontroverted evidence,” FRC
countered, revealed a moral dynamic: Amendment 2 “allows each individual to
act according to his own deeply held moral and religious views on an issue that
conspicuously engages a ‘millennia of moral teaching.’”271 Through Amendment

261. Id. at 13.
262. Id. at 17.
263. Id.
264. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
265. Id. at 17–18.
266. Id.
267. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
268. Id. at 18.
269. Id. at 19 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Case Against Political Judging, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 1989, at
24).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 19 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.186, 197 (1986)) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
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2, the “people of Colorado” stated clearly that “they did not consider it wise to
start down the road toward affirmative action for homosexuals.”272
As a final example of appeals to promoting morality, the brief for Oregon
Citizens Alliance et al. (OCA) expressed concern that the Colorado Supreme
Court’s decision was “a serious blow to the use of the initiative process in
Oregon,” where OCA hoped to put a measure similar to Amendment 2 on the
ballot in order to protect morality.273 OCA invoked former Chief Justice Burger’s
statement in Bowers: “‘To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching.’”274 A concern motivating the ballot initiative in Oregon was “the
trampling of the constitutional rights of conservative Christians at the hands of
gay activists.” OCA named two “rights”: (1) “parents’ rights to control the
education of their children” and (2) the right to “free expression of religious
speech.” OCA viewed these rights as connected to reflecting moral teaching
through law. Without Amendment 2, or a similar law in Oregon, schools would
be free to indoctrinate children into “the viewpoint of gay activists, specifically
that homosexual conduct is to be accepted as a normal and acceptable lifestyle
choice.”275
2. Religious Liberty
Concern for protecting religious liberty intertwined with some of the
arguments discussed above about the legitimacy of Amendment 2 promoting
morality. Several of the amicus briefs filed in support of Amendment 2 focused
more explicitly on its role in protecting religious liberty. Examining these
arguments is useful because some contemporary arguments against marriage
equality contend that while DOMA and state DOMAS protect religious liberty,
redefining marriage in civil law will pose extensive threats to religious liberty
and religious exemptions will not be adequate to meet that threat.
Amici contended that the people of Colorado, in voting for Amendment 2,
were constitutionally permitted to take sides in favor of protecting religious
liberty. For example, a brief submitted by the Christian Legal Society (CLS),
several conservative religious denominations, and the conservative Christian
group Focus on the Family (CLS brief) argued that Amendment 2 passes rational
basis review because it “is justified by the State of Colorado’s compelling interest
in protecting religious freedom.” 276 The CLS brief asserted: “There is a veritable
explosion of instances where either individuals of faith or religious organizations
are being forced to comply with gay-rights ordinances and other
nondiscrimination regulations where sexual orientation describes a protected
272. Id.
273. Brief for Oregon Citizens Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter OCA Brief].
274. Id. at 11.
275. Id.
276. Brief for Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1–2, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter CLS Brief]. Among the amici were the
National Ass’n of Evangelicals, the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention,
and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Id.

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

386 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

Volume 20:351 2013

class.”277 The Supreme Court of Colorado “agreed that protecting religious
freedom was a compelling governmental interest,” but, the brief contended,
mistakenly concluded that Amendment 2 was “not the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest,” since “religious exemptions from gay-rights ordinances
would be adequate.”278 CLS argued Amendment 2 was a preferable route since
exemptions do not “sufficiently protect” burdens upon religious exercise and
“applying such exemptions to religious organizations is extremely difficult.”279 It
noted several infirmities of religious exemptions, such as defining religious
institutions and procedurally disadvantaging religious organizations that wish to
turn away individuals because of sexual orientation by making them assert and
prove their religious status as an affirmative defense.280 Getting caught up in
such litigation could also compromise the public image of a religious institution,
which likely depends on public support and donations for survival.281
After itemizing several conflicts that local ordinances protecting sexual
orientation create for religious institutions, the refrain of the CLS brief in each
case was that: “Amendment 2 resolves these conflicts, simply and unequivocally,
in favor of religious liberty.”282 Some examples involved alleged interference
with religious organizations’ ordinary practices and with the rights of conscience
of individuals of faith, such as a religious landlord forced to rent to
homosexuals.283 The CLS brief offered examples from other states and localities
to suggest that no set of religious exemptions would be adequate. For instance, it
claimed that an antidiscrimination law adopted in New Jersey was so broad that
a pastor’s Sunday sermon could get him arrested.284 It offered hypotheticals to
illustrate possible clashes between gay rights ordinances and religious
organizations’ autonomy, for example, battered women’s shelters that may want
to turn away homosexual individuals and avoid liability for doing so.285
This brief also connected religious liberty to a “check [on] expansive
government,” such as attempts by governmental institutions to apply public
norms of antidiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to religious groups
that believe homosexual practices are immoral. Given the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,286 it is striking that the CLS
brief referred to policies by state universities that condition access to “limited
public fora . . . on compliance with nondiscrimination on the basis of

277. Id. at 2.
278. Id. at 2-3.
279. Id. at 3.
280. Id.
281. Id.at 21.
282. Id. at 8, 10, 11.
283. Id. at 12. CWA similarly argued that antidiscrimination laws including protections for sexual
orientation violate the religious liberties of landlords and employers who may wish to deny housing
and jobs to individuals based on sexual orientation and are entitled to do under the Free Exercise
Clause. See CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 20.
284. CLS Brief, supra note 276, at 13.
285. Id. at 14.
286. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
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homosexuality.”287 The CLS brief explained: “This presents problems for student
religious groups, such as Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, Campus Crusade
for Christ, and the Christian Legal Society, who select their leaders, inter alia, on
the basis of adherence to Biblical morality, including the avoidance of
homosexual practices.” This is but one of the conflicts that Amendment 2
“resolves . . . simply and unequivocally, in favor of religious liberty.”288
Interestingly, given this argument for unequivocal resolution, the CLS brief
acknowledged that religious denominations and religious people are not
uniform in their views about the morality of homosexuality. It enlisted this
variation, however, to support “independence” of religious organizations “to
pursue their beliefs and practices,” and for each “ecclesiastical body to develop
its own doctrine”:
It can hardly be denied that the morality of homosexual conduct is a matter of
heated national debate. It is, as well, the subject of impassioned discussion within
religious denominations, local churches, the religious social-service sector, and
other ecclesial organizations such as seminaries and religious universities.
Theologians, clerics, and laypersons all participate in the debate, and on both
sides. Because it confronts religious belief and church autonomy, homosexual
practice is a matter, which the First Amendment ensures that the confessional
communities may work out for themselves and in their own time.289

Thus, the CLS brief explained why some religious groups “do discriminate
against those who engage in homosexual practices”: “when an interpretation of
the scriptural canon is understand to warn against homosexual conduct,
obviously a church’s own employment practices, its schools with their attendant
curricula and codes of behavior, and its social-outreach programs will reflect that
moral stance.” The three “most often advanced” purposes for discriminating are:
“(i) correction of the person in error (for his own well-being); (ii) communication
within and without the confessional community of the scriptural teaching on
homosexuality (that others may not fall into error); and (iii) protection of the
traditional family (a foundation stone of civil society).”290
In conclusion, the CLS brief asserted that “[t]he social agenda of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals is moral legitimacy for their sexual practices.”291 Because
“religion, at least orthodox and traditional religions, generally deny them moral
legitimacy,” this “places religion foursquare in their path.”292 In saying that
“religious persons and religious groups – and hence free exercise and
institutional autonomy – are not a mere side issue in this case,” the CLS brief
implied they are the targets.293 Framed this way, what else is there to do but
adopt laws like Amendment 2 to protect religious liberty while the “vigorous,

287. CLS Brief, supra note 276, at 9 (discussing policy adopted by University of Michigan).
288. Id. at 10.
289. Id. at 3-4.
290. Id. at 4.
291. Id. at 25.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Duncan, supra note 247).
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often intransigent, debate” about homosexuality continues?294
Some amici linked the threat to religious liberty to the threat to the family,
deploying familiar language about the family as a building block of civil society.
The CLS brief identified protecting “the traditional family (a foundation of civil
society)” as a common reason given for discriminating on the basis of
“homosexual practices.”295 In its brief, the American Center for Law & Justice
Family Life Project (ACLJ) explained that it is a “public interest law firm and
educational organization dedicated to protecting religious liberty, human life,
and the family.”296 Its Family Life Project “recognizes the family as the primary
social and religious institution of any just society,” and is committed to “the two
-parent, marriage-bound family as the primary mediating institution of
civilization.”297 Thus, ACLJ “is committed to defending the family as long
understood within the classical Judeo-Christian tradition as a ‘domestic church,’
or ‘church in the home.’”298 Amendment 2, it contended, “serves the legitimate
purpose of (among others) protecting Colorado citizens’ religious liberties from
unnecessary and intrusive government regulation on behalf of a class whose
members do not need special government protection and is a class defined by
conduct that undermines the traditional marriage-bound, two-parent family.”299
ACLJ’s brief summarily mentioned that religious liberty may “come in
conflict with anti-discrimination laws,” and that “many people have sincere
religious or moral beliefs that would prevent them from hiring or doing certain
types of business with homosexuals.” For example, “persons running a religious
school may sincerely believe that hiring homosexuals would be wrong because
hiring homosexuals would create a harmful influence on students.”300 The brief
did not give an explicit example of a threat to the family. Perhaps the implicit
idea is that legitimizing homosexuality through hiring homosexuals in schools
might steer children into homosexuality rather than into traditional marriage.
3. Freedom of Association
Appeals to freedom of association as a justification for Amendment 2
feature in several briefs. This argument bears a close relationship to morality and
religious liberty arguments, since a religious belief that homosexuality and/or
homosexuality practices are immoral is often the reason for not wishing to
associate. The CWA brief, for example, argued that landlords and employers,
exercising their economic and religious liberty, should be able to discriminate
against homosexuals because of their freedom of association.301 CWA also
asserted that Amendment 2 permits “more moral freedom” than the civil rights

294. Id. at 26.
295. Id. at 4.
296. Brief for American Center for Law & Justice Family Life Project as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 1, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter ACLJ Brief].
297. Id. at 2.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 15.
301. See CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 20.
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ordinances it precluded because “[t]he citizens of Colorado are more free to
make their own moral determinations under Amendment 2 than they were
under any special homosexual rights law at the state or local level.”302 If they
believe homosexuality is immoral, they may “choose not to rent to or employ
homosexuals;” conversely, “those who see homosexuality as moral or at least
neutral are free to rent to or employ homosexuals.”303 CWA quoted Justice
Stevens: “Freedom is a blessing. Regulation is sometimes necessary, but it is
always burdensome.”304 Stevens continued: “A decision not to regulate the way in
which an owner chooses to enjoy the benefits of an improvement to his own
property is adequately justified by a presumption in favor of freedom.”305
Perhaps CWA’s implication was that freedom to discriminate is a blessing and
Amendment 2 is justified because it allows an owner to “choose” how to use his
or her property.
Similarly, the CLS brief argued that religious individuals should be free to
avoid associating with homosexuals and provided the example of members of a
health club who wish to exclude homosexuals from gender-specific locker
rooms.306
4. Animosity
In the DOMA litigation, one role Romer played was to provide precedent for
the proposition that legislation based on animus against a class cannot survive
Equal Protection scrutiny. This section and the corresponding section on
respondents’ briefs looks back at how arguments about animus featured in the
briefing in the Romer litigation. As I will explain below, amici for respondents
pointed to statements about homosexuality made by CFV in the campaign for
Amendment 2 and to the amendment itself as evidence of animus and hostility.
By contrast, a basic tenet in arguments in favor of Amendment 2 was that,
because of the moral issue, homosexuality is different than categories
traditionally protected by antidiscrimination law, such as race and sex, where
animus against the group may be present.
Amici distinguished discriminating against a racial minority from
discriminating against a homosexual individual. Thus, ACLJ’s brief contended:
“Discriminating against a black person is irrational and therefore most likely
based on animus for the person, because the fact that a person is black tells us
nothing about his character. But given the moral controversy surrounding
homosexuality, when a person ‘makes a distinction based upon a person’s
sexuality, he is making a judgment about the content of the individual’s
character.’”307
Another argument was that because Amendment 2 is rationally related to
legitimate state interests, such as protecting Coloradans’ religious liberty, there is

302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 21.
305. Id.
306. CLS Brief, supra note 276, at 12.
307. ACLJ Brief, supra note 296, at 12 (quoting Duncan, supra note 247, at 405).
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no danger that it is grounded in illegitimate animosity.308 CFV, sponsor of
Amendment 2, argued that Amendment 2 did not purposefully or invidiously
discriminate against a suspect class, such as racial minorities. Thus, strict
scrutiny did not apply.309
5. Special Rights Versus Equal Rights
A recurring theme in amicus briefs filed in support of petitioners was that
Amendment 2 simply prevented homosexuals from obtaining “special rights.”
Arguments about morality also shaped this claim. For example, CWA argued
that special rights should not be recognized for homosexuals because
homosexuality is not a morally neutral characteristic, such as race or sex.310 For
that reason, Colorado voters were entitled to determine that it is “not entitled to
special protections.”311 As noted above, CWA warned that, without Amendment
2, the state would lose any power to discourage homosexual conduct. CWA
further asserted that because homosexuals are politically and economically
powerful, Amendment 2 justifiably refused them “special rights”: “Special
homosexual rights laws do in fact confer special rights on homosexuals – rights
that are not enjoyed by other non-suspect classes who lack the homosexuals’
affluence, their political clout, and their claim to political correctness. . . .
Colorado was justified in refusing to capitulate to the homosexual lobby’s
demands for special treatment.”312
The special rights argument also appealed to the right of the people to
require government to be “neutral” about homosexuality. Thus, the Equal
Rights, Not Special Rights brief argued: “Amendment 2 represents a perfectly
rational determination by the voters of Colorado that government at all levels in
that state should remain neutral on the contentious moral and political issue of
whether citizens can, in their private associations and pursuits, take
homosexuality into account.”313 The local ordinances Amendment 2 overturned,
by contrast, “prohibited state residents from acting on their sincerely held moral
and religious beliefs that homosexuality – unlike, for example, race, ethnicity, or
gender – is a morally relevant characteristic.”314 As discussed below,
respondents’ amici pointed out that this argument does not address the broad
scope of Amendment 2, which also precluded public entities and actors from
discriminating.

308. See id. at 15-16.
309. CFV Brief, supra note 231, at 16.
310. See CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 16.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2–3.
313. Brief of Equal Rights, Not Special Rights, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at
4, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.94-1039) [hereinafter Equal Rights Brief]. This group
described itself as an “Ohio-based non-profit educational organization devoted to pro-family issues”
and explained that its predecessor organization had successfully sponsored a charter amendment to
repeal a local human rights ordinance prohibiting various forms of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and barring future protection. Id. at 1.
314. Id. at 4.
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6. Clash of Rights/The “Right” of the People to Use the Democratic Process
Some amici related the “special rights” argument to a clash of rights
argument: any supposed “right” of homosexuals to participate in the political
process (securing victories at the local level) must yield to the “right of the
people” of Colorado to limit the power of their representatives and bypass them,
through the constitutional amendment process.315 Amici stressed the right of
“the people” to constitute themselves and their government – an issue pertinent
to the Prop 8 litigation and other controversies over the use of the ballot initiative
process.
CFV’s brief, for example, asserted the “inherent right of the people to
organize and constitute their government in accordance with the rule of law.”316
Citing Thomas Paine, it asserted that Colorado’s constitution is “not an act of
government, but of a people constituting a government;” that constitution gives
“the People of Colorado” “the right to limit the power of their elected
representatives,” including “place[ing] the question of special legal protection for
homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals outside the authority of their elected
representatives.”317
CFV called “unprecedented and astounding” the Colorado Supreme Court’s
Equal Protection ruling that Amendment 2 warranted strict scrutiny because it
infringed on “the fundamental right to participate equally in the political
process” by “‘fencing out’ and independently identifiable class of persons.’”318
Amendment 2 did not involve “purposeful discrimination against [a] racial or
other constitutionally suspect class.”319 Nor does the U.S. Constitution “require a
state to protect persons from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,”
and thus it posed no limit to the people of Colorado’s “original right” to
constitute their government, including requiring that, henceforth, advocates for
such protections must proceed by way of constitutional amendment rather than
ordinary legislation.320 On CFV’s theory, “the People of the State of Colorado
were within their right to determine ‘to what extent private rights shall be
required to yield to the general good.’”321
Similarly, the Family Research Council argued that, in enacting Amendment
2, Coloradans exercised their constitutional rights to express their consensus on
homosexuality and that those rights should be protected. It analogized to the
abortion issue, arguing that neither expression of sexual orientation nor abortion

315. CFV Brief, supra note 231, at 21. See also Equal Rights Brief, supra note 313, at 9 (asserting that
Amendment 2 was constitutionally permissible because there is “nothing in the federal Constitution
that prohibits the people from resolving important public policy issues for themselves or that
requires them to delegate such important decisions to their employee representatives”). The
contemporary analogue to this argument about the power of the people through the initiative process
pertains to Proposition 8, not discussed in this article since the Court did not reach the merits in that
case.
316. CFV Brief, supra note 231, at 5.
317. Id. at 11.
318. Id. at 4.
319. Id.at 16.
320. Id. at 12.
321. Id. (citing THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 33 (1987)).
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are fundamental, constitutionally protected rights.322 Countering respondents’
argument that Amendment 2 deprives homosexuals of access to the political
process, FRC asserted that, after the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated
Amendment 2, Coloradans opposing homosexuality “have no effective political
forum open to them.”323
An amicus brief filed by Alabama and several other states (authored by
Charles J. Cooper, who would later defend Proposition 8 before the U.S.
Supreme Court, and prominent conservative jurist Robert Bork) argued that the
Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling “creates a right to have political issues decided
– finally – at the local, rather than higher levels,” which “conflicts with the
general power of states to structure their political functions as they see fit, subject
only to exceptions based on federally protected interests.”324 The states argued
that, because no suspect classifications were involved in the Colorado case, and
because the case did not implicate “the central meaning of equal protection – the
protection of racial minorities against laws which place unique burdens upon
their ability to enact legislation prohibiting racial discrimination,” the Colorado
high court’s ruling was not supported by Supreme Court precedent.325 This brief
offered a clash of rights argument: “rights do not exist in a vacuum, and cannot
be recognized without consequence to other constitutional values.”326 Here, the
“fundamental right of political participation” the Colorado high court “created”
is “inconsistent with the right of the people to enact constitutional provisions to
protect civil liberties.”327 That brief argued this new right gives any
“independently identifiable class of persons” a right “to have its political agenda
insulated against normal democratic processes.”328 However, the brief pointed
out ways in which certain constitutional features already discourage political
participation by some groups:
Constitutional law routinely discourages groups from seeking to legislate
political agendas which the Constitution has taken out of the hands of legislators.
Indeed, the central purpose of the Bill of Rights and similar protections in state
constitutions is to shelter persons whose liberties are protected against political
agendas designed to restrict those rights.329

This was an odd use of the familiar West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette argument for withdrawing certain matters from the vicissitudes of
shifting majorities. After all, Amendment 2 enshrined a lack of protection of
rights. But this brief read it as a clash of rights: the “right of political

322. FRC Brief, supra note 255, at 10-12.
323. Id. at 15.
324. Brief of Amici Curiae for Alabama et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Alabama Brief].
325. Id. at 5. See also OCA Brief, supra note 273, at 4 (asserting that the Colorado Supreme Court’s
framework of protecting the rights of “independently identifiable groups” expands equal protection
law too far).
326. Alabama Brief, supra note 324, at 10.
327. Id. at 18.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 19.
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participation” the Colorado high court created “casts a long shadow over the
right of the people to protect their freedom by adopting constitutional
liberties.”330
Finally, given the significance of Romer for marriage equality litigation, it
warrants mention that at least one amicus worried about the impact of
invalidating Amendment 2 on state marriage laws. Thus, the Special Rights brief
contended that if the constitution forbade voters from enacting Amendment 2,
homosexuals could lobby at the local level for “homosexual marriage” and argue
that state law forbidding it infringed their “fundamental rights.”331 If the
constitution forbade states from controlling the scope of “the lawmaking
authority of its political subdivisions,” “all laws restricting homosexual marriage,
child custody and adoption would be unconstitutional because the various states
have decided all such issues at the state level.”332
7. Gender and Race Discrimination Versus Discrimination on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation/Why Homosexuality is Not a Suspect Class
Amici, as discussed, distinguished discrimination against homosexuals
from race discrimination, arguing that the former were not – and should not be—
a constitutionally-protected suspect class. Amici contended that, unlike race and
sex, homosexuality involved moral objections. Further, homosexuals are
powerful, rather than powerless, and lack other earmarks of a protected class.
Therefore, because sexual orientation is not a suspect class, triggering strict
scrutiny, the Court need only conduct rational basis review to determine the
constitutional validity of Amendment 2.333
Amici argued that, by contrast to suspect classes, homosexuals have not
historically been politically disadvantaged, and have disproportionate amounts
of money and political influence.334 ACLJ, for example, argued that homosexuals
are “economically advantaged compared to similarly situated people, which
indicates they have not been the victims of the kind of devastating [sic]
discrimination as that faced by racial minorities.”335 As noted above, CWA also
asserted that homosexuals are “affluent and politically powerful.”336
CFV painted a David and Goliath type picture of its efforts to put

330. Id. Presumably, that constitutional freedom is to be free from charges of discrimination if
they discriminate against homosexuals.
331. Equal Rights Brief, supra note 313, at 13–14.
332. Id. at 13.
333. See, e.g., CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 2; Equal Rights Brief, supra note 313, at 6; OCA Brief,
supra note 273, at 4. One amicus, The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), argued against group rights,
claiming that fundamental rights are always individual rights and that American government
recognizes categories of people based on merit, not immutable characteristics such as race and sexual
orientation. It contended that affirmative action is problematic because “group rights permanently
pit each group against the others in encounters that are bound to be at least sporadically violent.” See
Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter PLF Brief].
334. ACLJ Brief, supra note 296, at 10-11.
335. Id.
336. CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 2.
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Amendment 2 on the ballot: “the opponents of Amendment 2 outspent CFV
almost 2 to 1 requiring CFV to rely heavily on citizen volunteers.”337
Additionally, the Denver television market “refused to run CFV’s
advertisements.”338
Another distinguishing feature, amici argued, is that “unlike race, national
origin, or sex, homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic,” because “what
defines the class of homosexuals is conduct.”339 Thus, the ACLJ brief cited case
law rejecting the idea that homosexuality is not centrally defined by conduct and
asserting that “[w]hat distinguishes the class of homosexuals is . . . the nature of
the member’s sexual proclivities or interests.”340
Another argument was that the “independently identifiable groups”
identified by the Colorado Supreme Court as burdened by Amendment 2 were
much broader than a suspect class, rendering suspect class analysis inapt.341 For
example, Alabama and several other states argued that the Equal Protection
cases on which respondents relied, such as Hunter v. Erickson and James v. Val
Tierra, could not be used as precedents for finding Amendment 2
unconstitutional because they rest on an Equal Protection framework that
protects race and other suspect classes from discriminatory state action; by
contrast, the previously-enacted Colorado antidiscrimination laws nullified by
Amendment 2 provided special rights for non-suspect groups such as gays and
lesbians.342 Other amici contended that the political burden homosexuals in
Colorado suffered under Amendment 2 was not comparable to the burdens
suffered by the plaintiffs in James and Hunter, Supreme Court precedents
involving constitutional amendments.343
E. Arguments Made in Amicus Curiae Briefs filed in Support of Respondents
(opposing Amendment 2)
There were twenty-one amicus briefs submitted in support of the
respondents.344 Some of respondents’ amici argued primarily in support of the
Colorado Supreme Court’s holding about Amendment 2 violating a fundamental
right to participate in the political process. Some provided support for an
alternative ground for invalidating Amendment 2: it lacked a rational basis and
did not advance a legitimate state interest. In presenting their arguments, I will
attempt to show how the themes in these briefs parallel and offer rejoinders to
arguments made by amici for petitioners. It will be evident in Part II.F how some
have an analogue in the Supreme Court’s Romer opinion. Some of the themes I
canvass below are by now familiar parts of the constitutional landscape:

337. CFV Brief, supra note 231, at 1.
338. Id.
339. ACLJ Brief, supra note 296, at 11.
340. Id. at 11-12 (citing Watkins v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1361 n.19 (9th Cir. 1988)).
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1989)).
341. See CFV Brief, supra note 231, at 23.
342. Alabama Brief, supra note 324, at 4.
343. Id. at 12, 14.
344. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
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arguments invoking the Cleburne-Moreno-Romer trio and Palmore v. Sidoti’s
language concerning government not giving effect to “private biases.” Some
other arguments may be less familiar and are a useful window into the evolution
of societal views about the legal and moral status of homosexuals.
1. Animosity, Antipathy, and the Role of Stereotypes in the Campaign for
and Approval of Amendment 2
Arguments about the role that stereotyping, prejudice, and animus played
in enacting Amendment 2 were central in the amicus briefs filed in support of
respondents. I lead with them because of the relevance of antipathy to the
Supreme Court’s Romer opinion and to contemporary efforts either to apply or
distinguish Romer in the Windsor litigation over DOMA. These arguments also
bear on the issues of morality and the proper level of constitutional review, as I
discuss below.
The brief submitted by the American Psychological Association, the
American Psychiatric Association, and other organizations (APA brief) argued
that Amendment 2 “can be invalidated under rational basis review” (citing
Cleburne) and, in support, presented “the latest research on the nature of sexual
orientation” and the “literature on prejudice and discrimination against gay
people.”345 It detailed the “history and prevalence of prejudice and
discrimination against gay people” based on “ignorance and stereotypes” and
the “nature” and effects of “anti-gay prejudice.”346 It concluded: “to the extent
that Amendment 2 rests on baseless stereotypes about gay people, and reflects
the sort of historically rooted antipathy still common in our society, it threatens
to compound the serious problems gay people face as a result of irrational
discrimination.”347
Sexual orientation, the APA Brief stressed, “is distinct from sexual
conduct.”348 It reports that “once established, sexual orientation is resistant to
change[,]” and “there is little evidence that treatment actually changes sexual
attractions.”349 It explained: “The psychiatric, psychological, and social-work
professions do not consider homosexual orientation to be a disorder.”350 As proof
that homosexuality is not a “psychological maladjustment,” it cited the American
Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to remove homosexuality from its list of
mental disorders, the American Psychological Association’s similar stance in
1975, and its urging “all mental health professionals to help dispel the stigma of
mental illness that had long been associated with homosexual orientation.”351
These newer stances differ from adherence earlier in the 20th century by mental
health professions to the “‘illness model’ of homosexual orientation,” a model

345. Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
at 7–8, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter APA Brief].
346. Id. at 18–19.
347. Id. at 27.
348. Id. at 10.
349. Id. at 14.
350. Id. at 15.
351. Id.
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developed “at least partly in an effort to displace the depravity immorality
model.”352
Amici explained their interest in terms of their public and formal urging of
“the elimination of irrational discrimination against gay men and lesbians.”353
The brief detailed continuing “intense prejudice” against lesbians and gay men
and asserted: “Gay people are the subject of strong antipathy.”354 That antipathy
rests on “an entrenched set of negative assumptions” and, particularly, with
respect to gay men,” in “crude stereotypes,” such that gay men are
“disproportionately responsible for child sexual abuse.”355 The brief reported the
absence of “any positive correlation between homosexual orientation and child
molestation.”356
Given the subsequent role of assertions about child well-being in opposing
and supporting marriage equality, it is worth mentioning that the APA Brief
reported that “the literature . . . undermines negative assumptions about gay
men and lesbians as parents.”357 A precursor to subsequent arguments about the
basic sameness between heterosexuals and homosexuals in their capacity to be
responsible parents and rear children successfully, the brief quoted one study:
“‘The most striking feature of the research on lesbian mothers, gay fathers, and
their children is the absence of pathological findings. The second most striking
feature is how similar the groups of gay and lesbian parents and their children
are to the heterosexual parents and their children that were included in the
studies.’”358 Moreover: “being raised by gay parents does not appear to cause
homosexual orientation.”359 Finally, in an additional important assertion of
sameness, the APA brief reported: “[D]espite stereotypes to the contrary, gay
men and lesbians often form committed relationships that share principal
elements of heterosexual marital relationships, that are based on deep emotional
attachments, and that endure for decades.”360
The Human Rights Campaign Fund brief (HRC) argued that, if the Court
addresses the level of review question, it should conclude that classifications
based on sexual orientation warrant strict scrutiny.361 Most pertinent to the
animus issue is HRC’s discussion of the role of prejudice. HRC argued that a
history of discrimination based on sexual orientation and the fact that sexual
orientation is unrelated to ability are warning signs that a legislative
classification based on homosexuality may not be rooted in legislative rationality,
but instead, be (quoting Plyler v. Doe) “a reflection of deep-seated prejudice.’”362
352. Id. at 20.
353. Id. at 2.
354. Id. at 21.
355. Id. at 23.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 17.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 18.
360. Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
361. See Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, at 30, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter HRCF Brief].
362. Id. at 8 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
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HRC also cited Cleburne on the risk that laws based on a characteristic that is
“irrelevant to an individual’s ability to perform or participate in society” are
“unlikely to be relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest.”363
Instead, “laws based on such characteristics ‘are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy – a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others.’”364
The HRC Brief detailed a history of discrimination, intensifying in the 1950s
but continuing so that, even in the 1990s, “most gay men and lesbians today
continue to opt for silence and hiding of their true identities.” 365 Gay people also
experience “political powerlessness,” in part because they must “avoid
prejudice” by keeping sexual orientation secret.366 The lengthy history of
discrimination against homosexuals in the United States, HRC argued, causes a
majority of gays and lesbians to stay in the closet because they fear both public
and private discrimination.367 Thus, these various “red flags indicate to the
Court that the ordinary processes of governmental decision making are suspect
when applied to classifications based on sexual orientation.”368
The National Bar Association (NBA) brief argued that Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional because “its actual purpose – to target for harm a politically
unpopular group – is based on irrational fear and hatred of that group.”369 It
analogized the fears incited by CFV to “the irrational fear and hatred that were
found to be to be constitutionally impermissible in Moreno and Cleburne.”370 The
NBA brief looked to “the campaign statements and materials of the
Amendment’s supporters” to provide evidence that “irrational fear and hatred of
homosexuals” prompted passage of Amendment 2.371
The NBA brief also suggested that the “actual purpose” of Amendment 2
can be “found in the climate of intolerance surrounding the issue homosexuality
in Colorado.”372 It offered examples from the campaign literature of CFV, the
drafter and “a primary promoter” of Amendment 2:
CFV distributed pamphlets containing unsubstantiated allegations that
exacerbated an irrational fear and hatred of homosexuals. Certain CFV literature
contained the spurious claim that “73 percent of homosexuals admit having sex
with minors and 28 percent admit having sex with more than 1,000 partners . . .
[and] most gays urinate or defecate on their partners.” . . . . Other CFV literature
claimed, “gays ‘are 12 times as likely’ as heterosexuals to molest children and are
out to ‘destroy’ the American family . . . ; and that “gays [are] sex-crazed,
disease-ridden perverts out to destroy the traditional family . . . Another group

363. Id. at 7 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
364. Id. at 7–8 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
365. Id. at 14.
366. Id. at 18.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 15.
369. Brief for National Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter NBA Brief].
370. Id.at 7.
371. Id. at 6.
372. Id.
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supporting Amendment 2, Focus on the Family, issued similar disinformation
claiming that “‘homosexual men ingest, on the average, the fecal material of 23
different men per year.” . . .373

The NBA brief also cited to statements made at a CFV-sponsored conference
in Colorado Springs to support its claim that the “actual purpose” of
Amendment 2 was “to target for harm” a “politically unpopular group,”
homosexual citizens.374 At this conference a Focus on the Family executive stated
that “the gay agenda has all the elements of that which is truly evil.”375 A goal of
a “written course of action outlined by conference participants was to ‘[e]xpose
that homosexuality . . . [is] . . . criminal. Homosexuals are [the] largest consumers
of pornography. Hound-Hound-Hound. Drive it home!!!”376 The NBA further
detailed “threats and acts of persecution against homosexual citizens” before and
after passage of Amendment 2.377 It further argued that the “irrational and
unsubstantiated fear of homosexuals” that motivated Amendment 2 was “similar
to and . . . even more alarming than [that] found to be constitutionally
impermissible in Moreno and Cleburne.”378
The brief submitted by the American Bar Association (ABA) similarly used
Cleburne and Moreno to anchor its argument that the purposes Amendment 2
were said to advance were “illegitimate” and “enshrin[ed] private prejudices in
the state constitution.”379 The ABA used examples from CFV’s campaign
literature to illustrate that proponents of Amendment 2 “played upon popular
myths equating gay men with child molesters to fuel their campaign,” for
example, with literature “urging voters “to say ‘no’ to sexual perversion with
children - vote YES! on Amendment 2!”380 The ABA cited to evidence introduced
at trial debunking these spurious representations of “pedophilia” as “an
accepted part of the homosexual community.”381 The ABA concluded that “if the
purported state interest in protecting children has any relevance to this case, it is
in exposing the fear- and prejudice-based appeals used by supporters of
Amendment 2 to provoke a visceral, negative reaction.”382 (Indeed, both the APA
brief and the National Education Association brief worry that, in this climate,
homosexual individuals, and adolescents in particular, will continue to hide their
sexual orientation and internalize societal homophobia as self-hatred and thus be
psychologically damaged by the stigma.383)
The ABA Brief concludes that Cleburne shows that “‘mere negative
373. Id. (internal citations omitted)
374. Id. at 7.
375. Id. at 6.
376. Id. at 7.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter ABA Brief].
380. Id. at 16.
381. Id. at 17.
382. Id.
383. See APA Brief, supra note 345, at 24; Brief of National Education Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter NEA Brief].
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attitudes,’ “‘private biases’” and ‘vague, undifferentiated fears’ cannot justify
government’s disparate treatment of different groups of citizens.”384 The role of
such “fearmongering” concerning “pedophilia” and of other “false notions about
gay people” in enacting Amendment 2 renders its classification based on
homosexuality “constitutionally illegitimate.”385
2. Promoting Morality and (Heterosexual) Marriage and the Family
Petitioners and their amici argued that Amendment 2 served a legitimate
purpose – promoting morality and traditional marriage. Conversely, the ABA
argued that the purposes asserted for Amendment 2 “sanctify private
prejudice.”386 The brief pointed out that at trial, petitioners asserted that
Amendment 2 served the State interest in the “well-being of our children” by
“recognizing heterosexual marriage as the foundation of a stable family unit,” or,
in the alternative, by “help[ing] to avert unnecessary suffering for those [young
people] who may be influenced relative to their sexual preference by not lending
government’s voice to the debate.”387 The ABA countered that Amendment 2
“says nothing about marriage or families;” nor does it lend government’s “voice”
to any “public discussion related to ‘unnecessary suffering.’” The trial court, in
fact, found that “[i]f the . . . [proffered] interest is in protecting the psychological
well-being of homosexual youth, the Court is unable to discern how allowing
discrimination against them by virtue of the Colorado Constitution promotes
their welfare.”388
The State indisputably has “a legitimate interest in protecting children,” the
ABA Brief acknowledged, but “Amendment 2 in no way addresses that
concern.”389 Instead, “proponents of the measure exploited the very real problem
of child abuse in order to play upon popular fears and myths about gay men.”390
Similarly, the NBA brief contended that CFV’s morality arguments – that
homosexual individuals are trying to push a dangerous and hypersexual gay
agenda on children and the traditional family – and the enactment of
Amendment 2 reflected irrational fears and incited violence and hatred. 391
The ABA brief also took up the argument that the “implicit endorsement of
homosexuality fostered by laws granting special protections could undermine
the efforts of some parents to teach traditional moral values,” and “that
Amendment 2, therefore, seeks to protect freedom within the family.”392 The

384. ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 17–18.
385. Id. at 18.
386. Id. at 15.
387. Id. at 16 (citing Def. Trial Brief at pp. 73, 75). The ABA observed that that rationale “has
apparently has been abandoned by the state.” Id. at 15.
388. Id. at 16 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at C-13 to -14, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (No. 94-1039)).
389. Id. at 15.
390. Id. at 15–16 (arguing that proponents of the measure “repeatedly and spuriously
represented” that homosexuality was bound up with pedophilia).
391. NBA Brief, supra note 369, at 7.
392. ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 23 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 45–46, Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039)).
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ABA brief pointed out that “neither Amendment 2 nor the laws it prohibits affect
the freedom of parents, whatever their values, to teach and raise their children as
they see fit.”393
The more basic point the ABA asserted about antidiscrimination law and
morality comes from the Colorado Supreme Court’s opinion: that
“[A]ntidiscrimination laws make no assumptions about the morality of protected
classes – they simply recognize that certain characteristics, be they moral or
immoral – have no relevance in enumerated commercial contexts.”394 Thus, those
laws “do not imply an endorsement of any particular sexual orientation and
practices.”395 Further, supporters of Amendment 2 testified that it made “no
moral statement” and expressed “no moral judgment on homosexuality,” but
instead was a “plain injunction against certain types of governmental action.”396
To be sure, these arguments about the expressive value of
antidiscrimination law and Amendment 2 are in tension with arguments made
by some of petitioners’ amici (discussed above) that Amendment 2 promoted
and preserved public morality by expressing the consensus that homosexuality is
immoral and that heterosexual marriage is favored.
Some amici also disputed the argument that homosexuality is a matter of
choice, and hence, subject to moral judgment. For example, both the APA and
HRC briefs contended that, even if some voters find homosexual sodomy to be
immoral, sodomy does not define the suspect class of homosexuals.397 In other
words, homosexual identity is immutable, not based solely on behavior in which
an individual chooses to engage.398
3. Religious Liberty
Various amici took on the argument put forth by petitioners and their amici
that Amendment 2 protects religious liberty. Notably, some religious
organizations filed amicus briefs in support of respondents. An amicus brief filed
by the U.S.A. Presbyterian Church acknowledged that the Church rejects
homosexuality as sinful, but refuses to allow other religious organizations to
speak on its behalf.399 The Church argued that Amendment 2 violates the
Establishment Clause because it permits government to make decisions affecting
religious belief on the behalf of religious organizations and individuals, while
also improperly intruding into the private matters of homosexuals’ romantic

393. Id. at 23–24.
394. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at B-15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039)).
395. Id. at 24 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at B-15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039).
396. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 43 n.65, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (No.
94-1039).
397. See ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 21; HRCF Brief, supra note 361, at 28–30.
398. ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 16–17; HRCF Brief, supra note 361, at 21.
399. Brief of Amicus Curiae of James E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in Support of Respondents at 1, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Presbyterian Brief].
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relationships.400 The Church cited its own historical tradition of “firmly and
consistently recogniz[ing] and support[ing] Biblical principles of justice and
equity for all persons, including homosexual persons, as demonstrated by Jesus
who welcomed and loved all.”401
The American Friends Service Committee et al. brief (AFSC) also rejected
discrimination against homosexuals as a universal religious belief, pointing out
that such discrimination was “contrary to” religious amici’s “religious beliefs.”402
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, AFSC
argued, because it “constitutes State endorsement of one set of religious beliefs
over all others.”403 Further, while petitioners may under their own right to
freedom of expression find homosexuality objectionable, the Free Exercise Clause
does not permit them to “employ the authority of the State of Colorado to carry
out that belief.”404 The AFSC argued that, rather than defending individuals’
religious beliefs, Amendment 2 “creates a special right for . . . anyone . . . to
discriminate against another targeted group of citizens they do not like.”405
The AFSC brief also argued that the express exemptions “for religiouslyheld beliefs” included in some antidiscrimination laws “demonstrate that there is
a way to protect the religious freedom of Amendment 2’s sponsors without
either promoting discrimination or inhibiting the religious freedom of others
who do not share the views of Amendment 2’s sponsors.”406 AFSC further
asserted that homosexual Coloradans themselves are having their religious
freedom rights violated by Amendment 2 because they refuse to adhere to the
religious beliefs of CFV (the drafter of Amendment 2).407
The normative good of homosexual relationships featured in the friend of
the court brief filed by the United Methodists for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Concerns and several other religious groups.408 Strikingly, they defined loving
homosexual relationships as “intimate to the degree of being sacred” just as
heterosexual marriages are considered to be sacred by religious institutions.409
Amici explained they grounded their advocacy for gay rights in the same
religious teachings that inspired abolition and the civil rights movement and
called human rights “the civic religion of the United States,” guaranteeing “equal
dignity of every person.”410
The State of Colorado and its amici, recall, contended that

400. Id. at 2.
401. Id. at 4.
402. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Friends Service Committee et al. in Support of
Respondents at 1, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter AFSC Brief].
403. Id.
404. Id. at 19.
405. AFSC Brief, supra note 402, at 25; see also infra Part II.E.5.
406. AFSC Brief, supra note 402, at 21.
407. Id. at 10.
408. Brief for Amici Curiae of Affirmation: United Methodists for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Concerns et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039) [hereinafter United Methodists Brief].
409. Id. at 8 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
410. Id. at 11.
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antidiscrimination laws threatened religious and associational freedom and that
Amendment 2 protected such constitutional freedom.411 The ABA brief
challenged petitioner’s argument that “anti-discrimination laws interfere with
private decisions not to employ or rent to others on religious grounds and with
personal choices in forming intimate relationships.”412 Petitioners, the ABA
countered, fail to articulate any explanation why, from among the many reasons
religious people might not wish to employ or rent to or serve certain people, the
state should single out lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, “when the proffered
government interest would implicate many other groups as well.”413 For
example, “far from increasing religious and associational freedoms in general,
Amendment 2 privileges solely those religious views and associational decisions
that reflect private bias against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.”414 But the
constitution “‘places no value on discrimination,’ . . . and while ‘[i]nvidious
private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment . . it has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections.’”415 This argument by the ABA shows the
intertwining of religious and associational freedom claims and provides a good
transition to how amici responded to freedom of association rationales for
Amendment 2.
4. Freedom of Association
The impermissibility of enlisting the state to further private preferences not
to associate is a strong theme in the amici briefs submitted in support of
respondents. Palmore and Cleburne feature prominently in these arguments. The
ABA brief observed that petitioners contend that “‘eliminating antidiscrimination provisions that compel landowners and religious institutions to
open their facilities to homosexuals and bisexuals is a rational means of protecting
the legitimate prevailing preferences of the State’s population.’”416 It also noted that
petitioners identify the goal of “‘the preservation of traditional social norms.’”417
The ABA responded by arguing that serving “prevailing preferences” to avoid
associations with gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals is not a permissible
governmental objective because , while “‘[p]rivate biases may be outside the
reach of the law, . . . the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.’”418
Thus, “[a]lthough the majority may indeed dislike and not wish to associate with
gay and bisexual citizens, such prevailing attitudes cannot be used to justify
government action.”419 Similarly, the NBA brief argued that Amendment 2
411. See infra Part II•D-2 for discussion of CLS Brief.
412. ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 22.
413. Id. at 23.
414. Id.
415. Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)).
416. Id. at 18 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Romer v. Evans at 13, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (No. 94-1039) (emphasis in ABA Brief)).
417. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 47, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 941039) (emphasis in ABA Brief)).
418. Id. at 19 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
419. Id. at 18.
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“unconstitutionally places the state’s power, authority and sanction behind acts
of private discriminations.”420
The ABA brief further argued: “Surely, under Cleburne, a zoning decision
‘fencing out’ lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals would not be defensible as a
means of protecting prevailing preferences;” if that is so, “then fencing them off
from the protection of anti-discrimination laws cannot be defended on that basis,
either.”421 The ABA stressed that this constitutionally impermissible fencing out
may stem not only from antipathy but also from prejudice rooted in religious
and moral beliefs:
Whether prevailing negative attitudes about a group arise from predominant
religious beliefs, moral sentiment, tradition or mere habit, or simply an
unthinking groundswell of antipathy, such attitudes against a disfavored class
are an improper basis for adverse treatment by the state. . . . Indeed, experience
teaches that prejudice frequently is clothed in religious and moral terms.422

This formulation in the ABA brief has parallels in the marriage equality
litigation concerning not only DOMA but also Prop 8.423
Public entities who filed amicus briefs raised another concern: following
Amendment 2, they would not be permitted to protect individuals from
discrimination based on sexual orientation even if they wanted to do so.424 For
example, the amicus brief filed by several U.S. cities (among them Atlanta,
Boston, Madison, and New York) argued that, under the Equal Protection
Clause, “a state may not enshrine in its constitution a positive privilege for its
employees to discriminate with impunity in the performance of their duties.”425
These cities expressed concern that, because Coloradans cannot be protected
from discrimination based on sexual orientation, government officials in
Colorado who dislike homosexuals will be encouraged to discriminate against
them because they know they can get away with doing so.426
Furthermore, the Colorado Bar Association argued that Amendment 2
allows a majority of Coloradans to “fix the very structure of government to
ensure its own perpetual dominance or at least the perpetual subordination of a
disfavored minority.”427 The Framers intended to “mediate between majority and
minority interests . . . [and] to structure a political process that would be duly
responsive to each.”428
420. NBA Brief, supra note 369, at 8 (citing Palmore).
421. ABA Brief, supra note 379, at 19 (internal citations omitted).
422. Id. (citations omitted).
423. See discussion infra Part III.
424. Brief for City of Aspen and City Council of Aspen as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Aspen Brief].
425. Brief of the Cities of Atlanta, Baltimore, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
9, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Atlanta Brief].
426. See id. at 10 (“Amendment 2 seeks to compel governments to give effect to the biases of their
own employees. Where such employees have been vested with significant discretion, their authority
to employ bias arbitrarily is particularly pernicious.” (emphasis in Atlanta Brief)).
427. Brief of the Colorado Bar Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 8, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter CBA Brief].
428. Id.
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Finally, the amicus brief filed by The State of Oregon, six other states, and
the District of Columbia condemned the “sweep” of Amendment 2 and its
“blanket endorsement of discrimination,” noting that the Amendment
“indiscriminately lays waste to an entire landscape” of protections against
discrimination.429 The brief noted that while avoiding “interfering with the
religious, moral, or associational interests of private citizens,” are, “[i]n the
abstract,” rational objectives, the line drawn by Amendment 2 – divesting “all
governmental branches of the authority to respond to any problem of
discrimination based on gay, lesbian, or bisexual status” – was not rational.430
Instead, “the stated goal” of the law “becomes so attenuated as to render the
focus on those characteristics [defined in Amendment 2] irrational, arbitrary, or
invidious.”431
5. Special Rights Versus Equal Rights/Clash of Rights
While petitioners’ amici contended Amendment 2 prevented homosexuals
from obtaining “special rights,” respondents’ challenged this “special rights”
frame. They countered that Amendment 2 denied homosexuals equal rights and
equal protection under the law and, if anything, gave “special rights” to public
officials and private persons to discriminate. For example, the City of Aspen
argued that individuals’ access to participation in the political process is a
fundamental right. Since Amendment 2 curtails that right for homosexuals only,
repealing the amendment would serve merely to provide all Coloradans with the
chance at equal rights.432 What is more, the amicus brief filed by the City of
Atlanta, nine other cities, and the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers,
argued, Amendment 2 creates special rights rather than repeals them, since it
creates “a positive power and privilege to discriminate against gay, lesbian and
bisexual individuals solely on the basis of prejudice.”433
The Colorado Bar Association brief argued that “government may not place
extra obstacles in the path of any particular group of citizens in seeking to
advance their political interests.” This principle, it continued, “appeals to the
very idea of equality of political opportunity that democratic government and
equal protection of the laws embody.”434
Some amici argued for more careful judicial scrutiny because voter
initiatives such as Amendment 2 were particularly problematic because they
were not subject to representation and separation of power filters in the same
way that bills passed by the legislature are and thus are emotionally rather than
rationally driven.435 Initiatives, the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers of Philadelphia

429. Brief of Amici Curiae States of Oregon et al. in Support of Respondents at 4, 5, 14, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Oregon States Brief].
430. Id. at 28.
431. Id. at 29 (citing to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).
432. Aspen Brief, supra note 424, at 15-18.
433. Atlanta Brief, supra note 425, at 4.
434. CBA Brief, supra note 427, at 14 (citations omitted).
435. Brief of the Gay & Lesbian Lawyers of Philadelphia, as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 13-16, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
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argued, leave “relatively little time for reflection and refinement of particular
positions” and “oversimplify[] the issues and appeal[] to the electorate’s worst
instincts.”436
6. Race and Gender Discrimination and the Analogy to Discrimination on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Which Level of Review?
Amici took a variety of approaches to the standard of review question.
While petitioners’ amici argued that homosexuality was distinct from race and
gender and did not warrant treatment as a suspect class or inclusion in
antidiscrimination laws, several amicus briefs for respondent stressed analogies
among forms of discrimination and similarity in the groups’ need for protection.
For example, the brief of the United Methodists for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Concerns et al. compared the gay rights movement directly to the civil rights
movement, arguing that human rights mandates equal protection for all classes
of individuals.437 Indeed, the brief compared Amendment 2 and the Bowers v.
Hardwick decision with the “exclusion ‘in law’” codified by the Dred Scott v.
Sanford decision:
As in Dred Scott, the only purported escape from the equality principle would
have been a finding of the inferiority of gay people, of their capacity to be loving
human beings, and of their intimate relationships of companionship and
family. . . . Branded with this Court’s imprimatur [in Bowers] of criminality;
immorality; and in a word, inferiority, gay people were robbed of an essential
part of what it means to be a human being of full and equal dignity.438

This brief seems strangely contemporary, given the role of “dignity” in the
Supreme Court’s trajectory from Bowers to Lawrence to Windsor.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. brief also utilized
analogy, comparing the worries of proponents of Amendment 2 about “militant
gay aggression” with an earlier societal prejudice “that Jews, who in fact then
faced widespread and open discrimination, were somehow covertly exercising
control over the nation’s policies.”439 The Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund et al. argued that even if Amendment 2 is different from
historical racial discrimination, it may just be a newer version of the same type of
animus-driven discrimination and therefore is just as constitutionally
impermissible.440 Moreover, it argued that Amendment 2 itself makes homosexual
individuals a suspect class when it deprives them of the benefit of equal
protection “by prohibiting courts and legislature from rectifying discrimination”

436. Id. at 14.
437. United Methodists Brief, supra note 408, at 10-12.
438. Id. at 11 (citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 422 (1856)).
439. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 15, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
440. Brief for Amicie Curiae Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund et al. in Support
of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, at 10, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Asian American
Brief] (“That this case does not involve racial discrimination says nothing about whether it involves
discrimination in the political process.”).

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

406 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

Volume 20:351 2013

against them.441 It thus creates “a discrete and insular minority in Colorado
whose members are uniquely prohibited from seeking enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment in their own State.”442 Because judges are uniquely
suited to protect discrete and insular minorities against majoritarian
discrimination, the brief continued, homosexual Coloradans must at least be able
to access the courts to vindicate their rights following the passage of Amendment
2.443
The American Association on Mental Retardation et al. (AAMR) brief
argued that neither homosexual individuals nor individuals with disabilities can
be characterized as merely “identifiable groups,” as the Colorado Supreme Court
has done.444 Rather, both homosexuals in this case and the mentally retarded in
Cleburne “were singled out by the state for discriminatory treatment because of
who they are, and not because of a political position they have taken or a club
they have chosen to join.”445 Those who have been singled out for such invidious
discrimination, but who the Court has not designated as a suspect class, “are in
particular need of judicial protection from irrational laws.”446 The AAMR also
critiqued the tier system of Equal Protection analysis because it has left out so
many individuals and groups who have experienced invidious discrimination.447
The Oregon states brief argued that, even if sexual orientation is not a
suspect class, Amendment 2 violates Equal Protection by interfering with states’
“‘compelling’ interest in public accommodation laws addressed to non-suspect
as well as suspect groups.”448 Amici States found this particularly disturbing
because they have found that “bias crimes result in particularly great individual
and societal harm because they ‘provoke retaliation crimes, inflict distinct
emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest’” and thus state
officials need to be able to enact legislation specifically targeting hate crimes in
order to protect public safety and morale.449
Some amici stressed that the Court could find Amendment 2
unconstitutional even without moving to heightened scrutiny. Thus, Oregon and
other State amici submitted that Amendment 2 was “illegitimate” under any
level of scrutiny and found Moreno and Cleburne apt in explaining the policy
behind the law was nothing more than “discrimination for discrimination’s

441. Id. at 25.
442. Id. at 26.
443. Id. at 26-27.
444. Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. in Support of Respondents at 16,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
445. Id. at 17 (arguing that, despite the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick refusing to invalidate state
anti-sodomy laws, classifications based on sexual orientation require strict scrutiny because
homosexuals are not defined by their sexual behavior).
446. Id.
447. See id. at 4 (“Petitioners’ conceptualization of the tiers as the entirety of equal protection law,
rather than as a tool, would also mean that the protection of the equal protection clause will
increasingly be reserved for those who need it least.”).
448. Oregon States Brief, supra note 429, at 19.
449. Id. at 19-20 (internal citations omitted).
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sake.”450 The brief asserted that Colorado’s justifications for the law—to have less
government regulation, to have more uniform statewide laws, or to avoid
interfering with the religious, moral or associational interests of private
citizens—were not actually served by Amendment 2.451 Indeed, the brief
questioned the legitimacy of this last state interest since it seemed to be merely
state-sanctioned discrimination.452
Finally, in a brief that “ended up having a profound influence on the
Court’s understanding of the case,”453 Laurence Tribe and several constitutional
law professors maintained that Amendment 2 was a “per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause” because:
[A] state’s constitution by definition denies equal protection of the laws when it
decrees that homosexuality, or indeed any identifying characteristic the state uses
to select a person or class of persons from the population at large, may never be
invoked as the basis of any claim of discrimination by such persons under any
present or future law or regulation enacted by the state, its agencies, or its
localities.454

This brief put the entire issue of suspect classifications to the side, since
homosexuals need not be a suspect classification to warrant the basic protection
Equal Protection requires. Such a boldface violation of the Equal Protection
Clause failed even rational basis review. The brief used the language of
“outlawry” to explain the constitutional evil:
[T]he command of equal protection extends to every person within the state’s
jurisdiction, regardless of what that person might have done, and certainly
regardless of what that person might be inclined to do. Outlawry may be
consistent with some regimes, but it is not consistent with the regime
contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Amendment 2 does not
literally declare any class of citizens to be outlaws; that is, it does not completely
strip any set of persons of all legal rights, thereby placing them in all respects
outside the law. . . . It does, however, deprive them of equal protection, and it is
this deprivation that should be deemed fatal under the Equal Protection
Clause.455

As I will now discuss, this notion of “outlawry” finds echoes in the Romer
majority’s reference to Amendment 2 making a class a “stranger to its laws.”
F. The U.S. Supreme Court Rules: Romer v. Evans
What is striking about the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans
450. Id. at 14-15.
451. See id. at 8-16 (noting that “Amendment 2 is invalid because it lacks a legitimate state
objective.”).
452. See id. at 29 (noting that “when a law focuses on unpopular personal traits, there is a point at
which the law’s loose fit to its purported objectives provides no real confidence that is rests on
anything other than prejudice or private bias.”).
453. BALL, supra note 27, at 131.
454. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (emphasis in original).
455. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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after reading the state court opinions and all the friends of the court briefs filed
in the Supreme Court is how comparatively little attention the Court gives to the
campaign for Amendment 2, the rationales asserted for it, and the Colorado
courts’ evaluation of them. It is also striking how confidently and matter-offactly the Court was able to rule that Amendment 2 was simply constitutionally
out of bounds. As noted above, Justice Kennedy opened the majority opinion
with Justice Harlan’s admonition that “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor
tolerate classes among citizens.’”456 He ended with the Court’s often-quoted
conclusion that: “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot
do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.”457
What the Court did not do was to adopt the Colorado Supreme Court’s
rationale for striking down Amendment 2 (based on that court’s reading of U.S.
Supreme Court precedents), that it “infringed the fundamental right of gays and
lesbians to participate in the political process.”458 It also did not adopt that
court’s holding that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny, requiring
Colorado to demonstrate a compelling state interest for violating a fundamental
right.459
One common theme, nonetheless, in both high court opinions is that
Amendment 2 “singled out” a class in a way that was constitutionally
problematic. Justice Kennedy wrote that a central principle of Equal Protection is
that “government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance.” Equal protection “‘is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.’”460 Thus, “[r]espect for this principle explains why
laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general
hardships are rare.”461 Perhaps reflecting the influence of the Tribe amicus brief,
Kennedy stated that a law like Amendment 2, which “identifies persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection across the board” is “not within our
constitutional tradition.”462 The Court also rejected the argument that
Amendment 2 simply denies homosexuals “special protection,” or “special
rights,” countering that “the amendment imposes a special disability upon those
persons alone.”463
A key issue in the DOMA litigation in the First and Second Circuits was
whether Romer stands for something other than deferential rational basis review,
whether it be called “‘rational basis plus or intermediate scrutiny minus.’”464

456. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(dissenting opinion), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
457. Id. at 635.
458. Id. at 625-26 (“We . . . now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different from that
adopted by the State Supreme Court.”).
459. Id. at 635.
460. Id. at 633.
461. Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 631.
464. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting counsel for BLAG’s
witty characterization).

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor

409

Romer finds Amendment 2 invalid under both forms of rational basis review.
First, Justice Kennedy’s opinion articulated the general rule for assessing
whether a law offends Equal Protection: “if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”465 He continued:
“Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.” He
explained that “the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as
we shall explain, invalid form of legislation.”466 And “its sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests.”467
Justice Kennedy then stated that “Amendment 2 confounds this normal
process of judicial review,”468 where “a law will be sustained if it can be said to
advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works
to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous.”469 In those cases:
[T]he laws challenged . . . were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a
sufficient factual context for us to ascertain some relation between the
classification and the purpose it served. By requiring that the classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure
that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law.470

Amendment 2, however, is “at once too narrow and too broad.”471 As
quoted above, Justice Kennedy highlighted how Amendment 2 “identifies
persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board,” a
“resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific
protection from the law [that] is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”472 Justice
Kennedy then cited earlier Supreme Court precedent, in a passage that appears
in the Windsor briefs and in his majority opinion: “‘[d]iscriminations of an
unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether
they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’”473 He observed that
Amendment 2 departs from “our constitutional tradition,” in which “laws
singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general
hardships are rare.”474 This part of the Court’s opinion supports reading Romer

465. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
466. Id. at 632.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 633.
469. Id. at 632 (citations omitted).
470. Id. at 632-33 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
471. Id. at 633.
472. Id.
473. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
474. Id.
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as calling for the notion that courts should take a closer look when facing certain
type of class-based legislation.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion returned to the issue of animus, on the heels of
this call for “careful consideration” of laws with “discrimination of an unusual
character.” He stated: “laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.”475 In support he cited to Moreno’s language about equal
protection requiring that a “‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.’”476 This language,
henceforth, will be a staple in arguments about classifying on the basis of sexual
orientation, including in the DOMA litigation.
The Court devoted one paragraph to considering and finding
constitutionally inadequate the State’s proffered rationales. This passage
warrants quotation in full precisely because of the economy of words, given the
extensive discussion in the amicus briefs discussed above about whether the
rationales offered for Amendment 2 were constitutionally sufficient:
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other
citizens’ freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or
employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.
Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination
against other groups. The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from
these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot
say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or
discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual
context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it
is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection clause does not permit. “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . “477

While the Court acknowledged the religious liberty and freedom of
association rationales, it does not mention the argument made by Colorado and
many of its amici that Amendment 2 permissibly, under Bowers v. Hardwick,
reflects moral disapproval of homosexuality and protects morality and the
family. That theme is central in Justice Scalia’s memorable dissent, in which he
accused the majority of mistaking “a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,” and
contended that Amendment 2 was surely constitutional as a “modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws.”478 Colorado long ago had decriminalized sodomy, Justice Scalia pointed
out. How, he asked, could the Court say “homosexuality cannot be singled out
for disfavorable treatment,” when just ten years earlier, in Bowers—a case the
majority nowhere mentions, let alone overrules – it upheld a state law imposing

475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. at 634.
Id. (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
Id. at 636. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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criminal punishment on homosexuals for sodomy.479 In Scalia’s words (similar to
those in CWA’s amicus brief): “If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to
make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a
State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.”480 What’s
more: “Surely . . . the only sort of ‘animus’ at issue here [is] moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the
centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.”481
Amendment 2, Justice Scalia contended, was an example of how a society
that eliminated criminal punishment could nonetheless continue to express
“moral and social disapprobation of homosexuality,” and, in doing so at the state
level, “counter” successfully the “disproportionate political power” of
homosexuals who resided in “disproportionate numbers” in urban areas.482
Here, Scalia’s dissent echoes claims by amici about the political power of
homosexuals.
Scalia painted a picture of Coloradan voters exposed to
“homosexuals’ quest for social endorsement” happening not just in places like
New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, but right there in the cities of
Colorado.483
Finally, Scalia accused the majority of taking sides in the culture wars with
the knights, “more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and
values of the lawyer class” – rather than with the “villeins” – evidently the
people of Colorado who passed Amendment 2 “to prevent piecemeal
deterioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans.”484 The
Court has taken sides, he contended, not only by “inventing a novel and
extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional
forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional
attitudes.”485 This accusation that the Court has taken sides in a cultural war and
called the losing side bigots – and worse—recurs in Scalia’s dissent in Windsor, as
I will discuss in Part III.G.3.
G. Reactions to Romer v. Evans
Across the ideological spectrum, activists and commentators immediately
recognized that the Court’s decision in Romer was a “watershed” and presented a
“new landscape” on which future battles over civil rights for gay men and
lesbians would occur.486 As Keen and Goldberg report, Amendment 2 had
“spawned a series of copycat measures all over the country;” one immediate
effect of the Romer ruling was to “edge[] to a close this era of gay politics in
which popular initiatives took direct aim at gay people’s ability to obtain

479. Id. (citing to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
480. Id. at 641.
481. Id. at 644.
482. Id. at 645, 647.
483. Id. at 646.
484. Id. at 653.
485. Id. at 652.
486. KEEN AND GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 235.
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protection against discrimination.”487
Romer drew sharp criticism from conservative critics for usurping the
political process, limiting the use of law to preserve traditional morality, and
possibly opening the door to judicial imposition of same-sex marriage. The
Court’s attribution of animus to Amendment 2 drew particular ire. In 1996, in a
famous symposium in First Things, Charles Colson warned of “kingdoms in
conflict,” and that “the Court in Romer v. Evans effectively branded a bigot any
citizen who considers homosexuality immoral.”488 He predicted that, under
Romer, the Court would “easily find no compelling state interest in confining
marriage to a man and a woman.”489 He also, as he did later in the Manhattan
Declaration, discussed the problem of what Christians should do when facing
unjust laws.490
Hadley Arkes, a conservative social scientist, contended that Amendment 2
simply sought to ensure that “coercions of the law would not be used to punish
those people who bore moral objections to homosexuality,” which the Court now
characterized as animus or blind prejudice.491 Romer, Arkes argued, pronounced
“the traditional moral teaching of Judaism and Christianity as empty, irrational,
unjustified.”492 Arkes, who had recently testified in Congress in support of
DOMA, warned that Romer opened the door to judges imposing gay marriage,
which went contrary to the “natural teleology of the body.”493
Marriage would soon become a new focus for conservative and gay rights
activists. For, “just two days after the Romer ruling,” the Clinton Administration
announced that President Clinton would sign the Defense of Marriage Act if
Congress passed it.494
III. THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
On September 21, 1996, near the end of his first term, in a closed, aftermidnight session to avoid publicity, President Clinton signed DOMA.495
487. Id. at 226–227, 238.
488. Charles W. Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 1996), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/11/006-the-end-of-democracy-kingdoms-in-conflict-34.
489. Id.
490. Id. Colson later was a co-author with Robert George (also a participant in the First Things
symposium) of “The Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience” (2009), which sounded
the alarm about redefining marriage and filed an amicus brief in Windsor, discussed infra in Part
III•E. See Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, MANHATTAN DECLARATION (Nov.
20,
2009),
http://manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration
_full_text.pdf.
491. Hadley Arkes, A Culture Corrupted, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 1996) available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/11/005-the-end-of-democracy-a-culture-corrupted-21.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. KEEN AND GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 239 (arguing that, in doing so, Clinton “disregarded
the [Romer] decision’s clear message”).
495. Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996,
at A21; see also Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/us/politics/bill-clintons-decision-and-regreton-defense-of-marriage-act.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (making the point that President Clinton
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Introduced in the House of Representatives in May 1996 by Republican
Representative Bob Barr (Georgia),496 and, in the Senate, by Republican
Senator Don Nickles, with presidential candidate Republican Senator Robert
Dole as co-sponsor,497 DOMA’s “two primary purposes” were “to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” and “to protect the right of
the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition
of same-sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implications that
might attend the recognition by one State of the right for homosexual couples
to acquire marriage licenses.”498 To achieve the second purpose, Section 2
provides that no state “shall be required to give effect” to any public act or
judicial proceeding of another state with respect to a “relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State.”499 Section 3, the provision recently struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Windsor, after successful challenges in federal court, defines
marriage, for purposes of federal statute, regulation, or administrative
interpretation, as meaning “only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife;” “spouse” shall refer “only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”500 This federal definition of marriage
and spouse meant that none of the over 1000 federal laws referring to
marriage501 — including various governmental benefits and obligations —
would apply to marriages between two men or two women – even though
such marriages were valid as a matter of state law.
The impetus for DOMA, as the House Report explains, was a “very
particular development in the State of Hawaii”: “state courts in Hawaii appear
to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples” and that prospect “threatens to have very real consequences both on
federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of the various
States.”502 In effect, members of Congress perceived that an “orchestrated legal
assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights

avoided publicity at the signing of DOMA).
496. For an informative look back at the history of DOMA, see Chris Geidner, Marriage Wars,
METRO WEEKLY, July 14, 2011, available at http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=6427
[hereinafter Marriage Wars].
497. Chris Geidner, Double Defeat, METRO WEEKLY, Sept. 15, 2011, available at
http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=6567.
498. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, supra note 11, at 2.
499. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
500. Id. at § 3.
501. See Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (“The enactment’s comprehensive
definition of marriage for purposes of all federal statutes and other regulations or directives covered
by its terms . . . does control over 1,000 federal laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as
a matter of federal law.”) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE
ACT:
UPDATE
TO
PRIOR
REPORT
1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92442.html.). The House Report accompanying DOMA used
slightly different numbers: “The word ‘marriage’ appears in more than 800 sections of federal statutes
and regulations, and the word ‘spouse’ appears more than 3,100 times.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, supra
note 11, at 10.
502. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, supra note 11, at 2.
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groups and their lawyers” had met with initial success in the Hawaiian courts
(by contrast to earlier lawsuits brought in other states) and that “it appears
that judges in Hawaii are prepared to foist the newly-coined institution of
homosexual ‘marriage’ upon an unwilling Hawaiian public,” and also,
ultimately, on other States, as couples married in Hawaii and then demanded
that their home States recognize their marriages.503 A decision by the
Hawaiian court, in other words, could spawn a sort of “marriage tourism”
that would threaten the sovereignty of individual states.
At the time Congress voted on DOMA, the Hawaii Supreme Court had
ruled, in a 1993 opinion, that denying gay and lesbian couples the right to
marry presumptively violated the sex discrimination provisions of its state
constitution and that the state would have to justify its marriage law under a
strict scrutiny standard.504 A trial was scheduled for September 1996.
Hawaiian State Representative Terrance Tom testified that Congress must act
if they could act “to preserve the will of the people as expressed through their
elected representatives,” and that congressional “inaction . . . runs the risk that
a single judge in Hawaii may re-define the scope of federal legislation, as well
as legislation throughout the other forty-nine states,” surely a “dereliction of
the responsibility” invested in members of Congress by voters.505
Given this article’s dual focus on Amendment 2 and DOMA, it is notable
that another state legislator urging Congress to act was Representative
Marilyn Musgrave, of the Colorado House of Representatives, who reported
on her unsuccessful efforts to enact a state DOMA in Colorado.506 Although
the legislature passed such a law, Governor Romer vetoed it, leaving
Colorado, the House Report asserts, “particularly exposed to an argument –
sure to be made by gay rights groups – that its laws currently do not evince a
public policy sufficiently strong to ward off a Hawaiian same-sex ‘marriage’
license.”507
DOMA moved through the House quickly and successfully, perhaps
because of the dominance of the Contract with America Republicans.508 The
Senate held just one day of hearings on the DOMA bill. Some Democratic
Senators (such as Senator Edward Kennedy) strongly opposed DOMA as
unconstitutional., More typical, however, was the stance of Senator Tom
Daschle, then Senate Democratic leader, who voted for DOMA as the lesser
of two evils, fearing that a proposed federal constitutional marriage
amendment was “inevitable.”509 Moreover, some rationalized that, if they
went along on DOMA, they might, as a compromise, get their colleagues to
support the Employment Nondiscrimination Act. Dissenters, like Senator

503. Id. at 2–3, 6.
504. Id. at 4 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)).
505. Id. at 17.
506. Id. at 10 n.32.
507. Id. at 10 n.33.
508. Marriage Wars, supra note 496.
509. Chris Geidner, Becoming Law, METRO WEEKLY,
http://metroweekly.com/feature/?ak=6613.

Sept.

29,

2011,

available

at
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Kennedy, argued that DOMA was unnecessary since states have always had
the authority to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriage that offended the
strong public policy of the state and it was by no means clear that marriages
even fell within the Full Faith and Credit Clause.510 Dissenters noted that there
was no “emergency,” since the trial in Hawaii had not even taken place and,
in the meantime, “14 states have enacted laws which in some fashion make
explicit those states’ objection to same sex marriages.”511 Further, some
members of Congress and some constitutional law experts questioned
DOMA’s constitutionality.512
The DOJ consistently gave its opinion that DOMA was constitutional,
even reiterating that view after the U.S. Supreme Court released its opinion in
Romer.513 The House Report was highly critical of Romer, calling it, “to put it
charitably, an elusive decision” and finding it “difficult to fathom” how “the
Court majority,” applying a rational basis standard, could have concluded
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional.514 In particular, the report noted that, as a
result of the local antidiscrimination ordinances Amendment 2 sought to halt,
“Colorado citizens who have moral, religious, or other objections to
homosexuality could be forced to employ, rent an apartment to, or otherwise
associate with homosexuals.”515 Surely, it was “conceivable,” the Report
continued, that Amendment 2 “would advance the State’s interest in
protecting the associational freedom of such persons.”516 The Report also
found the Court’s failure to mention Bowers “unsettling,” asserting (like
Scalia’s dissent) that “If (as in Bowers) moral objections to homosexuality can
justify laws criminalizing homosexual behavior, then surely such moral
sentiments provide a rational basis for choosing not to grant homosexuals
preferred status as a protected class under antidiscrimination laws.”517 The
report concluded, nonetheless, that “it would be incomprehensible for any
court to conclude that traditional marriage laws are (as the Supreme Court
concluded regarding Amendment 2) motivated by animus toward
homosexuals.”518 To the contrary, such laws “have been the unbroken rule
and tradition in this (and other) countries primarily because they are
conducive to the objectives of procreation and responsible child-rearing.”519
Thus, referring back to the “legitimate government interests” that DOMA
advanced, the Report’s “short note” on Romer concludes that DOMA is

510. See Dissenting Views on H.R. 3396, H.R. REP. No. 104-664, supra note 11, at 36–37.
511. Id.
512. See id. at 27–28 (referring to Senator Edward Kennedy introducing Professor Laurence Tribe’s
letter into the Congressional Record, at 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-33 (June 6, 1996)).
513. See id. at 33–34 (including letter from DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs to Hon. Henry J.
Hyde).
514. Id. at 32 (“A Short Note on Romer v. Evans”).
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 32–33.
518. Id. at 33.
519. Id.
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“plainly constitutional under Romer.”520
Congress, thus, passed DOMA. Later in 1996, the couples challenging
Hawaii’s law prevailed at trial when the state failed to demonstrate a
compelling state interest to exclude them from marriage.521 That victory in
court was short-lived. While the trial court ruling was on appeal to the Hawaii
Supreme Court, Hawaii voters, on November 3, 1998, approved by a
substantial margin (69 to 29%) a constitutional amendment, proposed by the
Hawaii legislature, that gave the legislature the power to “reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”522 Meanwhile, the Hawaii legislature approved a
Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law, giving same-sex couples and various pairs of
individuals who could not marry access to a small subset of the benefits and
rights linked to marriage.523
IV. CHALLENGES TO SECTION 3 OF DOMA: UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
At the time Congress enacted DOMA, no state in the United States allowed
same-sex couples to marry. In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to allow
such marriages, after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health, ruled in favor of a state constitutional challenge to
Massachusetts’s marriage law brought by several same-sex couples.524 Issued in
2003, just months after Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers, the Goodridge opinion
frequently drew on Lawrence in articulating how human dignity, respect, liberty,
and equality are at stake in matters of sexual intimacy, marriage, and family.525
Within several more years, several more states would allow same-sex marriage,
either as a result of constitutional litigation or legislative enactment.526 Yet more
states (such as New York) indicated they would recognize such marriages, even
if they did not (yet) allow them.527 Because of DOMA, this new era of state
marriage law led to practical problems when marriages, valid under state law,
were not valid under federal law. Spouses or surviving spouses were ineligible
for the numerous federal benefits linked to marital status, such as, in Windsor, the
exemption from estate tax a surviving spouse enjoys. Lawsuits filed by same-sex
couples, surviving spouses, and the states themselves challenged Section 3 as

520. Id.
521. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996). For an informative account of the trial, see BALL,
supra note 27, at 151–98.
522. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (approving HB 117 (1997)). See also BALL, supra note 27, at 178–85
(describing political context of Hawaiian ballot initiative).
523. See Reciprocal Beneficiaries, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2011). For a discussion of the problems
with this strategy of “partial equality,” see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 184–87 (2006).
524. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
525. Id. at 958–59. I elaborate on the role of Lawrence in Goodridge in MCCLAIN, supra note 523, at
162–70; and FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 159, at 184–90.
526. For a helpful overview of these legal developments in the District of Columbia and the
fourteen states that now permit same-sex couples to marry, see www.FreedomtoMarry.org/states.
527. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398–400 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169
(2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that New York, “through its executive agencies and appellate courts,
uniformly recognized Windsor’s [out of state] marriage” in 2009, when she paid federal estate taxes).

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor

417

unconstitutional.528
The Department of Justice initially defended DOMA, even though (as did
President Obama) it urged Congress to repeal it. On February 2011, the DOJ
changed direction. Attorney General Eric Holder wrote a letter to the Speaker of
the House, Hon. John A. Boehner, informing him that “after careful
consideration, . . .the President of the United States has made the determination
that Section 3 of [DOMA] . . . as applied to same-sex couples who are legally
married under state law, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment,” and accordingly, that the DOJ will not defend DOMA in the “new
lawsuits” brought in the federal district courts of Connecticut and New York. 529
The Second Circuit, he observed, where these suits would ultimately be heard on
appeal, had not yet ruled on what standard of review to apply to classifications
based on sexual orientation.
Holder explained that he and President Obama had concluded that
“classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny and
that, as applied to same-sex couples legally married under state law, Section 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional.”530 If, however, the district courts in the Second
Circuit concluded that rational basis should be the applicable standard for
reviewing DOMA, the DOJ would “state that, consistent with the position it has
taken in prior cases, a reasonable argument for Section 3’s constitutionality may
be proffered under that permissive standard.”531 However, it would leave it to
Congress to make any such defense. Subsequently, Congress did so, through the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives
(BLAG).532
Holder turned to prior Supreme Court precedents identifying four factors
indicating that a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis is appropriate for
classifications based on sexual orientation.533 He stressed as particularly
important “a significant history of purposeful discrimination against gay and
lesbian people, by governmental as well as private entities, based on prejudice
and stereotypes that continue to have ramifications today.”534 He referred to
Lawrence, noting that “until very recently, states have ‘demean[ed] the[]
existence’ of gays and lesbians ‘by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.’”535

528. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6–7, 15–16 (1st
Cir. 2012) (detailing lawsuits challenging Section 3 brought by Massachusetts couples and by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; affirming lower court ruling finding Section 3 unconstitutional).
529. Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Holder]. All quotes in text from Holder’s
analysis of DOMA are from this letter, unless otherwise indicated.
530. Id. at 2.
531. Id. at 6.
532. This is a bit of a misnomer since the two Democrats in this five-member group have
declined to participate in defending DOMA.
533. Letter from Holder, supra note 529, at 2 (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 438 U.S. 587, 602–03
(1987); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985)).
534. Id.
535. Id. at 2.
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Holder noted that “recent evolutions in legislation” (such as the repeal of
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell), “community practices,” “case law” (such as Romer and
Lawrence), and social science “all make clear that sexual orientation is not a
characteristic that generally bears on legitimate policy objectives.”536 Although
many circuit courts had concluded that only rational basis review is necessary
for sexual orientation, many reasoned from analogy from Bowers, a line of
argument no longer available since Lawrence.
Turning to Holder’s discussion of the constitutional status of expression of
moral disapproval through law, he identified “moral disapproval” as a primary
purpose of DOMA, contending that “the legislative record underlying DOMA’s
passage . . . contains numerous expressions reflecting moral disapproval of gays
and lesbians and their intimate and family relationships – precisely the kind of
stereotype-based thinking and animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to
guard against.” 537 He noted that the DOJ – when it was defending DOMA—had
already disavowed two rationales as “unreasonable” two rationales: “responsible
procreation and child-rearing.”538 “As the Department has explained in
numerous filings, since the enactment of DOMA, many leading medical,
psychological, and social welfare organizations have concluded, based on
numerous studies, that children raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to
be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents.”539
In support of his conclusion that DOMA fails intermediate scrutiny, Holder
cites to Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore.540 Notwithstanding the President’s
conclusion that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional under such scrutiny,
Holder informed Congress that the President had instructed executive agencies
to “continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA” until Congress repealed it or
“the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law’s
constitutionality.”541 Holder stated that such a stance “respects the actions of the
prior Congress that enacted DOMA” and “recognizes the judiciary as the final
arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”542 As discussed below, this stance of
enforcing but not defending Section 3 introduced issues of standing. Because the
Windsor v. United States challenge to DOMA is the one in which the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and ultimately decided, it is that case on which I focus
my analysis in the rest of this article.
A. Windsor v. United States: the Federal District Court Ruling
In Windsor v. United States, Edith Windsor, the widow of Thea Spyer,
challenged Section 3 in federal district because, under it, she did not qualify for
the unlimited marital deduction from federal estate tax and had to pay $363,053
when, “according to her last will and testament, Spyer’s estate passed for
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3-4 n.5 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 13).
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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Windsor’s benefit.”543
Windsor and Spyer had been in a “committed
relationship” since shortly after they met in 1963, and, as Spyer’s health
deteriorated, they married in Canada in 2007.544 Spyer died in 2009 and, after
paying the estate taxes, Windsor sued in November 2010, seeking a refund of the
federal tax paid and a declaration that Section 3 “violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”545 At the time they married, New York did not
permit same-sex couples to marry, and its highest court, in Hernandez v. Robles,546
had rejected a state constitutional challenge by same-sex couples to their
exclusion from New York’s marriage laws. This led BLAG, which had
successfully moved to intervene to defend DOMA after the DOJ announced it
would no longer do so, to challenge whether Windsor had standing to challenge
DOMA.547 By 2009, the relevant year for tax purposes, however, “all three
statewide elected executive official[s] – the Governor, the Attorney General, and
the comptroller – had endorsed the recognition of Windsor’s marriage,”548 and
more, generally, marriages by New York same-sex couples who validly married
in other jurisdictions.
In the federal district court action, the United States argued that the court
should apply intermediate scrutiny to Section 3 because it classified based on
sexual orientation.549 Plaintiff Windsor argued that the court should apply strict
scrutiny because homosexuals are a suspect class, or, in the alternative,
intermediate scrutiny.550 BLAG contended that rational basis review was the
proper test and that, “under that standard, there are ample reasons that justify
the legislation.”551
The federal district court declined Windsor’s invitation to decide, “as a
matter of first impression in the Second Circuit,” whether homosexuals were a
suspect class, triggering strict scrutiny.552 To do so, the court observed, would
require distinguishing “precedent” in the eleven federal courts of appeals that
had applied rational basis to classifications based on sexual orientation.553
Nonetheless, the court found Section 3 unconstitutional,554 applying rational
basis review as informed by the First Circuit’s reasoning in another DOMA
challenge, Massachusetts v. DHHS.555 In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge
Michael Boudin, a Republican nominated to the bench by President George H.W.

543. 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
544. Id. They registered as domestic partners in New York City in 1993, “as soon as that option
became available.” Id.
545. Id.
546. 855 N.E.2d 1 (2006). The Court of Appeals, however, noted that the legislature could, if it
chose to do so, enact a marriage equality law.
547. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 398.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 397.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 401.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 406.
555. 682 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
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Bush, the First Circuit struck down Section 3 using the “more searching form of
rational basis review” that the Supreme Court has applied in circumstances
where minorities with a historical pattern of disadvantage are subject to
“discrepant treatment,” in contrast with “ordinary economic legislation.”556 The
First Circuit found this pattern in the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence in
Romer, Moreno, and Cleburne.557
The Windsor district court also invoked Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Lawrence, which cited the Romer, Moreno, and Cleburne trio as
illustrating that the Supreme Court’s equal protection decisions “have
increasingly distinguished” between “‘[l]aws such as economic or tax legislation
that are scrutinized under rational basis review[, which] normally pass
constitutional muster,’ and ‘law[s that] exhibit[] . . . a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group,’ which receive ‘a more searching form of rational basis
review . . . .’”558 At the same time, the court invoked Romer in observing that,
whether or not this more “searching” review was required “where a
classification burdens homosexuals as a class,” the court must still “‘insist on
knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be
attained,’” and must evaluate whether government’s asserted interests are
legitimate.559 Applying these principles and “mindful of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudential cues,” it concluded that Section 3 “does not pass constitutional
muster.”560
Observing that BLAG advanced “some, but not all” of the justifications
Congress offered for DOMA and asserted some additional interests, the court
asked (following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Heller v. Doe) whether
Windsor had “‘negative[d] every conceivable basis which might support’”
Section 3.561 BLAG did not press the moral disapproval argument; instead, it
asserted that Congress rationally might have enacted DOMA: (1) out of
“caution,” so Congress could maintain the definition of marriage “universally
accepted in American law” while considering whether to embrace some states’
novel definitions of marriage, (2) to promote childrearing and procreation in an
ideal family structure, (3) to provide for consistency and uniformity of benefits,
and (4) to conserve the public fisc.562 The approach the court took (similar to the
First Circuit) was to conclude that, even assuming the various asserted interests
were legitimate, BLAG had not shown how Section 3 advanced them since it
“creates a federal definition of marriage” and leaves “the decision of whether
same-sex couples can marry” to the states.563 Thus, as to “caution,” the court
noted that DOMA “did not compel” states to “‘wait[ ] for evidence spanning a
longer term before engaging in . . . a major redefinition of a foundational social
556. Id. at 11–12.
557. Id. at 10.
558. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-580 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
559. Id. (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
560. Id. at 402.
561. Id. at 403 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993)).
562. Id. at 403–06.
563. Id. at 403.
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institution;’” indeed, “[a] number of states now permit same-sex marriages.”564
On the second asserted rationale, the court concluded that, although BLAG
argued Congress “might have passed DOMA to deter heterosexual couples from
having children out of wedlock, or to incentivize couples who are pregnant to get
married” (the accidental procreation argument), DOMA “has no direct impact on
heterosexual couples at all”: excluding one group of people from federal benefits
cannot logically “incentivize[]” another group to marry or procreate.565 Noting
that, at most, DOMA might have an “indirect effect on popular perceptions of
what a family ‘is’ and should be” and no effect on “the types of family structures
in which children in this country are raised,” the court invoked Romer:
“‘Congress’s goal is ‘so far removed’ from the classification, it is impossible to
credit its justification.’”566
The problem with the consistency and uniformity of benefits argument, by
contrast, was not a lack of fit between means and ends, but that the means were
not legitimate in view of “important principles of federalism.”567 The court
pointed out that, prior to DOMA, “any uniformity at the federal level with
respect to citizens’ eligibility for marital benefits was merely a byproduct of the
states’ shared definition of marriage,” rather than a result of Congress
sponsoring or promoting uniformity.568 Even assuming Congress had
“developed a newfound interest” in such uniformity, DOMA’s method – making
a “sweeping federal review” of state decisions concerning same-sex marriage,
sanctioning some and rejecting others – was not legitimate in light of
federalism’s placing “matters at the ‘core’ of the domestic relations law
exclusively within the province of the states.”569 Concurring with the First Circuit
on “‘the virtue of federalism,’” the court observed that, “through their legislative
or constitutional processes,” states may make different choices about whether to
“preserve traditional marriage or to redefine it.”570 Historically, as BLAG
conceded, “the federal government has not attempted to manage those processes
and affairs” unless a state was unable to assume this role.571
The district court also found the First Circuit’s opinion instructive on the
constitutional status of the appeal, in the House Report on DOMA, to promoting
traditional morality. The district court distinguished between an interest in
merely preserving tradition for its own sake, which might not be legitimate, and
an interest in “preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”572 The latter,
the court stated, “when coupled with other legitimate interests, could be a sound

564. Id. at 404.
565. Id. at 404.
566. Id. at 405 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 405. The district court cites a similar conclusion reached by the
federal district court in the First Circuit DOMA challenge. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249-250 (D. Mass. 2010)).
570. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (quoting Massachusetts, 682 F. 3d at 16).
571. Id.
572. Id. at 403 n. 3.
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reason for a legislative classification.”573 Indeed, it quoted the First Circuit,
evidently agreeing that “‘[p]reserving th[e] institution [of traditional marriage] is
not the same as mere moral disapproval of an excluded group, and that is
singularly so in this case given the range of bipartisan support for [DOMA].”574
The district court drew on Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence,
where, on the one hand, she read Romer as teaching that “[m]oral disapproval of
a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection
Clause,” but, on the other, asserted that “[u]nlike the moral disapproval of samesex relations – the asserted state interest in [Texas’s sodomy law] – other reasons
exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of
an excluded group.”575 (As I will discuss below, Justice O’Connor’s words appear
repeatedly in friends of the court briefs filed on both sides in the Supreme Court
stage of the Windsor litigation.)
Finally, the district court considered whether an “‘interest in promoting
heterosexuality,’” asserted by Congress but not by BLAG, might provide a
rationale for DOMA. Applying the test (seen in Romer) that “a permissible
classification must at least ‘find some footing in the realities of the subject
addressed by the legislation,’” the court pointed out that Section 3 only affects
married homosexual persons and it is “implausible” to believe that it serves to
persuade them “to abandon their current marriages in favor of heterosexual
relationships.”576 Citing Cleburne, the court found that the goal of promoting
heterosexuality is “so attenuated from DOMA’s classification that it ‘render[s]
the distinction arbitrary or irrational.’”577 Thus, the court deployed the Cleburne,
Moreno, and Romer framework, but did not explicitly attribute Section 3 to
animus.
After the district court’s ruling, BLAG promptly appealed to the Second
Circuit. Edith Windsor filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment (by
the Second Circuit), urging the Supreme Court to resolve the constitutionality of
DOMA before the Second Circuit ruled, in light of her age (83) and because the
U.S. government “continues to enforce [section 3] pending resolution” by the
Supreme Court,” causing individuals like her to “continue to suffer serious
consequences from the Government’s failure to recognize their lawfully
solemnized marriages.”578 BLAG opposed the certiorari petition, arguing that,
due to various problems with Windsor’s case, the First Circuit DOMA case
provided a better vehicle for resolving Section 3’s constitutionality.579 The
Solicitor General also urged the Court that the First Circuit case provided a better
vehicle for resolving the constitutional questions, but if the Court did not agree,
573. Id.
574. Id. (quoting Massachusetts, 682 F. 3d at 16).
575. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583, 585 (2003)) (O’Connor, J., concurring), cited at Windsor,
833 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
576. Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 403 n. 4 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
577. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).
578. Petition for Writ of Certiorari before Judgment, Windsor v. United States, No. 12-63 at 4, 12.
579. See Brief in Opposition (filed by BLAG), Windsor v. U.S., No. 12-63, at 1 (arguing that the
Court should grant certiorari in the First Circuit case because of questions of Windsor’s standing and
the absence of a Second Circuit ruling).
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then it should grant Windsor’s petition.580 As I will now discuss, the Second
Circuit ruled before the Court considered Windsor’s petition.
B. Windsor v. United States: The Second Circuit Calls for Heightened Scrutiny
On October 18, 2012, in another opinion authored by a Republican
appointed by President George H.W. Bush, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit became the second federal appellate court to strike down
Section 3.581 The Second Circuit did so applying intermediate scrutiny, the
standard of review urged by the DOJ and Windsor (if the court did not move all
the way to strict scrutiny).582 It noted, but declined to follow, the First Circuit’s
reasoning for not adopting heightened scrutiny. One reason was that it did not
read the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer, to apply rational basis review as
implying a “refusal to recognize homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class,” since
“the litigants in Romer had abandoned their quasi-suspect argument after the
trial court decision” and did not press that issue before the Supreme Court. 583
The Second Circuit also disagreed, on two grounds, with the First Circuit’s
suggestion that moving to intermediate scrutiny would “‘imply[] an overruling’”
of Baker v. Nelson, where the Supreme Court summarily dismissed, “for want of
a substantial federal question,” an appeal from a Minnesota Supreme Court
decision “finding no right to same-sex marriage” and no violation of equal
protection.584 First, the Second Circuit reasoned, Baker was decided before
“intermediate scrutiny” was in the Court’s vernacular and, second, it pre-dated
Romer, when the Court first ruled that a classification of homosexuals lacked a
rational basis.585 For these reasons, the Second Circuit also rejected BLAG’s more
far-reaching reading of Baker as compelling “the inference that Congress may
prohibit same-sex marriage in the same-way [as Minnesota] under federal law
without offending the Equal Protection Clause.”586
While the First Circuit and the federal district court in Windsor read the
Court’s precedents to support a “more exacting rational basis review for
DOMA,” the Second Circuit observed that the Supreme Court “has not expressly
sanctioned such modulation in the level of rational basis review,” leaving “some
doctrinal instability in this area.”587 To illustrate, it compared Justice O’Connor’s

580. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before Judgment, Windsor v. U.S., at 10. The U.S. argued that
the Court should “hold this petition” pending its consideration of the petition in DHHS v.
Massachusetts and the petition for certiorari before judgment in Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinsky, No.
12-16). It asserted that Windsor’s petition raised threshold questions that were potential obstacles to
her petition: she sought cert before judgment and BLAG questioned whether New York law
recognized her Canadian marriage.
581. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). The judge was Chief Judge Dennis
Jacobs.
582. Id. at 181.
583. Id at 179.
584. Id. at 178-79 (discussing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
585. Id. (distinguishing Baker, 409 U.S. 810).
586. Id. at 178.
587. Id. at 180-81. The Second Circuit noted that BLAG’s counsel had “wittily” referred to this test
as “rational basis plus or intermediate scrutiny minus.” Id. at 180 (quoting Oral Arg. Tr. 16:10-12).
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characterization in her Lawrence concurrence (cited by the Windsor district court)
of the “more searching form of review” the Court used in Equal Protection cases
such as Romer with Justice Marshall’s criticism of the Court, in his Cleburne
partial concurrence and dissent, for failure to articulate the factors that justify
“‘second order’ rational basis review.”588 The Second Circuit acknowledged that
Romer’s statement that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest”589 supports the point that,
while “indulgent and respectful,” rational basis is not meant to be
“‘toothless.’”590 Nonetheless, it observed that “the existence of a rational basis for
Section 3 of DOMA is closely argued” by BLAG and its amici; because rational
basis review requires the party challenging a law to “disprove ‘every conceivable
basis which might support it,’” such a party takes up a heavy load.”591 The court
continued: “that would seem to be true in this case – the law was passed by
overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress; it has varying
impact on more than a thousand federal laws; and the definition of marriage it
affirms has been long-supported and encouraged.”592
The Second Circuit avoided this problem because “fortunately . . .
heightened scrutiny is available” and should be used to assess Section 3 of
DOMA.593 Henceforth, classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny and “substantially related to an important
governmental interest.”594 The court drew on two famous sex-based
discrimination cases, U.S. v. Virginia and Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, to explain that “substantially related” means that government’s
explanation must be “exceedingly persuasive.”595
The Second Circuit’s analysis of the four factors that the Supreme Court has
used to decide whether a new classification qualifies as suspect or quasi-suspect
was similar to that offered in the Holder letter, discussed above. Thus, on the
first factor, “whether the class has been historically ‘subjected to
discrimination,’” it noted that Lawrence recounted how criminal laws punishing
homosexual conduct “demean[ed] [homosexuals’] existence [and] control[led]
their destiny.”596 Indeed, such laws are “perhaps the most telling proof of animus
and discrimination,” and (until Lawrence) “had the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court.”597 Windsor and several friends of the court, the court observed, “labor to

588. Id. at 181 n.3 (comparing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J, concurring) with, among
other cases, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 459-460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
589. Id. at 180 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)).
590. Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Vison, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 510 (1976)).
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 181.
594. Id. at 185.
595. Id. (citing United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
596. Id. at 181-82.
597. Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
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establish and document this history, but we think it is not much in debate.”598
On the second, “whether the class characteristic ‘frequently bears [a]
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,’” the Second Circuit
utilized Frontiero v. Richardson,599 a sex-based discrimination case, for the point
that what distinguishes the characteristic singled out in the legislation from some
non-suspect statutes is that the characteristic “‘frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society.’”600 Homosexuality is like sex in that
there is “no such impairment” inhibiting an individual’s “ability to contribute to
society.”601 The court stated: “The aversion homosexuals experience has nothing
to do with aptitude or performance.”602 BLAG argued that “same-sex couples
have a diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the raising
of children.”603 The court countered that BLAG cited “no precedential application
of that standard to support its interpretation” of that factor, which referred to
“one’s general ability to contribute to society.”604 Further, “the abilities or
inabilities cited by BLAG bear upon whether the law withstands scrutiny . . .
rather than upon the level of scrutiny to apply.”605
On the third factor, that the group have a distinguishing characteristic,
sometimes couched as “immutability,” BLAG argued that immutability did not
apply because sexual orientation is “not necessarily fixed,” but “may change
over time, range along a continuum, and overlap.”606 The Second Circuit
referenced a broader test than immutability: “whether there are ‘obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define . . . a discrete group.’”607
The critical point was “whether the characteristic of the class calls down
discrimination when it is manifest.”608 That discrimination occurs, pursuant to
Section 3, “when a surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage [Windsor] seeks the
benefit of the [federal] spousal deduction” and the federal government refuses to
recognize her marriage.609 Thus, married same-sex couples are “the population
most visible to the law, and they are foremost in mind when reviewing DOMA’s
constitutionality.”610
Finally, on the fourth factor, political powerlessness, the Second Circuit
concluded that “homosexuals are still significantly encumbered in this respect,”
that is, they “may be unable to protect themselves from discrimination at the

598. Id. at 182.
599. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
600. Windsor, 699 F. 3d at 182 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; also citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-442 (1985)).
601. Id.
602. Id. at 182-83.
603. Id. at 183.
604. Id. (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id. (emphasis in opinion) (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
608. Id.
609. Id. at 184.
610. Id.
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hands of the majoritarian political process.”611 Certainly, homosexuals “clearly”
have “achieved political successes over the years,” but the question is whether
they can protect themselves from “wrongful discrimination.” The court drew
parallels between the “status of women at the time of Frontiero” and that of
“homosexuals today” to conclude that, even if a group wins some political
victories, they may still be powerless for purposes of heightened protection,
especially if they are under-represented in positions of power and authority.612
Noting the risks to gay men and lesbians of identifying their sexual preference
publicly, the court concluded that “homosexuals are not in a position to
adequately protect themselves from the discriminatory wishes of the
majoritarian public.”613 Strikingly, it was this fourth factor, political
powerlessness, that the trial court in Evans v. Romer concluded plaintiffs had not
demonstrated because of their political success.614 It is also notable that the
Second Circuit’s observations about the risk of identifying as homosexual, made
in 2012, closely parallel those made in friends of the court briefs before the
Supreme Court nearly twenty years ago in Romer (discussed in Part II).
Applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the Second Court found that the
arguments offered by BLAG for Section 3 failed. It observed that “[a]t argument,
BLAG’s counsel all but conceded that these reasons for enacting DOMA may not
withstand intermediate scrutiny.”615 Romer played a role in the court’s analysis.
First, BLAG argued there was a “unique federal interest[]” in maintaining a
“consistent federal definition of marriage,” but the Second Circuit concluded that
this emphasis on uniformity was “suspicious” and deserved a “cold eye” cast
upon it, given the historical and continuing deference by Congress and the
Supreme Court to “state domestic relations laws, irrespective of variations.”616
As a friend of court brief filed by family law professors explained, DOMA “left
standing all other inconsistences in the laws of the states, such as minimum age,
consanguinity, divorce, and paternity.”617 Under Romer, the court observed, “the
absence of precedent . . . is itself instructive; ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’”618 Under the intermediate scrutiny
framework, Section 3’s “unprecedented breach” of deference to federalism fails
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” test.619
BLAG’s other rationales also failed the intermediate scrutiny test.
“Preserving traditional marriage as an institution,” the Second Circuit

611. Id.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 185.
614. See supra Part II.B.3.
615. Windsor, 699 F. 3d at 185.
616. Id. at 185-86.
617. Id. at 186 (referring to Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Family Law Professors & the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 1213, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Family Law Brief]).
618. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). This language will feature in Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor. See Part IV.F.
619. Id.

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor

427

concluded, could not suffice: if “‘[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give
[a law] immunity from attack for lacking a rational basis,’”620 then all the more so
under a heightened scrutiny test.621 In Lawrence, it observed, the Supreme Court
analogized anti-sodomy laws to anti-miscegenation laws in explaining that
appeals to history or tradition alone cannot save a law.622 Even if, however,
preserving marriage were in itself an “important goal,” DOMA does not do so; as
the district court observed, Section 3 leaves it to states to define who may
marry.623
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected a cluster of staple arguments in BLAG’s
defense of DOMA: the law advances responsible procreation and childrearing.
DOMA does so, BLAG argued, by providing benefits to the only couples who
can procreate “‘naturally’” – opposite sex couples; by subsidizing “biological
parenting;” and by facilitating “the optimal parenting arrangement of a mother
and a father.”624 Promoting procreation “can be an important governmental
objective,” the Second Circuit stated, but DOMA lacked a substantial relationship
to that goal.625 Indeed, noting that the First Circuit and the lower court were not
able to find “even a rational connection” between DOMA and these asserted
interests, the Second Circuit reiterated that DOMA does not provide any
“incentives for heterosexual couples” – any “incremental reason” for them to
engage in “responsible procreation.”626
C. The Windsor Dissent: DOMA Rests on More than “Mere Moral Disapproval”
One judge on the three judge panel, Circuit Judge Straub, issued a lengthy
dissent.627 Justice O’Connor’s assertion, in Lawrence, that “other reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group” featured prominently in the dissent’s contention that several
federal purposes advanced for DOMA – either by Congress or BLAG – readily
survived rational basis review.628 Further, the dissent read Romer as employing
conventional rational basis review and criticized the First Circuit for “creat[ing] a
novel ‘plus’ level of scrutiny applicable to DOMA,” which would “deprive the
American people of further consideration of DOMA through their democratically
elected representatives.”629 The dissent also viewed the First Circuit’s move to a
heightened form of rational basis review to evaluate classifications based on
sexual orientation – and, a fortiori, the Second Circuit majority’s move to
620. Id. at 187 (quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993)).
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id. (referencing Windsor v. U.S., 833 F.Supp.2d 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
624. Id. at 188.
625. Id.
626. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir.
2012); Windsor, 833 F.Supp.2d at 404-05; Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mngmt., 881 F.Supp.2d 294, 2012
WL 3113883, at *40–43 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012)(emphasis added)).
627. Id. at 188-211 (Straub, J., dissenting).
628. Id. at 189, 199 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 197-208 (concluding several rationales survive rational basis review).
629. Id. at 209-10 (critiquing Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9).
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intermediate scrutiny—as precluded both by Romer, which the Court decided
“without a need to employ a more exacting level of review,” and by the
precedential effect of Baker v. Nelson.630 While the majority stressed that Baker predated the Court’s modern equal protection jurisprudence, the dissent stressed
that Edith Windsor’s equal protection challenge to Section 3 was “essentially
identical” to the challenge brought to Minnesota’s law; because the Court’s
summary affirmance was “a merits decision,” from which the Court “has never
walked away,” lower courts must apply traditional rational basis review.631
Even under rational basis, the dissent acknowledged, Romer teaches that
“laws that single out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status ‘raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.’” 632 So, too, under Moreno, “such animosity
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental objective.”633 The dissent asserted,
however, that a discriminatory law may still be valid if it is motivated “both by
impermissible purposes (e.g., animus, negative attitudes, malice, fear, the desire
to harm a group, moral disapproval, ignorance) and permissible purposes.”634
Concluding that “any single valid rationale is sufficient to support DOMA’s
constitutionality,” the dissent chose to analyze only certain rationales offered by
BLAG and not others.635 This allowed it to steer clear of Congress’s appeal to
moral approval and disapproval, instead hewing to Justice O’Connor’s guidance
about the existence of reasons for supporting marriage other than “mere moral
disapproval.”636 Other lower courts, the dissent noted, have concluded that
“denying same-sex couples federal marriage rights or even the right to marry at
all can be grounded in reasons other than animus.”637
While the majority found that BLAG’s asserted rationales of promoting
responsible procreation and childrearing, even if plausible, lacked a sufficient fit
with Section 3, the dissent found them legitimate in light of marriage’s role in
“combat[ting] the risk of instability which is characteristic of inherently
procreative opposite-sex relationships, but absent from same-sex
relationships.”638 The dissent relied on the “accidental pregnancy” form of the
channeling argument elaborated in Hernandez v. Robles: marriage addressed the
problem that only opposite-sex couples may produce “unintended, unplanned,
unwanted children” by “creat[ing] more stability and permanence in the

630. Id. at 209-10. I do not elaborate here on the dissent’s lengthy treatment of Baker v. Nelson,
which appears at Windsor, 699 F. 3d at 192-95, 209-11. By contrast, the First Circuit concluded that
Baker prevented it from adopting intermediate scrutiny, but not the more searching form of rational
basis review. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9-10.
631. Windsor, 699 F. 3d at 189, 192-93.
632. Id. at 197 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996)).
633. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
634. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)).
635. Id. at 197, 208.
636. Id. at 199 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)(O’Connor., J., concurring)).
637. Id. (citing, inter alia., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 7
(striking down Section 3 but observing “we do not rely upon the charge that DOMA’s hidden but
dominant purpose was hostility to homosexuality”)).
638. Id. at 200.
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relationships that cause children to be born.’”639 Similarly, the dissent credited
BLAG’s assertion of a Congressional desire “to have children raised in families
with only biological mothers and fathers, which same-sex couples cannot
provide,” again stressing marriage’s institutional role in “encourage[ing]
biological parents to remain together.”640 Under rational basis, the dissent
concluded, where “means and ends need not match,” Congress’s “‘common
sense’ regarding the needs of children” need not yield to a lack of scientific
evidence showing that children reared by opposite-sex couples fare better than
those reared by same-sex couples.641
As to the consistency and uniformity of benefits rationales asserted by
BLAG, the dissent granted the general force of principles of federalism with
respect to domestic relations law, but contended: “that the federal government
often defers to state determinations regarding marriage does not obligate it to do
so.”642 Congress “reasonably froze federal benefits policy as it existed in 1996
with respect to same-sex marriage” to wait to see how state law developed,
letting states “serve as laboratories of policy development,” and “to avoid
federal implications of state-law developments in the area of marriage.”643 The
dissent stressed that Congress may have its own definition of marriage. Indeed,
the dissent devoted several pages to quoting passages from over a century of
Supreme Court opinions extolling the institution of marriage as the foundation of
society to support its conclusion that: “Marriage today, according to the federal
government, means what it has always meant – a holy union, essential to the
survival of the species, between a man and a woman, the principle purpose of
which is to encourage responsible child rearing.”644 To Windsor’s argument that
DOMA “establishes two tiers of married couples in states that permit same-sex
marriage” with respect to federal benefits, the dissent countered that Congress
could rationally prefer a different kind of uniformity: no same-sex couples would
be eligible for federal marital benefits.645
The dissent concluded by stressing that, “the American people and their
elected representatives,” rather than courts, should settle such matters as
“whether connections between marriage, procreation, and biological offspring
recognized by DOMA and the uniformity it imposes are to continue.”646 When
courts intervene in “robust political debate” by entertaining claims like

639. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Robles, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y. 2006) (plurality opinion)). An
influential version of the argument that marriage is the institution that brings order to certain
features of heterosexual sex and procreation that could otherwise lead to a chaotic society is Justice
Cordy’s dissent in Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
640. Id. at 201 (also citing Brief Addressing the Merits of the State of Indiana and 16 other States
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 24, 35, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter
Indiana Brief]).
641. Id. at 201–02.
642. Id. at 202.
643. Id. at 204.
644. Id. at 205–07.
645. Id. at 208.
646. Id. at 211.
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Windsor’s, it “poisons the political well, imposing a destructive anti-majoritarian
constitutional ruling on a vigorous debate.”647
D. Moral Disapproval, Romer, and More in Friends of the Court Briefs before the
Supreme Court
Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s ruling, the United States filed a
supplemental brief with the Supreme Court, urging the Court to grant certiorari
in the Windsor case because the Second Circuit’s decision “materially strengthens
this case as a vehicle for reviewing the constitutionality of Section 3 of
DOMA.”648 Windsor filed a short supplemental brief in support of her prior
petition, referencing her prior arguments and those of the U.S. in its new brief.649
BLAG argued that the Court should review DOMA’s constitutionality, but that
Windsor was not the best vehicle for doing so.650 On December 7, 2012, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry, and, in
both cases, requested briefing not only on the merits but also on the question of
standing. In Windsor, it requested briefing on whether the Court was deprived of
jurisdiction, under Article III, to hear the DOMA challenge once the U.S.
government agreed with plaintiff Edith Windsor about DOMA’s
unconstitutionality and whether BLAG had standing.651 These intensely-watched
cases generated numerous amicus curiae briefs filed on both sides by states,
members of Congress, medical and psychological organizations, bar associations,
religious groups, professors, and individuals. In this section, I will analyze some
of the prominent themes in the briefs filed on both sides in Windsor, pointing out
parallels to and differences from the briefs filed nearly twenty years ago in
Romer.
There were eighty amicus curiae briefs filed in Windsor, thirty two in
support of respondent BLAG; forty six in support of respondent Windsor; and
two in support of neither party.652 The Windsor majority and dissenting opinions

647. Id.
648. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner United States at 7, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) ( No. 12-307).
649. Supplemental Brief of Respondent Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
650. Supplemental Brief for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 2, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
651. See Supreme Court Information, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, available at
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-307.htm. In Hollingsworth, it
requested briefing on whether the petitioners (proponents of Proposition 8) had standing under
Article
III.
See
Proceedings
and
Orders,
http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/hollingsworth-v-perry/.
652. This count is based on reviewing the docket. See Preview of the United States Supreme
Court
Cases,
U.S.
v.
Edith
Schlain
Windsor,
Docket
No.
12-307.
www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/12-307.html; Supreme Court Information, U.S.
v. Windsor, www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?Flename=/docketfiles/12-307.htm. In addition,
the Court appointed law professor Vicki Jackson as amicus curiae “to argue the position that the
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the dispute.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
The author of this article joined an amicus brief filed in support of Windsor, Brief of Amici Curiae
Family and Child Welfare Law Professors and in Support of Respondents, as well as amicus briefs
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expressly referred to few of the amicus briefs, but arguments made in the briefs
find echoes in the various Windsor opinions. Even apart from the question of
whether one can match judicial opinions to strands of argument by the amici, it is
instructive to examine these arguments to identity the different ways amici on
opposing sides used Romer, and, more generally, the Cleburne-Moreno-Romer trio.
In addition, by contrast to briefing on Romer, which took place when Bowers was
the Court’s last word on the use of law to express moral disapproval of
homosexuality, the Windsor amici (some of whom also were amici in Romer)
operated in a legal landscape in which Lawrence had, ten years earlier, overruled
Bowers.
Amici took sharply conflicting views about the import of the
combination of Romer and Lawrence for the proper standard of review as well as
for DOMA’s constitutionality. Since Justice Kennedy wrote both of those
opinions, the briefing in Windsor might well be viewed as an example of what
Susan Estrich and Kathleen, years ago, called “writing for an audience of one,”
with Justice Kennedy, instead of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the “real
audience” that the parties and their amici were trying to persuade.653
The several themes that I analyze overlap with, but are not identical to, the
themes discussed in Part II in the Romer briefs. One obvious reason is that Romer
itself, and its precedential significance for DOMA’s constitutionality, especially
when combined with Lawrence, was a central theme in a large number of the
Windsor amicus briefs. For that reason, rather than separating out “animus” as a
theme, I focus on how amici enlisted it or disavowed it in evaluating various
rationales offered for DOMA. In addition, because the Court, in Windsor,
declined the Second Circuit’s invitation to embrace intermediate scrutiny and
instead utilized Romer’s template of careful consideration, I put to the side, for
the most part,
arguments made about whether sexual orientation or
homosexuality meet the criteria for a suspect or quasi-suspect classification
except to the extent that these arguments pertain to the issues of moral
disapproval and animus. I now turn to these lines of arguments: (1) arguments
about the relevance of Romer and Lawrence to the constitutionality of DOMA; (2)
arguments about protecting morality and marriage and about a national debate
over marriage; (3) arguments about religious liberty and a clash of rights;654 and

filed by this group in lower court proceedings in the DOMA litigations.
653. See Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 122–23 (1989) (observing that the battle over abortion rights in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), made clear that “eight men may read our briefs,
but the real audience is one woman”: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor).
654. By contrast to the briefing in Romer, there was considerably less argument in Windsor about
freedom of association. Such argument generally appeared in arguments that contended that samesex marriage would threaten religious liberty. See, e.g., Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hollingsworth and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (On the
Merits) at 29, United States v. Windsor, 133. S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Becket Brief]
(asserting that conflicts resulting from redefining marriage would “implicate the fundamental First
Amendment rights of religious institutions, including the rights to freedom of religion and freedom
of association”); Brief for the American Jewish Committee as Amicus Curiae Supporting Individual
Respondents (On the Merits) at 26, United States v. Windsor, 133. S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)
[hereinafter AJC brief] (stating that civil recognition of same-sex marriage may pose problems for
individuals who do not want to associate with same-sex couples).
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(4) argument about “letting the people decide.”
1. Arguments about the Relevance of Romer and Lawrence to the
Constitutionality of DOMA
(a) Arguments made in support of BLAG and for upholding DOMA
Amici who supported BLAG and DOMA generally attempted to enlist
Romer and Lawrence to support the argument that homosexuals are not a suspect
class, and therefore traditional rational basis review is the appropriate test for the
Court to apply. For example, the Family Research Council (FRC), a repeat player
from Romer, argued that Romer itself did not designate homosexuals as a suspect
class, even though the Court “had the opportunity to do so,” and instead struck
down Amendment 2 on “rational basis grounds.”655 Thus, the federal district
court in Windsor correctly “declined plaintiff’s invitation to apply heightened
scrutiny” to Section 3, given Romer and the fact that eleven federal circuit courts
of appeal “have applied the rational basis test to legislation that classifies on the
basis of sexual orientation.’”656 Similarly, an amicus brief filed by the Christian
Legal Society and several other organizations asserted that Judge Straub’s dissent
from the Second Circuit majority opinion correctly criticized the majority’s break
from those eleven circuits in moving to higher scrutiny.657 FRC denied that
Lawrence’s overturning of Bowers rendered these circuit court opinions
distinguishable, since some decisions post-dated Lawrence, and, in any case,
Lawrence itself “employed the rational basis standard of review, the very same
standard that was used in the pre-Lawrence authorities” that rejected heightened
scrutiny.658 FRC also noted that the Windsor district court declined to apply
heightened scrutiny because, “as the Supreme Court has observed, ‘courts have
been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system,’ to create new
suspect classes.”659 Therefore, FRC argued: “[P]ublic discrimination towards
persons who are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class is permissible
as long as such official discrimination is rationally linked to the furtherance of
some valid public interest.”660 Thus, under existing precedent, “regardless of
animus,” discrimination against homosexuals was constitutional if “rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”661
655. Brief for the Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal) at 4, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter FRC Brief] (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 1
(1992)).
656. Id.
657. Brief for Catholic Answers, Christian Legal Society, and Catholic Vote Education as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits and
Supporting Reversal) at 22, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter
Catholic Answers Brief].
658. FRC Brief, supra note 655, at 19 (citations omitted).
659. Id. at 4 (citing Order of June 6, 2012, at 14–15 (quoting City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985))).
660. Id. at 31 (citing Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati Inc., v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,
297 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629, 632 (1996))).
661. Id. at 31–32.
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In FRC’s view, the Windsor district court’s conclusion that DOMA failed the
rational basis test was flawed in part because “[n]one of the four cases the district
court cited” – Romer, Cleburne, Moreno, and Lawrence – “supports the proposition
that ‘law[s that] exhibit[] . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group’
should be subjected to ‘a more searching form of rational basis review . . . under
the Equal Protection Clause;” further, Lawrence was decided on due process
grounds. 662 Many amicus filing in support of BLAG similarly contended that
Romer and Lawrence showed that rational basis review is “consistent with the
level of scrutiny that this Court has applied to legislative classifications on the
basis of sexual orientation.”663
Another frequent claim in briefs filed in support of BLAG was that Lawrence
did not support an argument that DOMA violates equal protection because
Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, stated that “other reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group.’”664 For example, the brief filed by United States Senators for
BLAG asserts: “It is simply not irrational or bigoted to oppose the redefinition of
marriage in a manner ‘unknown to history and tradition.’”665 The amicus brief
filed by the Liberty Counsel for BLAG asserted that Section 3 furthers not just
legitimate interests, but important governmental objectives “that reinforce the
link between marriage and procreation.”666 (I will return to amici’s arguments
about the ends marriage serves below.)
Amici also distinguished Lawrence because it concerned government’s
infringement upon liberty and privacy, not, as the Court observed, the issue of
formal recognition of same-sex relationships.667 Marriage, after all, is “more than
a private act,” the Foundation for Moral Law argued; it is “a civil and religious
institution that involves child welfare, child-rearing, income tax status
(individual, joint, or separate tax returns; deductions; credits)[,] estate and
inheritance tax considerations, testamentary rights, privileged communications
(husband-wife privilege), Social Security and Medicare benefits, military housing
allowances, and a host of other matters.”668 Thus, “DOMA is not simply

662. Id. at 31–32 n. 2.
663. Brief for Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group at 26, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter Liberty
Counsel Brief].
664. Brief of United States Senators Orrin G. Hatch, Saxby Chambliss, Dan Coats, Thad Cochran,
Mike Crapo, Charles Grassley, Lindsey Graham, Mitch McConnell, Richard Shelby and Roger Wicker
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 28, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter U.S.
Senators Brief].
665. Id.
666. Liberty Counsel Brief, supra note 663, at 36.
667. Brief for Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives (On the Merits) at
12, 14, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Eagle Forum Brief].
668. Brief for Foundation for Moral Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 27, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter Foundation for Moral Law Brief].
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Lawrence revisited.”669 The American Civil Rights Union (ACRU) asserted:
The redefinition of marriage involves public recognition of a relationship— not
privacy or liberty. This case involves no governmental infringement on plaintiffs’
constitutional privacy or liberty rights. The traditional definition of marriage
does not limit personal autonomy, and it does not prevent citizens from defining
or living according to their own individual concepts of existence.670

ACRU further distinguished between government unconstitutionally
prohibiting certain conduct and constitutionally declining to “promote or
facilitate it.” Analogizing to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, ACRU asserted:
while the state certainly cannot ban same-sex relationships under Lawrence, the
government is under no obligation to recognize or facilitate them to the same
degree as traditional marriages. The European Court of Human Rights drew this
precise distinction in holding that member states could adhere to traditional
marriage even though they cannot ban same-sex relationships. Furthermore, the
same privacy concerns that animated Lawrence preclude the argument (often
advanced by same-sex marriage advocates) that traditional marriage cannot
serve the interest of responsible procreation unless government limits marriage
to fertile couples. Such a bizarre and invasive rule would stand Lawrence, and
this Court’s privacy jurisprudence, on its head.671

Some amici maintained that upholding traditional morality and expressing
moral disapproval were a sufficient basis for law, notwithstanding Lawrence,
since “American history, law, and traditional morality speak with a clear voice
that homosexuality is to be opposed and any formal government recognition of a
homosexual relationship is to be rejected.”672 Similarly, amici also contended
that Washington v. Glucksberg was a “better analog to this case than Lawrence,”
because there is no “tradition” of same-sex marriage, while “the traditional
definition of marriage has existed throughout the world for centuries and has
been reaffirmed by a substantial majority of States and the Federal
Government.”673 Thus, ACRU argued:
As in Glucksberg, this Court should allow the States and Congress to continue the
ongoing democratic debate over the wisdom of extending marriage to same-sex
relationships, instead of interpreting the Constitution to mandate a definition of
marriage that lacks any support in our nation’s history, traditions, or practices
and that tens of millions of Americans fundamentally oppose.674

669. Id.
670. Brief for the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hollingsworth and
Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal) at 6–
7, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter ACRU Brief].
671. Id. See also Foundation for Moral Law Brief, supra note 668, at 27–28 (“Even if we were to
agree with Lawrence, which Amicus does not, that private sexual conduct is an aspect of a person’s
right to define one’s own existence, that is far from saying that the person has a right to require that
the federal government echo a state’s ‘formal recognition’ of same-sex ‘marriage’ and convey upon it
all the benefits and recognitions that usually follow. Not even Lawrence requires such a leap.”).
672. Foundation for Moral Law Brief, supra note 668, at 26.
673. ACRU Brief, supra note 670, at 7 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
674. Id.
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Similarly, the Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation and North Carolina Values
Coalition Foundation cited to Glucksberg – as well as Romer – in suggesting that
same-sex marriage is a political, and not a judicial, prerogative:
Judicial restraint is imperative because the asserted [fundamental] rights are
removed from the arena of public debate and legislative action. . . . Even the right
to marry—as the concept has been widely understood for centuries—does not
appear in the text of the Constitution. Redefining that right is a radical
proposition and a matter of heated debate.675

Amici appealed to government’s interest in preserving marriage as a way to
defuse charges of animus. Thus, the U.S. Senators brief’s two-step argument was
that: first, the charge that DOMA was “allegedly motivated by unconstitutional
‘animus’” is insufficient because “legislative motivation is not a basis for setting
aside a federal statute supported by legitimate and rational government
interests;” second, “support for traditional marriage cannot be equated to
‘animus.’”676 (I elaborate on arguments about animus below.) Similarly, amici
read Equal Protection precedents like Moreno as meaning simply that a law
could not rest merely on disapproval of a group (such as “hippies”), but would
be constitutional “even if some or all members who voted for it expressed
disapproval of [such a group] as their reason for doing so,” so long as the
furthered a “legitimate government interest. “677
Amici also worked around Romer and its conclusions about animus by
contrasting Amendment 2 with Section 3, and asserting that, although the Court
found Amendment 2 unconstitutional, it should not reach such a conclusion
about DOMA. For example, the U.S. Senators brief contended: “[a]lthough the
Court noted that ‘laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected,’” the Court’s inference was “based on the structure of the amendment
and the absence of ‘any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective’”
rather than on a “subjective evaluation of the motives of the . . . people of
Colorado.”678 The brief submitted: “This distinction is of critical importance
because judicial scrutiny of legislative motives is fraught with peril.”679 Similarly,
Liberty Counsel contrasted Section 3 with Amendment 2: “Section 3 of DOMA
simply provides the definition for how the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse’ will be
construed for purposes of federal law. As such, it does not impede access to the
political process.”680 Another amicus contended that Romer only guaranteed
“political rights to petition government that homosexuals—as individuals—

675. Brief for Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation and North Carolina Values Coalition as Amici
Curiae Supporting Hollingsworth and Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (Addressing
the Merits and Supporting Reversal) at 2, United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12307)[hereinafter Liberty, Life and Law Foundation Brief].
676. U.S. Senators Brief, supra note 664, at 9 (citations omitted).; ACRU Brief, supra note 670, at 6.
677. U.S. Senators Brief, supra note 664, at 26.
678. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
679. Id.
680. Liberty Counsel Brief, supra note 663, at 28-29 (referring, as a “compare” cite, to Romer, 517
U.S. at 624).
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theretofore had shared with all citizens,” and that such political rights do not
extend to a right to same-sex marriage.681
Some amici resisted the changed landscape brought about by Romer and
Lawrence, favorably invoking Justice Scalia’s dissents in those cases. Thus, the
Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund, Inc. appealed to Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Lawrence to contend that the people, rather than the judiciary, should
decide whether there is a right to same-sex marriage: “‘people, unlike judges,
need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual
marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and
may legislate accordingly.’”682 The brief also invoked Justice Scalia’s warning
that, by striking down Texas’s sodomy law, the Court opened the door to attacks
on traditional marriage laws and urged the Windsor Court to “extricate” itself
from (again, invoking Justice Scalia) going down a “‘slippery slope’” to
“‘produc[ing] a result that bears no resemblance to the America that we
know.’”683 Westboro Baptist Church referenced Justice Scalia’s criticism of the
Lawrence majority signing on to homosexuals’ “agenda” in describing the
acceptance of homosexuality as “the product of . . . a law-profession culture, that
has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda.”684
(b) Arguments made in support of Windsor
Many amici supporting Windsor offered arguments about why heightened
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of judicial review by which to assess
Section 3. At the same time, amici drew on Romer and Lawrence to stress that the
Court could strike down DOMA even without making such a move. Thus, in
their brief, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAAD) and Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund stated: “The focus on heightened scrutiny in the
parties’ filings, . . . should not leave the Court with the impression that
heightened scrutiny would be required to find DOMA unconstitutional. To the
contrary, this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence requires the same result
even absent heightened review.”685 The brief argues that DOMA fails under the
heightened rational basis review set forth in Romer. As GLAAD and Lambda
LDEF summarize the Court’s jurisprudence:
[P]articular attention is warranted under equal protection review, including
when: (1) the group disadvantaged by a measure is traditionally disliked or
misunderstood, (2) important personal or liberty interests are at stake, and (3) the

681. Eagle Forum Brief, supra note 667, at 24 (emphasis in original).
682. Id. at 10 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
683. Id. at 12 (citing Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
695-96 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
684. Brief for Westboro Baptist Church as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party (Suggesting
Reversal) at 7, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter Westboro
Baptist Church Brief] (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603).
685. Brief for Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders and Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Edith Windsor and the United States
(Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance), United States v. Windsor, at 3, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (No. 12-307)[hereinafter GLAAD & Lambda Brief].
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disadvantageous classification arises not in the usual course of governing but as
a one-time departure from past practice. Under these circumstances, the usual
presumption of constitutionality—that classifications are being drawn in good
faith, for genuine purposes, and not arbitrarily or to penalize a disfavored
group—is weakened.686

DOMA “raises concerns under all these criteria,” and, thus, “presents the
paradigmatic case for particularly demanding review under this Court’s
‘conventional and venerable’ rational basis test.”687 Accordingly, “a string of
recent lower court decisions,” including the First Circuit’s DOMA opinion, “have
each held DOMA unconstitutional even under rational basis review.”688
The GLAAD/LAMBDA LDEF brief also turns to Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lawrence to explain how the Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer trio
supports heightened rational basis review of Section 3: “[E]ven absent
application of heightened scrutiny, the normal presumption of constitutionality
is less conclusive when a measure disfavors a historically disadvantaged or
unpopular group. The targeting of such groups raises questions about whether
bare antipathy formed the basis for the legislation. . . In such cases, the Court has
applied ‘a more searching form of rational basis review.’”689 The brief drew on
Romer to assert that “‘animus’ toward gay people is not a legitimate basis for
law,” but pointed out, drawing on a concurrence by Justice Kennedy, that the
“category of prohibited rationales extends well beyond overt animosity, bigotry,
or hatred” to include “a more subtle yet harmful ‘insensitivity caused by simple
want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard
against people who appear to be different in some respects from ourselves.’”690
The brief invoked both Lawrence and Romer for the point that “it is obvious that
the persons disadvantaged by DOMA have historically been mistreated and
condemned,” and “[f]or that reason alone, laws that selectively disadvantage gay
men and lesbians, as DOMA does, merit closer attention.” 691 In a passage that
has some parallel in Justice Kennedy’s eventual majority opinion in Windsor,
amici emphasized the ways in which DOMA places burdens on the marriages of
same-sex couples in daily life, and then explicitly framed the injury in Romer’s
terms:
[I]rrespective of whether the burdens imposed by DOMA on the marriages of
same-sex couples are viewed as encroaching on fundamental rights to family
relationships, the family and liberty interests at stake are certainly substantial.
The burdens of having one’s lawful marriage negated in the many important
areas of life touched by the federal government (which range from treatment

686. Id. at 6.
687. Id. at 6-7 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
688. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
689. Id. at 7-8 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
690. Id. at 17 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
691. Id. at 13 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
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under the tax laws to legal protections in federal court, private pension plans,
rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and federal benefits under numerous
programs, among others) pervasively disadvantage those relationships and
thereby implicate “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of
children.” . . . .[E]ven indirect burdens on such interests merit close attention. . . .
Moreover, DOMA’s wholesale refusal to afford marriages of same-sex couples
any legal recognition withdraws a panoply of protections of marriage that
cumulatively “constitute ordinary civic life in a free society” taken for granted by
other married couples.692

In this passage, the brief signals a way the Court could strike down DOMA
without engaging in fundamental rights analysis and deciding whether
homosexuals have the same fundamental right to marry as heterosexuals.
In another significant amicus brief, New York, along with other states that
permitted or recognized same-sex marriage and states that offered legal
recognition to same-sex couples’ relationships through civil union or domestic
partnerships laws , argued that, under Romer, Section 3 of DOMA was “so
sweeping” that if fails “any level of scrutiny,” “even rational basis review.”693
The New York Brief honed in on language in Romer that subsequently featured in
Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion as providing the relevant legal framework:
“DOMA’s discriminatory treatment of state marriage laws and same-sex couples
married under state law requires more than minimal justification. This Court has
recognized that laws that impose novel disabilities and ‘[d]iscriminations of an
unusual character’ warrant more searching scrutiny even under a rational basis
standard.”694 Amici states, appropriately, stressed that this “unusual”
discrimination implicated federalism: “Section 3 of DOMA imposes just such a
novel and unusual rule of non-recognition on marriages that are valid under
state law, and thereby constitutes a broad, unprecedented intrusion into state
regulation of domestic relations.”695
The New York Brief further fit Section 3 into the Romer template by stressing
its sweep, a feature that must lead it to fail the “skeptical examination warranted
by its legislative novelty and its substantial federalism costs.” Amici argued, in
the alternative, that Section 3 would fail “even if more searching scrutiny” was
not used because it “is so unmoored from any concrete federal end that it fails
even rational basis review. Like [Amendment 2], DOMA’s staggering breadth
‘confounds [the] normal process of judicial review’ because it lacks even a
rudimentary fit between ‘the classification adopted and the object to be
attained.’”696 Contending that “DOMA’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages

692. Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted).
693. Brief on the Merits for the States of New York et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 18, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)
[hereinafter New York Brief].
694. Id. at 5–6 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277
U.S. 32, 37 (1928))).
695. Id. at 6. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Bar Ass’n in Support of Respondent
Edith Schlain Windsor on the Merits Question at 25, United States v. Windsor, 133. S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307) [hereinafter ABA Windsor].
696. New York Brief, supra note 693, at 18 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 633).
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does nothing to conserve federal resources, while inflicting stigmatic harm on
married same-sex couples who are excluded from statutory definitions of
marriage,” amici states appeal to Romer’s conclusion that a law lacks a legitimate
interest when it is “‘inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects.’”697 Amici invoked Romer’s concluding passage: “At bottom, section 3
accomplishes only one coherent objective: making married same-sex couples
‘unequal to everyone else,’ . . . an aim that violates equal protection.”698
The amicus brief filed by 172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
and 40 U.S. Senators highlighted the contrast between DOMA and ordinary
“Acts of Congress” to argue, under Romer, that DOMA “must fail even if it does
not trigger heightened review.”699 By contrast to amici in support of BLAG who
stressed the irrelevance of legislative motive, these legislators highlighted the
central role that “moral disapproval” played in enacting DOMA – as evidenced
in the House Report – and cited that disapproval as evidence that DOMA was
based on impermissible “animus.”700 This excerpt from the brief illustrates how
thoroughly these members of Congress enlisted Romer, even to the point of
Justice Kennedy’s opening quotation from Justice Harlan:
Justice Harlan famously said in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that “the
Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” . . . . That
unassailable principle, which lies at the very heart of this Nation’s character,
dictates the outcome here: DOMA is constitutionally impermissible “class
legislation” [Romer (quoting Justice Harlan)], plain and simple.
Virtually every feature of DOMA distinguishes it from routine “statutory
definitions and other line-drawing exercises.” . . . It was enacted without any
genuine effort to discern a connection to a legitimate federal interest. It singles
out married same-sex couples by one trait alone and denies them protection
across the board. And a purpose for its enactment, clearly stated in the House
Report and during floor debates, was moral disapproval of the minority group
that it burdens. None of the arguments advanced in DOMA’s defense comes
remotely close to justifying it. Thus, even if the Court does not apply heightened
review, DOMA must be struck down. “It is not within our constitutional
tradition to enact laws of this sort.” [Romer]701

Amici also enlisted Lawrence to frame the constitutional problems with

697. Id. at 21 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
698. Id. at 19 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
699. Brief of 172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the Merits at 3,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter 172 Members Brief].
700. See id. at 20 (explaining that DOMA is different from other Congressional acts because “[a]
clearly stated purpose for its enactment was to express moral disapproval of a disfavored minority
group.”).
701. Id. at 12 (citations omitted) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)). The amicus brief also stressed Section 3’s sweep: “[I]t affects
thousands of laws and regulations—many more than the eight laws and policies identified by the
petitioners in Romer . . . Given the lack of grounding in any of the affected statutes or regulations, it is
impossible to discern a rational connection between DOMA and any of the legitimate purposes that
those laws are designed to achieve.” Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
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Section 3. First, referencing moral disapproval of homosexuality and concern
over defending marriage, the brief filed by members of Congress stated:
Those views no doubt reflect “profound and deep convictions,” reflecting the
“ethical and moral principles” of those who hold them. . . . But this Court has
made clear that such “considerations do not answer the question before us.” . . .
No matter how sincerely held, such beliefs are not a constitutionally valid basis
for enacting “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake” and
“den[ying] them protection across the board.”702

Amici similarly drew on Lawrence in combination with Romer to argue for
the constitutional insufficiency of appeals to tradition or to “‘the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a practice as
immoral . . . .’”703 They found applicable Justice O’Connor’s statement, in her
concurrence in Lawrence (discussed above) that, under the Equal Protection
clause, “the Court had ‘never held that moral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause
to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.’”704 Moreover, amici
quoted the Lawerence majority’s adaptation of the famous language from the joint
opinion (co-authored by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter) in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: the fact that “‘for centuries there have been powerful voices
to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral . . . shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family . . . do[es] not answer the question before us, however . . . [which is]
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on
the whole society.’”705 Thus, the American Humanist Association also quoted the
Court’s declaration, in Lawrence (echoing Casey), that: “[Our] obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”706 The AntiDefamation League similarly argued:
Religion plays an important role in the lives of many Americans, and many
lawmakers are undoubtedly guided in their legislative decision-making by
personal religious and moral beliefs. But under a line of cases including this
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas . . . a law must be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest beyond the desire to disadvantage a group on the
basis of moral disapproval. DOMA lacks such other interest.707

702. Id. at 21 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, 635).
703. See, e.g., Brief for the Anti-Defamation League et al. As Amici Curiae In Support Of
Respondent Edith Windsor On The Merits Question at 20, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Anti-Defamation League Brief] (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577).
704. Id.
705. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Humanist Ass’n and American Atheists, Inc. et al. in
Support of Respondents Addressing the Merits at 15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307) [hereinafter American Humanist Ass’n Brief] (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571). Amici
leave out the concluding words of this passage: “through operation of the criminal law.” Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 571.
706. American Humanist Ass’n Brief, supra note 705, at 15 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))).
707. Anti-Defamation League Brief, supra note 703, at 19.
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Amici also classified Lawrence, with its limits on moral disapproval as a
basis for law, as “consistent with a series of cases in which the Court invalidated
laws reflecting a ‘bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.’”708 Taking
language from the Cleburne, Moreno, and Romer trilogy, for example, the AntiDefamation League asserted: “In these cases, the Court properly stripped away
the rationales proffered in support of such laws to uncover the fact that ‘animus,’
‘negative attitudes,’ ‘unease,’ ‘fear,’ ‘bias,’ or ‘unpopular[ity]’ actually motivated
the legislative action at issue.”709 In doing so, amici contended that the Court’s
Due Process jurisprudence (as in Lawrence), which supports the propositions that
“moral condemnation of an identifiable group is never a legitimate government
interest,” and that “religious and moral beliefs . . . standing alone and directed
toward the disparagement of a single identifiable group, cannot survive even the
lowest level of constitutional review,” should apply to cases brought under the
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection guarantee, like Windsor’s challenge to
DOMA.710
Some amici directly responded to those amici supporting BLAG who
invoked Justice Scalia’s warning, in his Lawrence dissent, that “if morality is an
insufficient governmental interest, a number of state laws would be ‘called into
question,’” such as “‘laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity’”.711
Thus, the AHA countered:
Even putting aside the repulsive calumny inherent in lumping together marriage
equality with bestiality and incest, a careful review of each instance in which this
Court has considered such laws reveals that morality has never stood alone as
justification for them. In every instance, the decision relied on the governmental
interest in preventing other concrete harms of the prohibited conduct and not on a
bare assertion of immorality.712

2. Arguments about Promoting Morality and Marriage and the Presence or
Absence of Animus
In this section I consider arguments filed by amici on both sides concerning
whether protecting marriage as an institution provided a constitutional
justification for DOMA. Some of the arguments for DOMA appealed to
promoting traditional morality; others appealed to promoting responsible
procreation and optimal childrearing. Both strands of argument insisted animus
did not underlie DOMA. Amici filing in support of BLAG, for example, framed
the issue as one of robust public debate over two competing models of marriage
and urged the Court to refrain from interfering in that debate by taking sides (a
theme sounded in Justice Alito’s Windsor dissent, as I shall discuss below). Amici
filing in support of Windsor pointed out the problems in the appeals to

708. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
709. Id. at 20–21 (citations omitted).
710. Id. at 2–3.
711. American Humanist Ass’n Brief, supra note 705, at 17 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
712. Id.
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procreation and optimal parenting, while also insisting that preserving tradition
– including traditional marriage – was insufficient to justify Section 3. Inevitably,
amici read and enlisted Lawrence different ways, sometimes in combination with
Romer.
(a) Arguments in favor of DOMA and BLAG
Several amici who filed briefs in support of BLAG framed the litigation over
Section 3 as improperly shifting from the democratic to the judicial arena a
societal debate over what marriage is and should be. They further argued that
the Constitution does not require one vision or the other, and that is all the more
reason “the people,” not the judiciary should decide. If, however, the judiciary is
to reach the merits, amici insisted, only deferential basis should apply – a test
Section 3 readily met. This is, I argue below, the road not taken by the Windsor
majority, but it is the road taken by Justice Alito’s dissent and, in blunter terms,
by Justice Scalia’s.
Robert George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan Anderson framed the debate over
the definition of marriage as between the “conjugal view” of marriage as a
“comprehensive union” of spouses “begun by commitment and sealed by sexual
intercourse. . . . by which new life is made,” and a “revisionist view,” in which
“marriage is essentially an emotional union, accompanied by any consensual
activity” and seen “as valuable while the emotion lasts.”713 They contended that
while the conjugal view “has long informed the law,” the revisionist view “has
informed certain marriage policy changes of the last several decades.”714 For
these amici, the stakes over striking down or upholding DOMA, which affirms
the conjugal view, are serious. They contended that, while prior legal
developments in the direction of the revisionist view (such as liberalizing divorce
law) have already undermined marriage as an institution, “[r]edefining civil
marriage will obscure the true nature of marriage as a conjugal union,” uniquely
linked to procreation and childrearing, and, thus, undermine – rather than
strengthen—marriage’s “stabilizing norms,” to the detriment of “spouses,
children, and others.”715 As I discuss below, Justice Alito draws on the
arguments made by George, Girgis, and Anderson.716
The amicus brief filed by the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE)
and several other prominent religious denominations similarly framed the issue
as a high-stakes debate over models of marriage.717 They explained their interest

713. Amici Curiae Brief of Robert P. George et al. in Support of Hollingsworth and Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal at 5–6, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) & United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-144 & 12-307)
[hereinafter George brief].
714. Id. at 5.
715. Id. at 15.
716. In elaborating the idea of “conjugal marriage,” Justice Alito does not cite to their brief but to
their book elaborating on the arguments. See discussion infra Part IV.G.2.
717. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of National Ass’n of Evangelicals et al. in Support of
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives Addressing the
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter National Ass’n of
Evangelicals Brief].
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in the litigation: “Faith communities have the deepest interest in the legal
definition of marriage and in the stability and vitality of that time-honored
institution.”718 The NAE brief elaborated two contrasting conceptions of
marriage:
The age-old, traditional understanding conceives of marriage as a union between
a man and a woman that is inherently oriented toward procreation and
childrearing and in which society has a profound stake. A more recent
conception views marriage as primarily a vehicle for affirming and supporting
intimate adult relationship choices, a vision that is not inherently oriented
toward uniting the sexes for the bearing and rearing of children.719

The brief further asserted that the newer conception is a “radical break from
all human history,” because “gender itself is irrelevant. What matters most is
public endorsement of the adults’ chosen relationship, obtaining official status
for that relationship, and the official approval that comes with such endorsement
and status.”720
The NAE brief next argued that “[w]hether the Nation retains the
traditional definition of marriage or redefines marriage to include same-sex
couples is a social issue with potentially wide-ranging consequences,” and that
“such policy questions cannot be definitively answered by science, professional
opinion, or legal reasoning alone.”721 Although NAE has been “persuaded by
scholarly opinion supporting traditional marriage,” it acknowledged
disagreement among “social science scholars” over things like “the effects of gay
parenting on children.”722 The outcome of that disagreement, however, is
irrelevant to what the Court should do:
Whatever the ultimate conclusions may be, “[n]othing in the Constitution
requires [government] to accept as truth the most advanced and sophisticated
[scientific] opinion.” . . . . In part, because such opinions are inherently tentative,
especially in the social sciences where conclusions are often laden with valuesbased assumptions and there is no values-neutral position from which to weigh
and judge what is best. But also because in a democratic society the People
govern—not philosophers, scientists, or academics.
Hence, whether the Nation should redefine marriage is principally about the
People’s values, morals, and policy judgments.723

By “the People,” NAE must have been referring to the national electorate,
one presumes, since New York’s “people” had made a decision to allow samesex couples to marry, as a result of a deliberative process.724
NAE further argued that Congress may act to protect a “valued moral
norm” and that “many congressional enactments reflect unmistakable moral and
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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value choices.”725 NAE also warned that “declaring DOMA void because it
adheres to traditional moral and religious beliefs would fly in the face of this
Court’s teaching that the Constitution ‘does not license government to treat
religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as
such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique
disabilities.’”726 NAE argued for a form of neutrality toward religion: “DOMA is
entitled to be judged on its merits according to settled rules of law – not on a
more demanding standard born of suspicion toward religion, religious believers,
or their values.”727
Amici often anchored their marriage-based arguments for DOMA to Justice
O’Connor’s statement, in Lawrence, that “‘other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of the law.’”728 These
reasons, amici asserted, were not unconstitutional animus. Several amici linked
DOMA to legitimate governmental purposes associated with encouraging
responsible procreation and optimal parenting – arguments BLAG stressed as
well. For example, in their brief in support of BLAG, Indiana and sixteen other
states asserted that the fundamental Equal Protection question was “whether
there is anything wrong with adhering to the traditional definition of marriage,”
and answered:
As long as some legitimate governmental purpose exists for conferring exclusive
benefits on qualified opposite-sex couples, DOMA is valid in all applications.
Such a legitimate rationale is crystal-clear: opposite-sex couples are the only
procreative relationships that exist, which means that such couples are the only
ones the government has a need to encourage. . . . [I]f this innately biological
rationale is dismissed, the government has no coherent argument for denying
marriage status to any number of persons who desire a committed relationship
with each other. 729

The states disavowed animus: “the traditional definition of marriage has
always been about the need to encourage potentially procreative couples to stay
together for the sake of the children their sexual union may produce, not about
animus toward homosexuals.”730
The Manhattan Declaration brief, after invoking Justice O’Connor’s
Lawrence concurrence, asserted that their position is not rooted in animus, but on
“sincere belief and sound public policy considerations,” since heterosexual
marriage “encourages and supports responsible procreation and childrearing,”
and “redounds to the health and well-being of societies in general.”731 The

725. National Ass’n of Evangelicals Brief, supra note 717, at 19.
726. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
727. Id. at 21.
728. See, e.g., Liberty Counsel Brief, supra note 663, at 36; Amicus Curiae Brief of Manhattan
Declaration in Support of Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and
Supporting Reversal at n.15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter
Manhattan Declaration Brief].
729. Indiana Brief, supra note 640, at 3-4.
730. Id. at 2–3.
731. Manhattan Declaration Brief, supra note 728, at 3.
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Coalition for the Protection of Marriage similarly distinguished “animus” from
“sound public policy”:
The overwhelming international consensus— including among liberal western
democracies with established traditions of concern for the rights of gays and
lesbians—is that reserving the formal institution of ‘marriage’ to opposite- sex
couples while supporting same-sex couples through other rights and legal
mechanisms is sound public policy. That consensus is based not on irrationality,
ignorance, or animus toward gays and lesbians but on considered judgments
about the unique nature and needs of same-sex couples and children.732

The Liberty Counsel linked Section 3 to “important governmental objectives
that reinforce the link between marriage and procreation,”733 contending:
Congress could have rationally concluded that marriage is society’s way of
recognizing that the sexual union of one man and one woman is unique, and that
government needs to support this union for the benefit of society and its
children, or that marriage laws are not primarily about adult needs for
approbation and support, but about the well-being of children and society. This
conclusion is not only rational, but it [is] based on centuries of historical
traditions and customs, sociological studies, and common sense.734

Amici also asserted that the longstanding tradition of heterosexual marriage
undermined any inference that “marriage was invented thousands of years ago
as a device to discriminate against homosexuals.”735 This argument went both to
animus and to the lack of any basis for applying heightened scrutiny. Thus, amici
states argued that, while DOMA and traditional state definitions of marriage
have an impact on homosexuals, they do not “target” them, and thus, the states
concluded, heightened scrutiny was not appropriate since “a decision to adhere
to that longstanding traditional definition of marriage [does not] betray a
purpose to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”736 The Manhattan
Declaration also disavowed any discriminatory purpose: “defenders of marriage
are not interested in discrimination but rather in preserving marriage as the
objective reality it has always been—for the good of the societal interests it has
always served.”737
Some amici conceived the different models of marriage at stake as
traditional versus “genderless” marriage and warned that society cannot have
732. Amicus Curiae Brief for Coalition for the Protection of Marriage in Support of
Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal
at 35, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) & United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(Nos. 12-144 & 12-307) [hereinafter Protection of Marriage Brief] (quoting Brief for Judge Georg Ress
and the Marriage Law Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144)).
733. Liberty Counsel Brief, supra note 663, at 36.
734. Id. at 45.
735. Indiana Brief, supra note 640, at 7. The amici states did not take a position on “whether
homosexuals constitute a specially protected class in the abstract,” just on whether or not “DOMA,
and by extension traditional state definitions of marriage, constitute facial discrimination against
homosexuals.” Id. at 5.
736. Id. at 7.
737. Manhattan Declaration Brief, supra note 728, at 13.
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both institutions at once. For example, the Coalition for the Protection of
Marriage contrasted “man-woman marriage” and “genderless marriage” in
terms of the former’s broader vision of marriage as a vital social institution
offering social goods:
A fundamental issue in the contest over the constitutionality of man-woman
marriage is: What is marriage? All advocacy for genderless marriage is built
upon a narrow view that marriage is no more than love and friendship, security
for adults and their children, economic protection, and public affirmation of
commitment. . . . [P]roponents of man- woman marriage advance a broader view
of marriage [that] encompasses the social benefits (‘goods’) identified with the
narrow view but also much more. . . . the marriage institution’s vital role and
social goods (i) centered in children (those now living and for generations to
come), including making meaningful the child’s bonding right, providing
adequate private welfare to the vast majority of children (those conceived
through passionate, heterosexual coupling), and perpetuating the optimal
childrearing mode; (ii) essential in the statuses and identities of husband and wife;
and (iii) necessary for protection of the fundamental rights of natural parenthood
and family relations.738

The Coalition’s brief elaborated on how the “man-woman meaning” is at
the “core” of the interrelated meanings that make up marriage as a “vital and
fundamental social institution,” and how, because marriage is a social institution,
it provides men and women with “statuses, identities, perceptions, aspirations,
and projects” and guides their conduct in ways that realize social goods, such as
a child’s “knowing and being raised by her own mother and father.”739 Marriage
is the foundation of “the natural family as a buffer between family members and
the state,” and also “humankind’s best means for maximizing private welfare to
the vast majority of children (those conceived by passionate, heterosexual
coupling); and the irreplaceable foundation of the optimal child-rearing
mode.”740
If society preserves man-woman marriage, even while it “recognizes
domestic partnerships,” the Coalition argued, the former “continues to provide
society with valuable social goods that it cannot get otherwise.”741 By contrast,
“society cannot have at the same time two institutions denominated marriage
with different core meanings or a single institution denominated marriage with
different, conflicting core meanings.”742 If society goes the route of permitting
genderless marriage,
T]he reality is that changing the meaning of marriage to that of “any two
persons” will transform the institution profoundly, if not immediately then
certainly over time as the new meaning is mandated in texts, in schools, and in
many other parts of the public square and voluntarily published by the media
and other institutions, with society, especially its children, thereby losing the

738.
739.
740.
741.
742.

Protection of Marriage Brief, supra note732, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 6.
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ability to discern the meanings of the old institution.743

Indeed, the Coalition predicted further harmful consequences:
A genderless marriage regime is and will be socially hostile and politically
adverse to: the child’s bonding interest; natural parenthood as the foundation for
the construction of parenthood in our society; the concept that relational rights
within the natural family are not created, dispensed, and withdrawn at the will
of the state; and the personally and socially valuable statuses and identities of
husband and wife.744

As this passage suggests, the Coalition views “the natural family,” of which
man-woman marriage is the core, as prepolitical, but vulnerable to tampering by
the state if the law uses its power to “mandate[e] a genderless marriage regime,”
which will “over time” suppress and displace the man-woman meaning.745
The brief filed by the Manhattan Declaration similarly warned that Edith
Windsor’s “cavalier project” of requiring the federal government to accept each
state’s redefinition of marriage
threatens to transform marriage from an organic institution marked primarily by
unitive creation and the promotion of life and generational continuity to a
manufactured institution marked primarily by the satisfaction to be provided by
adult romance. . . . [should] the new marriage regime . . . come to fruition, [it]
would inevitably opt for the private over the common good, with predictably
deleterious consequences for children and society at large. 746

The brief framed the issue as a threat to “marriage culture:”
Vast human experience confirms that marriage is the original and most
important institution for sustaining the health, education, and welfare of all
persons in a society. Where marriage is honored, and where there is a flourishing
marriage culture, everyone benefits – the spouses themselves, their children, the
communities and societies in which they live. Where the marriage culture begins
to erode, social pathologies of every sort quickly manifest themselves.747

Some amici appealed to religious and Biblical understandings of marriage
in support of Section 3’s preserving “traditional” marriage and warned of
consequences if the civil law of marriage departs sharply from religious
conceptions of marriage. Some amici resisted the very idea that civil and
religious understandings of marriage could or should be distinct. For example,
the Coalition for the Protection of Marriage asserted: “Although interacting with
and influenced by other institutions such as law, property, and religion, marriage
in our society is a distinct, unitary social institution and does not have two
separate, independent existences, one ‘civil’ and one ‘religious.’”748 The
Manhattan Declaration brief argued that the concept that societies give legal

743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Manhattan Declaration Brief, supra note 728, at 8–9.
Id. at 4–5 (quoting ROBERT GEORGE ET AL., MANHATTAN DECLARATION 4 (2009)).
Protection of Marriage Brief, supra note 732, at 6–7.
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recognition to marriage to “encourage and support responsible procreation and
childrearing” is “remarkably similar to the Christian belief that through
marriage man and woman cooperate conjugally in the creative act of God
Himself.”749
Some amici who stressed the relevance of religious conceptions of marriage
insisted that Congress could enact DOMA to defend traditional notions of
morality, including disapproval of homosexuality. For example, Westboro
Baptist Church argued at length that homosexuality (along with adultery,
abortion and the like) is such a serious sin that it will motivate God to punish the
U.S. by destroying it, similar to the Flood in Noah’s time.750 The Foundation for
Moral Law asserted: “From Biblical law and other ancient law, through English
and American common law and organic law, to recent times, homosexual
conduct has been abhorred and opposed; the idea of a ‘marriage’ based on such
conduct never even entered the legal mind until very recent times.”751 Thus:
Congress’s passage of the federal definition of marriage in DOMA had the force
of that history behind it and several present-day interests that were asserted
when DOMA was enacted in 1996, such as an interest in defending marriage and
an interest in defending traditional notions of morality. DOMA easily bears a
rational relationship to Congress’s support of traditional marriage as it began to
come under attack through the courts in 1993.752

The Foundation’s statement of interest in the case reads like a Bowers-era,
pre-Lawrence argument: after declaring that “this nation’s laws should reflect the
moral basis upon which the nation was founded,” including “the ancient roots of
the common law,” the Founders’ views, and “the views of the American people,”
it reported that those views have always “held that homosexual conduct has
always been and continues to be immoral and should not be protected or
sanctioned by law.”753 Other amici explicitly referred to Bowers’ recognition of
the role of religious beliefs in condemning homosexuality in asserting that the
DOMA battle involved a clash of rights. After invoking Chief Justice Burger’s
Bowers concurrence in support of the assertion that “[s]ame-sex intimacy is
contrary to centuries of religious teaching. . . . [and] would ‘cast aside millennia
of moral teaching’ to convert it to a fundamental right,”754 the Liberty, Life and
Law Foundation and North Carolina Values Coalition argued that, even under
Lawrence, the privacy rights of homosexuals should not trump the privacy rights
of other citizens, since:
even in overruling Bowers, this Court acknowledged that: ‘The condemnation [of
homosexual conduct] has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right
and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons
these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as
749. Manhattan Declaration Brief, supra note 728, at 6- 7.
750. See Westboro Baptist Church Brief, supra note 684, at 13–20.
751. Foundation for Moral Law Brief, supra note 668, at 3.
752. Id.
753. Id. at 1–2.
754. Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation Brief, supra note 675, at 3–4, (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring)).
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ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives.’755

Finally, in contrast, some conservative amici generally committed to
bringing biblical principles to bear on public policy made no overt reference to
morality and instead emphasized other reasons for DOMA. Thus, a brief filed by
the Beverly LeHaye Institute and National Legal Foundation, affiliated with
Concerned Women of America, stated its interest in providing “accurate
academic and scientific data with sound analysis to inform and substantiate
policy positions on contemporary issues from a traditional pro-family, feminine
perspective;” its brief appealed to the dissent in Windsor, contending that “Judge
Straub “demonstrated just how easy it is to understand how DOMA advances
the goals of responsible childrearing.” 756 The brief then detailed scientific studies
that allegedly demonstrated that children in same-sex parent households are
disadvantaged.757
(b) Arguments made for Edith Windsor
As discussed above, amici filing in support of Windsor enlisted Romer and
Lawrence to argue that expressing moral disapproval and promoting traditional
morality were insufficient reasons to survive any form of judicial review, be it
heightened scrutiny, the more searching form of rational basis review, or even
ordinary rational basis review. Amici frequently referred to the House Report
language that DOMA’s purpose was “‘to reflect and honor a collective moral
judgment about human sexuality’ that ‘entails both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality,’” and connected this moral
approval to impermissible animus, prejudice, and a bare desire to harm.758 The
brief filed by 172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S.
Senators stressed that under Lawrence, the appeal to traditional views of marriage
was not enough:
That same-sex couples were previously excluded from marriage, and therefore
from federal responsibilities and rights that hinge on marriage, cannot itself
justify their continued exclusion. After all, there is no guarantee that tradition—
which often reflects fallible social norms and biases—is itself rational. Thus,
“[t]hat the governing majority. . . . has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice” (Lawrence, . . .) and “[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give it

755. Id. at 4.
756. Brief Amici Curiae of the Beverly Lehaye Institute, and the National Legal Foundation, in
Support of the Respondent, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
Representatives, Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal at 1, United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Lehaye Brief]; Id. at 5 (citing U.S. v. Windsor, 699 F.3d at
199-202).
757. Id. at 6-20 (discussing, in particular, Mark Regnerus, How Different are the Adult Children of
Parents Who Have Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41 SOC. SC.
RESESARCH 752 (2012))).
758. See GLAAD and Lambda Brief, supra note 685, at 22-25 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1-4-664, supra
note 11, at 15-16).
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immunity from attack for lacking a rational basis” . . . DOMA must rationally
serve legitimate federal interests independent of consistency with tradition or
historical practice. It doesn’t.759

The American Humanist Association contended that “DOMA can be
justified by no actual governmental interests that can logically be shown to
prevent harm or promote welfare,” and “[a]ll that is left to its defenders is a
moral argument that homosexuals are sinful and therefore not to be permitted to
share the institution of marriage with heterosexuals.”760 The Association argued:
“This kind of spiteful, self-righteous ‘desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.’”761
While amici supporting BLAG framed the issue more in terms of the Court
not taking sides in a debate over models of marriage, amici for Windsor stressed
that the only couples affected by DOMA were those lawfully married under state
law and argued that the lack of fit between means and end provided further
evidence of the lack of any legitimate purpose. The amicus brief filed by the
American Bar Association heavily employed the Romer template in arguing that
“[t]he governmental interests advanced in support of Section 3 cannot justify the
unprecedented exclusion of one group, legally married gay and lesbian couples,
from all of the federal benefits and responsibilities of marriage.”762 The ABA brief
characterized Section 3 as “discriminations of an unusual character,” as
evidenced by the practical consequences for those lawfully married couples
whom the provision “singles out” in the areas of health care, retirement
planning, immigration, military benefits, taxes, and ethical responsibilities.763 “By
‘deem[ing] a class of [married] persons a stranger to [federal] laws,’ . . .
notwithstanding recognition by a couple’s State of their marriage,” the ABA
argued, “Section 3 denies that class [of] legally married gay and lesbian
couples . . . equal protection.”764 The ABA dismissed the several “‘unique
federal interests’” that BLAG asserted for Section 3: that it “‘preserves each
sovereign’s ability to define marriage for itself,’” “fills the need for a ‘uniform
federal definition’ of marriage,” and “permits States to ‘act as laboratories of
democracy’ while the federal government reserves judgment on same-sex
marriage.”765 The ABA countered that such justifications “founder in light of the
States’ long-standing primacy in defining marriage,” referencing other amicus
briefs detailing how “the regulation of marriage has always varied from State to
State in numerous ways,” such as rules concerning minimum age, consanguinity,
and recognition of common law marriage.766 Far from encouraging states to be
experimental laboratories, it continued, “Section 3 thwarts the democratic
759. 172 Members Brief, supra note 699, at 22 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003);
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 327 (1993)).
760. American Humanist Ass’n Brief, supra note 705, at 20.
761. Id. (quoting United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
762. ABA Windsor, supra note 695, at 25.
763. See id. at 6, 8–26 ( quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
764. Id. at 29 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
765. Id. at 30 (quoting Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the U.S. House of Representatives at 30-37, 41-43, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
766. Id. at 30 (citing Family Law Brief, supra note 617 at 7–9).
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process by preventing States from allowing their gay and lesbian citizens a truly
equal share in the benefits and responsibilities of civil marriage.”767 As I discuss
below, this type of argument about how DOMA creates a regime of unequal
benefits and responsibilities features in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Windsor.
Amici also responded to arguments that Section 3 promoted governmental
interests in responsible procreation and optimal parenting. Drawing on the First
Circuit’s DOMA opinion, the ABA, for example, stressed the complete lack of
connection between the argument that Section 3 promotes traditional marriage
and childrearing and Section 3’s actual impact:
As a purely logical matter, excluding gay and lesbian couples from federal
benefits cannot create an incentive for heterosexual couples to marry or raise
children responsibly. “This is not merely a matter of poor fit of remedy to
perceived problem, but a lack of any demonstrated connection between DOMA’s
treatment of same-sex couples and its asserted goal of strengthening the bonds
and benefits to society of heterosexual marriage.”768

The American Jewish Committee argued that BLAG’s procreation-based
justifications for denying same-sex marriage were misguided, since “[m]arriage
is about far more than children.”769 While the state has an important interest in
protecting children, the AJC continued, denying same- sex marriage neither
furthered this interest nor kept same-sex couples from having and raising
children.770 Further, the brief made a significant distinction between religious
and civil marriage, observing that, while “[s]ex and sexual morality are central to
religious marriage,” these same values are “increasingly peripheral to legal
provisions for civil marriage.”771
In support of their argument that procreation is not “an essential element of
marriage,” the Family and Child Welfare Law Professors brief enlisted Justice
Scalia’s query and answer in his Lawrence dissent: “[W]hat justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples
exercising ‘[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution’? Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to
marry.”772 This brief also appealed to the Lawrence majority to refute BLAG’s
appeal to procreation as a rationale for DOMA: “‘it would demean a married
couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.’”773 The brief canvassed state statutes and case law to support the

767. Id. at 32.
768. Id. at 33 (quoting Mass. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st
Cir. 2012)).
769. See AJC Brief, supra note 654, at 2, 8.
770. See id. at 8-9.
771. Id. at 20.
772. Brief Amici Curiae Family & Child Welfare Law Professors Addressing the Merits & in
Support of Respondents at 5, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter
Family & Child Welfare Brief] (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
773. Id. at 10 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
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argument that procreation (or intention to procreate) is not a requirement for any
marriage, the inability to procreate is not a ground for divorce, and marriage
itself offers many social and financial benefits to spouses that have nothing to do
with procreation.774 The brief concluded that “DOMA ‘seems inexplicable by
anything other than animus towards the class it affects.’”775
Some amici challenged contentions by BLAG’s amici that social science
evidence supported continued adherence to traditional marriage. For example,
the American Psychological Association, along with the American Medical
Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics, filed an amicus brief, just
as it did in the Romer litigation.776 Parallel to that earlier brief, the APA brief
chronicled a history of prejudice toward homosexuals and the scientific
community’s changed view about homosexuality. Pertinent to the DOMA
litigation, it argued that numerous studies demonstrate that heterosexual couples
are not inherently better parents than same-sex couples, as BLAG and others
suggested; instead, “the vast majority of scientific studies . . . has consistently
shown” that gay and lesbian parents “are as fit and capable parents” as
heterosexual parents.777 Citing to many studies, the brief countered arguments
that homosexuality is a choice and that children of homosexual couples are
disadvantaged.
The APA brief argued that DOMA’s legislative history indicates that the Act
reflected legislators’ disapproval of homosexuality and that “the beliefs about
lesbians and gay men relied on by Congress in enacting DOMA. . . reflect an
unreasoned antipathy towards an identifiable minority.”778 It asserted that, by
offering greater privileges and protections to married heterosexual couples and
their children, DOMA “conveys the federal government’s judgment that
committed intimate relationships between people of the same sex . . . are inferior
to heterosexual relationships,” thereby “legitimiz[ing] prejudicial attitudes and
individual acts against the disfavored group, including ostracism, harassment,
discrimination, and violence.”779 The APA and other amici asserted that DOMA
stigmatized same-sex couples and their children.780 For example, the Family
Equality Council brought forth statements by children raised by same-sex
couples to challenge BLAG’s “assertion that marriage must be confined to
opposite-sex couples in order to ‘promot[e] an optimal social structure for
774. Id. at 4, 8–9.
775. Id. at 36 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
776. Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae on the Merits in Support of
Affirmance, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter APA Windsor]. For discussion of its
Romer brief, see APA Brief, supra note 345.
777. APA Windsor, supra note 775, at 18–19.
778. Id. at 34.
779. Id. at 34–35.
780. Id. at 34–35; id. at 36 (arguing that DOMA discriminates against same-sex couples by
“perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group
as “‘innately inferior’”) (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)); Brief of Amici
Curiae Family Equality Council et al. in Support of Respondents Perry, Stier, Katami, Zarrillo, City &
County of San Francisco, & Edith Schlain Windsor, in her Capacity as Executor of the Estate of Thea
Clara Spyer, Addressing the Merits & Supporting Affirmance at 3, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12307) [hereinafter Family Equality Council Brief].
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educating, socializing, and preparing [our] future citizens.’”781 The Council
argued that procreation-based justifications for excluding same-sex couples from
the definition of marriage “treat the children of same-sex parents as, at best,
invisible, and, at worst, non-existent, “ adding that “the major challenge most
same-sex parented families must surmount is . . . the societal and governmental
disapproval that both Proposition 8 and DOMA represent and perpetuate.”782
Moreover, DOMA and Proposition 8 “exacerbate feelings of hopelessness about
the future and perpetual ‘different-ness’ that many LGBT youth already feel and
discourage them from aspiring to full participation in civic life.”783
3. Arguments about Religious Liberty and a Clash of Rights
(a) Arguments for BLAG
Some of the arguments concerning DOMA’s role in protecting morality,
discussed above, also implicated arguments about preserving religious liberty.
Some amici also warned that as civil laws changed their definitions of marriage,
religious persons and groups adhering to traditional definitions would face
threats to their religious liberty. New civil marriage laws, in other words, would
create a clash of rights. Some arguments about how DOMA avoided that clash
parallel arguments made in Romer about how Amendment 2 resolved the
potential clash of rights posed by expansive anti-discrimination laws in favor of
religious liberty.784 For example, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued
that “because so many major religious groups center their teachings regarding
sexual morality around opposite-sex marriage, changing the definition of
marriage itself . . . triggers a distinct set of religious liberty concerns.” 785 For
example, “being forced to call a same-sex relationship a ‘marriage’ creates a
conflict of conscience for many religious organizations where ‘civil union’ or
‘domestic partnership’ would not.”786 DOMA, therefore, was a rational response
to two religious liberty conflicts caused by marriage equality laws:
First, objecting religious institutions and individuals will face an increased risk of
lawsuits under federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws, subjecting
religious organizations to substantial civil liability if they choose to continue
practicing their religious beliefs. Second, religious institutions and individuals
will face a range of penalties from federal, state and local governments, such as
denial of access to public facilities, loss of accreditation and licensing, and the
targeted withdrawal of government contracts and benefits.787

The Becket Fund asserted that “DOMA and Proposition 8 were rational
responses to court decisions that gave legal recognition to same-sex marriage

781. Family Equality Council Brief, supra note 780, at 3, 16 (quoting Brief of Petitioners at 37,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144)).
782. Id. at 8, 24.
783. Id. at 33.
784. See supra note 276 for discussion of the Christian Legal Society brief in Romer.
785. Becket Brief, supra note 654, at 29.
786. Id.
787. Id. at 4.

McClain Proofs 2 (Do Not Delete)

454 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

11/25/2013 12:53 PM

Volume 20:351 2013

without addressing the significant church-state conflicts that would result” from
“burdens imposed by . . . supposedly neutral, generally applicable laws.”788 This
argument seems inapt as applied to Windsor, since New York enacted marriage
equality through the legislative process and included religious exemptions.
The Christian Legal Society, joined by Catholic Answers and the Catholic
Vote Education Fund warned that classifying homosexuals as a suspect or quasisuspect class would compromise religious liberties:
This Court is being asked to recognize sexual orientation as a suspect or quasisuspect class for purposes of federal equal protection jurisprudence. But to do so
would, at both a theoretical and a practical level, necessarily diminish the ability
of our nation’s religious individuals and communities to live according to their
faith. . . . There is already a broad and intense conflict between the gay rights
movement and religious liberty regarding marriage, family, and sexual behavior.
If the Court creates a new suspect classification for sexual orientation, it will take
sides in that conflict and place millions of religious believers and organizations at
a potentially irreversible disadvantage in their efforts to consistently live out
their faith.789

The brief warned: “[B]y making sexual orientation a new protected class
under our Constitution, this Court would hand the government a tremendous
tool to constrain traditional churches, synagogues, and mosques to catechism
and ceremony, and to force religious believers to restrict the exercise of their faith
to those narrow confines.”790 The brief drew a parallel to the impact of
antidiscrimination laws on religious organizations: “As this Court observed in
[that] context . . . the ‘[f]ear of potential liability might affect the way an
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.’”791
The CLS brief also disputed the framing of the issue as “the inevitable
clash . . . between ‘identity liberty’ (of homosexuals and bisexuals) and ‘belief
liberty’ (of religious people)” because it wrongly assumed “that many religious
persons do not define their identities by their faith.”792 The brief further asserted
that, “[t]oo often gay rights advocates equate traditional religious beliefs
regarding sexual orientation and sexual conduct to racism, insisting that these
traditional religious beliefs should not be tolerated outside a tightly restricted
personal sphere,” while “many traditional religious believers approach issues
regarding sexual orientation as primarily religious questions about sexual
behavior, rather than personal identity.”793 The focus of this line of argument was
a concern that if the Court recognized sexual orientation as a “new suspect
class,” then states and municipalities would be “forced to remove their religious

788. Id. at 2, 29.
789. Catholic Answers Brief, supra note 657, at 4.
790. Id. at 11.
791. Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)).
792. Id. at 12 (quoting Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 123, 130 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008))
(disputing characterization by Civil Rights Commissioner Chai Feldblum).
793. Id.
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liberty exceptions,” leaving religious individuals and communities “very limited
legal recourse to protect their ability to fully live out their faiths.”794
The Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty asserted that repealing DOMA
would impair “military religious liberty,” since “it is very likely that service
members who hold traditional religious beliefs on marriage and family will face,
for the first time, military policies and duties that sharply [sic] hostile to their
beliefs.”795 For example, “[w]hile there is no question chaplains will continue to
serve all service members, if military policy becomes directly antithetical to their
beliefs on the fundamental issues of marriage and family, chaplains will find
their hands tied as to how they can serve,” since, “[o]n a wide variety of issues,
including some that are very important to military families, it seems likely that
military policy would directly conflict with a chaplain’s responsibility to provide
the full spectrum of religious counsel.”796 The brief predicted that chaplains and
service members who belonged to “faith groups that support traditional
marriage” would face a stark, forced choice between “their duty to obey God”
and “their chosen vocation of serving their country” if laws “affirming marriage
as the union of one man and one woman are invalidated as irrational and
unconstitutional.”797
Other amici warned that a civil regime recognizing same-sex marriage
would create a new governmental orthodoxy at odds with religious liberty. For
example, the Manhattan Declaration brief asserted that “redefining marriage
imperils religious liberty and oftentimes requires that freedom of conscience be
sacrificed to the newly regnant orthodoxy.”798 A new marriage regime that
recognized same-sex marriage, it asserted, would “circumscribe[] the ability of
the Christian faithful to put their beliefs into practice.”799 The brief included
various examples, such as Christian adoption agencies shutting down because of
their refusal to place children with same-sex couples, religious parents’ inability
to remove their children from public school classes advocating marriage
equality, and Christian organizations having to end all medical insurance for
employees’ spouses because they do not want to cover same-sex spouses.800 The
brief further contended that Christians would be limited in how they could
educate their children.801 The brief asserted that “[r]eligious freedom is our first,
most cherished liberty” and should not be infringed upon by same-sex

794. See id. at 30. The brief detailed concerns over diminished protection of conventional
religious beliefs under Title VII. Id. at 30–32. For a similar concern about the impact of heightened
scrutiny, see Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of
Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Addressing the Merits, and Supporting Reversal at
16–20, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
795. Brief of Amici Curiae Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty, et al., in Support of the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits & Supporting Reversal at 3–4, Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Chaplain Alliance Brief].
796. Id. at 4.
797. Id. at 4–5.
798. Manhattan Declaration Brief, supra note 728, at 3–4.
799. Id. at 15.
800. Id. at 15-19.
801. See id. at 17.
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marriage.802
Some religious amici contended that their religious objections to same-sex
marriage were not animus, and that for government to fail to credence those
objections infringed upon their religious liberty. For example, the Liberty, Life
and Law Foundation and North Carolina Values Coalition similarly warned that
marriage equality would infringe upon the “moral code of behavior” typical of
religions, including the regulation of sexual conduct, with the result that “[a]
state mandate to affirm same-sex marriage would have an explosive impact on
religious persons who could easily treat all individuals with equal respect and
dignity but cannot in good conscience endorse or facilitate same- sex
marriage.”803 The Foundation further argued that “[a] person’s religiously
motivated refusal to recognize same-sex unions is not tantamount to unlawful
discrimination, nor is it irrational animosity,” and that, “[t]o hold otherwise
would exhibit callous disregard for religion.”804 The evident logic of the
Foundation’s argument is that the Constitution protects religious beliefs and
conduct, and, thus, morality based on religion provides a valid rationale for
opposing same-sex marriage. The Foundation analogized to case law crediting
conscientious religious beliefs in other contexts, concluding: “[t]he government
must avoid showing hostility to religion by refusing to acknowledge religious
motivation.”805
(b) Arguments for Windsor
Amici filing in support of Windsor emphasized the distinction between civil
and religious marriage, and that redefining the former did not unconstitutionally
burden the latter. They further pointed out that religious exemptions were a
means of ensuring religious liberty. For example, the brief submitted by the
Bishops of the Episcopal Church in California, New York, and several other
states, the Jewish Theological Seminary, and numerous other religious groups
noted a growing affirmation by religious faiths of the “dignity” of same-sex
relationships and family life:
The American religious panorama embraces a multitude of theological
perspectives on lesbian and gay people and same-sex relationships. A vast range
of religious perspectives affirms the inherent dignity of lesbian and gay people,
their relationships, and their families. This affirmation reflects the deeply rooted
belief, common to many faiths, in the essential worth of all individuals and, more
particularly, the growing respect accorded within theological traditions to samesex couples.806

802. See id. at 15.
803. Liberty, Life and Law Foundation Brief, supra note 675, at 16.
804. Id. at 17.
805. See id. at 15–16.
806. Brief of Amici Curiae Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the States of California,
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, &
Washington & the District of Columbia et al. on the Merits & in Support of Affirmance in Favor of
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 3, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)
[hereinafter Episcopal Bishops Brief].
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The brief insists on the constitutional importance of the distinction between
civil and religious marriage:
Certain amici supporting reversal have argued that civil recognition for the
marriages of same-sex couples would alter a longstanding ‘Christian’ definition
of ‘marriage.’ But this and other religiously based arguments for limiting civil
recognition of marriage to different-sex couples cannot constitutionally be given
weight by this Court. Crediting such arguments would improperly both enshrine
a particular religious belief in the law – itself prohibited under the Establishment
Clause – and implicitly privilege religious viewpoints that oppose marriage
equality over those that favor it.807

The brief then argues that “[e]liminating discrimination in civil marriage
will not impinge upon religious doctrine or practice,” since “[a]ll religions would
remain free – as they are today with nine states and the District of Columbia
permitting same-sex couples to marry – to define religious marriage in any way
they choose.”808 The brief first points out that “[t]he types of conflicts forecast by
certain other amici already can and sometimes do arise under public
accommodation laws whenever religiously affiliated organizations operate in the
commercial or governmental spheres,” and “[c]ourts know how to respond if
enforcement of civil rights laws overreaches to infringe First Amendment
rights.”809 “In any event,” the brief concluded, “the issue largely is irrelevant
here, because the couples affected by the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)
already are lawfully married under state law.”810
Other amici also stressed that, under the Establishment Clause, religious
groups do not have “the right to have their religious views written into law so
that others may be compelled to follow them.”811 Addressing claims by amici
that “their ‘‘religious liberty’ . . . would be violated if this Court confirms a right
to legal equality for gays and lesbians,” because of “their Bible’s condemnation
of homosexuality,” the American Humanist Association asserted that, “[b]ecause
the First Amendment forbids, rather than requires, any law solely grounded in or
codifying a religious ‘moral’ commandment, such objections can be accorded no
weight.”812 Other amici stressed the insufficiency of moral disapproval, even if
rooted in religious belief. Thus, the Anti-Defamation acknowledged the
importance of religion in American life and that religious beliefs undoubtedly
guided many lawmakers, but explained that, “under a line of cases including
this Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, a law must be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest beyond the desire to disadvantage a group on the
basis of moral disapproval.”813
Some amici urged the Court to “bring healing to the nation by

807. Id. at 5.
808. Id. at 4.
809. Id.
810. Id.
811. American Humanist Ass’n Brief, supra note 705, at 4.
812. Id.
813. Anti-Defamation League Brief, supra note 703, at 19 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
574 –75 (2003)) (citation omitted).
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demonstrating that the humanity of gay citizens can be reconciled with respect
for religious freedom”:
The Constitution guarantees both the right of gay people to be treated as equals
under civil law and the right of individuals and organizations to hold beliefs
about homosexuality in accordance with their own consciences. By treating
homosexuality in the secular context with neutrality, and by affirming that all
people—whether gay or straight—are entitled to equal treatment under the
Constitution, this Court can unify the country around our shared values of
liberty and justice for all.814

One amicus who filed a brief in support of Windsor and Perry, the
American Jewish Committee (AJC), supported the state’s authority to redefine
civil marriage, but also urged that broad protections of religious liberty were
necessary if the state did so.815 Similar to some amici supporting DOMA, AJC
“agree[s] that significant religious liberty issues will follow in the wake of samesex civil marriage,” but it also argued that the issues could be remedied if “each
claim to liberty in our system . . . [is] defined in a way that is consistent with the
equal and sometimes conflicting liberty of others.”816 Thus, there would be “no
burden on religious exercise when the state recognizes someone else’s civil
marriage,” but there would be if “the state demands that religious organizations
or believers recognize or facilitate a marriage in ways that violate their religious
commitments.”817 The AJC saw parallels between the gay rights movement and
its own assertion of the need for religious liberties:
Both same-sex couples and religious dissenters also seek to live out their
identities in ways that are public in the sense of being socially apparent and
socially acknowledged. . . Religious believers. . .claim a right to follow their faith
not just in worship services, but in charitable services provided through their
religious organizations and in their daily lives.818

As did some religious amici supporting BLAG, the AJC identified a variety
of situations in which religious liberty might be compromised, including
marriage counseling by clergy and housing in religious colleges.819 As one way to
address these conflicts, the AJC also proposed that the Court reconsider
Employment Division v. Smith, so that religious actors would be exempt from
generally applicable laws that infringe on their freedoms unless application of
the statute can survive heightened scrutiny.820

814. Amici Curiae Brief of Utah Pride Center, Campaign for Southern Equality, Equality
Federation & Twenty-Five State-Wide Equality Organizations at 30, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Utah Pride Brief].
815. See AJC Brief, supra note 654, at 3-4.
816. Id. at 10–11.
817. Id. at 3, 21.
818. Id. at 15.
819. Id. at 23–25.
820. Id. at 32-34.
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4. Arguments about Letting the People Decide/Political Power and
Powerlessness
(a) Arguments for BLAG
Amici for BLAG made various arguments that the Court should not strike
down DOMA because it would interfere with letting the people decide. Above, I
discussed the theme that the Nation was involved in a debate over marriage.
Additional lines of argument stressed the impact on state sovereignty and state
legislative processes. For example, Indiana and sixteen other states argued that
“a judicial rejection of DOMA would erode constitutional support for similar
state laws.”821 In a remarkable analogy, the Eagle Forum compared gay rights
activists to southern slave owners: just as the slave owners triumphed in Dred
Scott v. Sanford in forcing free states to recognize slavery, same-sex marriage
supporters now “seek to compel the United States and forty-one other states to
recognize the same-sex marriage regimes of a few states.”822 It also insisted that
“the claimed right [by same-sex couples to marriage] was in no way conveyed by
the People to the Judiciary to dispense,” thus, “[t]o ensure its legitimacy as an
arbiter—not author—of our laws, this Court must extricate itself from this
slippery slope” of defining marriage.823
Concerned Women for America similarly urged the Court not to “cut off”
the debate over the definition of marriage, because different viewpoints “should
be respected and debated as part of the democratic process.”824 The gist of
CWA’s brief was to chronicle the success of gay men and lesbians in the political
process, both at the state and federal level, to demonstrate that they lacked the
“political powerlessness” needed to be a suspect of quasi-suspect group.825
Indeed, CWA contended that, “[i]f anything, they hold disproportionate political
power in comparison to their numbers,” noting their ability to attract “the
attention of lawmakers,” the President, and others.826 In seeing the accelerating
trend toward victory by gay men and lesbians in the political arena, CWA’s brief
stands in remarkable contrast to its brief in Romer, which enlisted the vote on
Amendment 2 as evidence of the majority’s disapproval of homosexuality.827 At
the same time, there is continuity with the past since proponents of Amendment
2 sought to counter a perceived disproportionate political power of homosexuals
in municipalities.

821. Indiana Brief, supra note 640, at 1.
822. Eagle Forum Brief, supra note 667, at 5.
823. Id. at 10, 12. Eagle Forum also points to the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment, which
“might have provided a basis for the claims here” as evidence of the American people’s rejection of
same-sex marriage. Id. at 5–6 (citing Nat’l Org. for Women v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982)).
824. Amicus Curiae Brief of Concerned Women for America, Addressing the Merits &
Supporting Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
Representatives and Reversal at 33, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)
[hereinafter CWA Windsor].
825. See id. at 3, 8, 11–33.
826. Id. at 12, 14.
827. See CWA Brief, supra note 234, at 2.
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(b) Arguments for Windsor
By contrast to the picture painted by CWA of increasing political power,
amici Utah Pride Center contended that the many states with DOMAs and other
discriminatory laws “have constructed systems of de jure (by law) denigration of
gay citizens. Millions of gay citizens live in these states, including many of the
states now urging this Court to preserve laws that both offend the Constitution
and do harm to the lives of gay Americans.”828 The enactment of such laws, the
brief argued, evidenced the “political vulnerability of gay Americans,” who were
“not able to prevent the enactment of laws that demoted them to second-class
citizenship,” and “lack both the political power and the realistic prospect of
attaining full equality through democratic processes.”829 The brief observed that
although “prejudice against gay people is inherently irrational,” so that “laws
burdening them should not be able to survive even rational basis review,”
heightened scrutiny was warranted to protect the constitutional rights of “gay
Americans” in light of the long history of discrimination against them and
because “gay citizens in Utah and other states have been—and will remain,
perhaps indefinitely—unable to vindicate their right to legal equality through
democratic processes.”830
E. United States v. Windsor: Justice Kennedy Completes a New Trio
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court announced its rulings in both cases. In
Hollingsworth v. Perry,831 the Proposition 8 case, the Court held that the
proponents of Proposition 8 did not have standing to appeal the district court’s
decision, with Justice Kennedy dissenting (joined by three justices). By contrast,
in another 5-4 split, the Court did reach the merits in Windsor v. United States, in
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy quickly hailed as a landmark by some
and decried as judicial overreaching by others. In this section, I highlight the role
played by Romer in Justice Kennedy’s opinion and how, along with Lawrence, it
featured as a template for the majority’s conclusion that Section 3 violated Equal
Protection and inflicted injury and indignity on lawfully married same-sex
couples. Now, in addition to the Cleburne-Moreno-Romer trio in Equal Protection
jurisprudence, Windsor completes a new trio of landmark rulings by the Court,
all authored by Justice Kennedy, about the status of gay men and lesbians. Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion struck down Section 3 without moving to the
intermediate scrutiny urged by the DOJ and the Second Circuit, and instead
confirmed – as the district court in Windsor and the First Circuit discerned – that
Romer supports a more searching form of rational basis review.
I then turn to the dissenting opinions by Justices Alito, Roberts, and Scalia.
Justice Alito’s dissent, in particular, suggests the road not taken by the Supreme
Court but urged by many amici who supported BLAG: the country is in the
midst of a robust debate over competing conceptions of marriage, and which

828.
829.
830.
831.

Utah Pride Brief, supra note 814, at 1; id. at 2-3.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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view should prevail is a matter for “We the people” to decide, not the Supreme
Court.832 Alternatively, the dissenters argued, on the merits, that ample reasons
for Section 3 existed to satisfy an ordinary rational basis test, which was the only
test the Court should apply.
1. Romer Is the Template for Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
In his majority opinion in Windsor, Justice Kennedy builds on the
foundation laid in Romer and expanded in Lawrence. Although there are only a
few explicit citations to Romer, the logic of the Romer opinion permeates
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor. Like Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer,
Windsor is a combination of judicial minimalism and avoidance, on the one hand,
and, on the other, a robust (or more maximalist) vision of equality and the status
of equal citizenship.833
First, the minimalism and avoidance: in dissent, Justice Scalia sharply
charges: “the opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what
had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed
for more than mere rationality.”834 This is not entirely correct, since the majority
mentions that the Attorney General, the President, and the Second Circuit
concluded that intermediate scrutiny should apply and that Section 3 could not
survive such review.835 More than once, the majority refers to the fact that the
Executive reached this conclusion about heightened scrutiny and made the
decision not to defend DOMA’s constitutionality, relying on a “definition still
being debated and considered in the courts” and “based on a constitutional
theory not yet established in judicial decisions.”836 Scalia is correct, however, that
the majority declines to use Windsor as a vehicle to establish that constitutional
theory.
Scalia’s formulation leaves out, however, the very thing that the Windsor
majority opinion does do: it enlists Romer to support a form of rational basis
review that is more than “mere rationality.” Thus, after observing that Section 3
of DOMA, “because of its reach and extent, departs from [the] history and
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage,” Justice Kennedy appeals to
Romer: “‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.’”837 Justice Kennedy returns to that same “careful consideration”
formulation in indicating how the Court should determine “whether a law is
motivated by an improper animus or purpose.”838 After observing that “DOMA
seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect,” he also turns to Moreno,

832. See infra Part IV.F for discussion.
833. On the idea of judicial minimalism and the contrast between minimalist and maximalist
decisions, see CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
834. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
835. Id. at 2683–84.
836. Id. at 2683–84, 2688.
837. Id. at 2692 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 610, 633 (1996)).
838. Id. at 2693.
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on which Romer drew in evaluating Amendment 2: “The Constitution’s
guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment
of that group.’”839 His opinion concludes that “DOMA cannot survive under
these principles.”840
Beyond these explicit references to Romer, Justice Kennedy’s opinion also
uses Romer as a template for the Constitution’s prohibition on adopting a
sweeping law that makes a class of persons strangers to its laws. Thus, he states
that, while New York sought to “eliminate inequality” by adopting a law to
permit same-sex marriage, “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United
States Code.” 841 In an echo of Romer’s conclusion that Amendment 2 “classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else,” Justice Kennedy concludes: “DOMA’s principal effect is to
identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.”842
Similarly, he finds that Section 3’s “demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any
State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as
second-class marriages for purposes of federal law.”843 Also reminiscent of Romer
is the majority’s language that DOMA “singles out a class of persons” and
“imposes a disability on the class.”844 While the conflict in Romer concerned an
effort to reverse, at the state level, protections secured at the municipal level, in
Windsor, Kennedy stresses that DOMA refuses “to acknowledge a status the State
finds to be dignified and proper.”845
There are also echoes, in Windsor, of Romer’s emphasis upon Amendment
2’s infliction of injuries upon the daily lives of homosexuals that “outrun and
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.”846 In Windsor,
Justice Kennedy states that, under DOMA, “same-sex married couples have their
lives burdened . . . in visible and public ways,” because DOMA “touches many
aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the profound.”847
Justice Kennedy concludes that “no legitimate purpose overcomes [Section
3’s] purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”848 Better to
appreciate that conclusion, I will now consider how Lawrence’s concern for
dignity and respect and law not demeaning the personhood of homosexuals
contribute to the majority’s analysis, including its account of why the status of
marriage matters. Implicitly, Lawrence also informs the Court’s evaluation of
DOMA as a vehicle for moral disapproval of homosexuality and moral approval

839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.
848.

Id. (citing Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–45 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 2694.
Id.; see Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94.
Id. at 2695–96.
Id.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
Id. at 2696.
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of traditional marriage.
2. Dignity, Respect, and the Status of Marriage: The Role of Lawrence
One significant aspect of the Windsor majority opinion is Justice Kennedy
characteristic appeal to “dignity” as he explains the injury that DOMA inflicts on
lawfully married same-sex couples. Lawrence is a significant template, even
though, in that case, the Court cautioned that it was not addressing marriage
(that is, “formal recognition of any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter”).849 In Windsor, formal recognition by the federal government of a
relationship permitted and recognized by state law was at stake. Justice Kennedy
explains that marriage bestows “status and dignity,” but, until recent decades,
“many citizens” did not even imagine that same-sex couples, like Edith Windsor
and Thea Spyer, “might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a
man and woman in lawful marriage.”850 Here Justice Kennedy combines
minimalism or avoidance with substantive and stirring rhetoric about the goods
of marriage and the status it bestows. His opinion is minimalist because, rather
than anchor his discussion of the dignity and respect linked to marital status to
the fundamental federal constitutional right to marry,851 he chronicles the
evolving understanding of marriage and equality in states, like New York, as
they “came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who
wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their
family, their friends, and their community.”852 New York, like “11 other states
and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the
right to marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a
status of equality with all other married persons.”853 New York’s citizens and
elected representatives, “after a statewide deliberative process,” acted to
“correct” what they now perceived “to be an injustice that they had not earlier
known or understood.”854
This language resembles Justice Kennedy’s statements in Lawrence about
evolving understandings of the constitutional status of homosexuals and his
concluding statement that “times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress.”855 In Windsor, however, it is an evolutionary process engaged in
by citizens and their elected representatives, where “New York was responding
‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their own
times.’”856 In Lawrence, persons sought to shape their destiny through
849. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
850. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
851. The Court avoided reaching this issue in Hollingsworth v. Perry because it vacated the Ninth
Circuit opinion due to a lack of jurisdiction, 133 S. Ct. at 2659, over Justice Kennedy’s stronglyworded dissent. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (submitting that “the Article III requirement for a
justiciable case or controversy does not prevent proponents from having their day in court”).
852. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
856. 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
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constitutional litigation about the “components of liberty,” for “[a]s the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can evoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.” 857
I do not want to overstate the contrast here between constitutional and
legislative change, since Kennedy acknowledges that the process by which some
states (like Massachusetts) have reached this new understanding was through
state constitutional litigation.858 Thus, his general point that DOMA refuses to
afford dignity and respect to marriages recognized by states and, thus,
“demeans” those couples is not confined only to those states who changed their
domestic relations law solely through the democratic process, without the spur
of constitutional litigation.859 The relevant point, for Justice Kennedy’s
conclusions about DOMA’s constitutional infirmity, is that states had conferred
upon same-sex couples the right to marry.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion offers a robust picture of why marriage matters:
New York’s decision to give same-sex couples the right to marry “conferred
upon them a dignity and status of immense import;” it “enhanced the
recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.”860
Analogizing to Lawrence’s assertion that “‘[p]rivate, consensual sexual intimacy
between two adults persons of the same sex’” is “‘but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring,’” Justice Kennedy reasons that, “[t]he States’ interest
in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional
guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine
classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits.”861 The marital status
conferred by New York on same-sex couples “is a far-reaching legal
acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with
all other marriages.”862 When federal law declines to recognize those marriages,
then, it ignores “the [state] community’s considered perspectives on the
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of
the meaning of equality.”863
3. DOMA’s Denial of Dignity: Moral Disapproval of a Class
Romer and Lawrence also shape Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the
constitutional status of moral disapproval. In explaining the injury that Section 3
inflicts, Justice Kennedy contrasts New York’s attempt to confer dignity and
respect on a class by changing its marriage laws to allow same-sex couples to
marry (and, prior to that, recognizing Edith Windsor’s out-of-state marriage)
with DOMA’s denial of such dignity and respect. Indeed, Justice Kennedy
concludes that “interference with the equal dignity of same-sex

857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
862.
863.

539 U.S. at 578–79.
133 S. Ct. at 2690 (citing, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003)).
Id. at 2694.
Id. at 2692.
Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).
Id.
Id. at 2692–93.
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marriages, . . . .conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power”
was DOMA’s “essence.”864 He finds powerful evidence in the House Report’s
appeal to defending “the institutional of traditional heterosexual marriage” and
its conclusion “that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’”865 Here, the Moreno and Romer
framework combine with a federalism argument to support Justice Kennedy’s
conclusion that DOMA’s “unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” is “strong evidence of a
law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.”866 Section 3’s
“avowed purpose and practical effect” are “to impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma” on same-sex couples lawfully married under the
“unquestioned authority of the States.”867
Justice Kennedy concludes that “the arguments put forward by BLAG are
just as candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state
sovereign choices about who may be married,” since “the goal was ‘to put a
thumb on the scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own
marriage laws.’”868 Moreover, Section 3’s constitutionally problematic purpose
was to treat “as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law” any samesex marriages that states decided to recognize.869 By contrast to the lower courts
in Windsor (including Judge Straub’s lengthy dissent), Justice Kennedy does not
mention, let alone evaluate, rationales such as “caution,” consistency and
uniformity of benefits, and responsible procreation and optimal childrearing. He
does, however, emphasize a different aspect of uniformity from which DOMA
departs: “DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits,
and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each
State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State
to the next.”870
Turning to DOMA’s effect, Justice Kennedy stresses the sweep of DOMA: it
controls “over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations.”871 Here, the
opinion stresses how federal law shapes the lives of persons lawfully married
under state law. Articulating an aspect of marriage that I have elaborated
864. Id. at 2693.
865. Id.
866. Id. Justice Kennedy declines to rest on a pure states rights or federalism rationale, that is,
that Congress lacked authority to enact DOMA because it lacks authority to regulate marriage,
because domestic relations is the traditional province of state law. Rather, he states “it is unnecessary
to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it
disrupts the federal balance.” Id. at 2692. He states that “the State’s power in defining the marital
relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism,” stressing the
contrast between states using their “historic and essential authority” to define marriage in a way that
enhances the status of same-sex couples, and DOMA imposing “restrictions and disabilities on those
couples.” Id.
867. Id. at 2693.
868. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. DHHS, 682 F. 3d at 12–13).
869. Id. at 2693–94.
870. Id. at 2692.
871. Id. at 2694.
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elsewhere, the opinion explains that marriage entails rights and responsibilities,
and that both “enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.”872 DOMA,
however, deprives same-sex couples lawfully married under state law – but not
opposite-sex couples – of “both rights and responsibilities.”873 Later, Justice
Kennedy reiterates: “DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and
responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that in most cases
would be honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”874 In insisting that the
dignity that the status of marriage brings includes responsibilities, and not only
rights, Justice Kennedy powerfully, if implicitly, challenges a view that the basic
purposes and goods of marriage cannot survive an expanded definition of why
may marry.
Emphasizing the broad scope of federal regulations bearing on marriage,
Justice Kennedy states that “DOMA touches many aspects of married and family
life, from the mundane to the profound.”875 Not only does its creation of “two
contradictory marriage regimes within the same State” diminish “the stability
and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to
acknowledge and protect,” but it tells those same-sex couples that “their
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”876 DOMA also
“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex
couples.”877 Without explicitly addressing whether such couples have a federal
constitutional right to marry, Justice Kennedy appeals to Lawrence: “the
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects . . . and whose relationship the State has sought to
dignify.”878 Several times, Justice Kennedy repeats that DOMA “demeans”
persons in “a lawful same-sex marriage,” explaining that the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause bars from government from doing so.879 Justice Kennedy
concludes: “The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”880 The crucial
constitutional point is that DOMA seeks to “displace” this state protection by
“treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others.”881 In a
sentence that receives much parsing in the dissents, he further adds: “This

872. Id. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 159, at 190–205 (elaborating a view of marriage as
securing rights and responsibilities and allowing various substantive moral goods).
873. 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
874. Id. at 2695.
875. Id. at 2694. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg, who joined the majority opinion,
emphasized that the federal laws referencing marriage “touch every aspect of life.” U.S. v. Windsor,
Transcript of Oral Argument (March 27, 2013) at 71, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307). She observed, that under DOMA, the state has two kinds of marriage: “the full
marriage, and then this sort of skim milk marriage.” Id.
876. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
877. Id.
878. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003)).
879. Id. at 2695.
880. Id. at 2696.
881. Id.
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opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”
In sum, both Romer and Lawrence provide a foundation for the majority’s
opinion in Windsor. This role is evident both in explicit references by Justice
Kennedy to these two cases as well as in the vocabulary and concepts that he
employs. These precedents, as well as the “background of lawful same-sex
marriage” in some states, shape his evaluation of “the design, purpose, and
effect of DOMA.”882 In sum, given the “moral disapproval” DOMA expressed
for homosexuals and its aim of “defending” marriage even by failing to
recognize marriages valid under state law, the majority places DOMA in the
category of “‘discrimination of an unusual character,’” which cannot survive
“careful consideration.” 883
Does Windsor imply, notwithstanding Kennedy’s penultimate sentence
about the reach of the majority opinion and holding, that states’ defense of
marriage statutes and constitutional amendments violate the federal constitution
for the same reasons that Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional: that they reflect
discrimination of an unusual character, disapprove of and single out a class of
relationships, and “demean” and “humiliate” same-sex couples? The dissenters
disagreed sharply over the answer to this question. On two points, however,
they united: (1) the Court should have let “the people” resolve the debate over
marriage and not taken sides; and (2) in striking down Section 3 of DOMA, the
majority failed to credence ample and legitimate rationales for DOMA that could
survive ordinary rational basis review, thus tarring Congress and persons who
adhered to the traditional definition of marriage as “bigots.”884 I will begin with a
brief discussion of Chief Justice Roberts’ comparatively short dissent, and then
discuss those by Justices Alito and Scalia.
F. The Windsor dissents
1. Chief Justice Roberts
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent primarily makes the point that the majority
should be taken at its word when it confines its ruling to “lawful marriages”
(under state law) of same-sex couples and that the Court “does not have before
it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the
States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential authority to define the
marital relation’ . . . may continue to utilize the traditional definition of
marriage.”885 He views that “logic” as being confined to the situation where a
State recognizes same-sex marriages and the federal government intrudes “into
an area ‘central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and
citizens’” by not recognizing those marriages.886 While the Chief Justice does not
agreed with the majority’s conclusion, the salient point, he insists, is that it is
“based on federalism” and does not address the constitutionality of state

882.
883.
884.
885.
886.

Id. at 2689–90.
Id. at 2693.
See discussion infra Part IV.F.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2697.
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marriage definitions.887 It is not a departure from federalism, he argues, when
states exercise their power and define marriage different ways, so that there is
not uniformity from one state to the next.888 Inapplicable to a “State’s decision
whether to expand the definition of marriage from its traditional contours” will
be the majority’s concern that, through DOMA, the federal government
“undermined” dignity conferred by states exercising their “sovereign power.”889
Chief Justice Roberts nowhere mentions Romer, Lawrence, or the
constitutional status of moral disapproval as a rationale for DOMA. He simply
indicates that he rejects the majority’s conclusion that DOMA’s “principal
purpose” – or lawmakers’ motive for it—was “a bare desire to harm.”890 The
Act’s “banal title” and the “snippets of legislative history” cited by the majority
do not make such a showing and, he continues, “without some more convincing
evidence that the Act’s principal purpose was to codify malice, and that it
furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political
branches with the brush of bigotry.”891
2. Justice Alito’s Dissent and the Road Not Taken: a Debate over Competing
Views of Marriage
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, framed Edith Windsor’s challenge to
DOMA and her request that the Court apply heightened scrutiny as asking the
Court to “intervene” in a debate about “the nature of the institution” of marriage,
and, specifically, between two views of marriage, which he called the
“traditional” or “conjugal” view and the “consent-based” view.892
The
Constitution, Justice Alito stated, “does not codify either of these views,”
although he offers in an aside that, when the Fifth Amendment and the
Constitution were adopted, “it would have been hard . . .to find Americans who
did not take the traditional view for granted.”893 Rather than endorse the
“consent-based view,” as Windsor (Alito asserts) asked the Court to do, the
Court should leave it to “the people.”894 I refer to this dissent as the road not
taken because Justice Alito sounds themes prominent in several of the amicus
briefs, analyzed in Part IV.D, with respect to how to frame the issue and because
he addresses the merits of the call for intermediate scrutiny.
While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion framed the pertinent issue as the
clash between efforts by states, through revised marriage laws, to confer status
and dignity and DOMA’s purpose and effect of refusing to recognize that status,
Justice Alito frames the problem of competing visions of marriage as a question
that “philosophers, historians, social scientists, and theologians are better
qualified [than the Court] to explore” and that “the people” are entitled to

887. Id.
888. Id.
889. Id.
890. Id. at 2696.
891. Id. (emphasis in original).
892. Id. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting).
893. Id.
894. Id. at 2718–19.
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resolve.895 Although Alito does not cite to any specific amicus briefs in
elaborating the two competing visions he perceives, he cites to works by authors
who filed amicus briefs as he describes the “conjugal” view, which “sees
marriage as an intrinsically opposite-sex institution,” one “inextricably linked to
procreation and biological kinship.”896 Without any citations, he characterizes the
“consent-based” vision, dominant in “the popular understanding of the
institution,” as viewing marriage as “the solemnization of mutual commitment –
marked by strong emotional attachment and sexual attraction – between two
persons,” where “gender differentiation is not relevant.”897
Where Justice Kennedy concludes that DOMA unconstitutionally “singles
out” a class of persons a State deems entitled to “recognition and protection,”
Justice Alito concludes that neither state governments nor the “political branches
of the Federal Government” need be neutral “between competing visions of the
good, provided that the vision of the good that they adopt is not countermanded
by the Constitution;” thus, “[b]oth Congress and the States are entitled to enact
laws recognizing either of the two understandings of marriage.”898 Thus, when
Justice Alito asserts that the “ultimate sovereignty” to decide the question about
same-sex marriage rests with “the people,” who have a right to “control their
own destiny,” he implicitly includes the American people, through their elected
federal representatives, and the people of particular states, as in New York.
Romer features in his opinion simply to support the idea that, under rational
basis review, courts have “long recognized that ‘the equal protection of the laws
must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one
purpose or another, with resulting disadvantages to various groups or
persons.’”899 While Justice Kennedy stresses the need for careful consideration,
Justice Alito counters (enlisting Cleburne) with a longstanding judicial reluctance
“to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent
those interests should be pursued.”900 There is no place for the Moreno-CleburneRomer template in Justice Alito’s vision of equal protection. Additionally, he
critiques the request by Windsor and the United States for heightened scrutiny,
contending that they request a ruling that “the presence of two members of the
opposite sex is as rationally related to marriage as white skin is to voting or a Ychromosome is to the ability to administer an estate.”901 To grant such a request,
he asserts, “would cast all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the nature

895.
896.

Id. at 2719.
Id. at 2718-19. For example, he cites SHERIF GIGRIS, RYAN ANDERSON, AND ROBERT GEORGE,
WHAT IS MARRIAGE: MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012) as offering a “philosophical” account of the
basis for marriage. Id. (“They argue that marriage is essentially the solemnizing of a comprehensive,
exclusive, permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not
always do so.”). The authors also filed an amicus brief, the George Brief, supra note 713, discussed
supra in Part IV. D.2.
897. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718.
898. Id. at 2719.
899. Id. at 2717.
900. Id. at 2718.
901. Id. at 2717–18.
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of marriage in the role of bigots or superstitious fools.”902 Instead, Justice Alito
counters, the Court should stay out of the debate (noted above) between two
competing views of marriage.
Justice Alito also rejects the majority’s analysis of how Section 3
unconstitutionally singles out a class. Section 3, he concludes, does not “encroach
on the prerogatives on the States” to recognize same-sex marriage or extend to
same-sex couples “any right, privilege, benefit, or obligation stemming from
state law,” but instead “defines a class for purposes to whom federal law
extends certain special benefits and upon whom federal law imposes certain
special burdens.”903 Congress, he assumes, did so “because it viewed marriage as
a valuable institution to be fostered and in part because it viewed married
couples as comprising a unique type of economic unit that merits special
regulatory treatment.”904 Justice Alito’s dissent nowhere mentions the language
in the House Report, cited by Justice Kennedy, about Congress seeking to
express moral disapproval of homosexuality. He instead seems to embrace,
without explicitly citing to, BLAG’s and various amici’s appeal for “caution,”
that is, that because “the family is an ancient and universal human institution,”
and changes in its structure “can have profound effects,” as evidenced by “farreaching consequences” of “past changes in the understanding of marriage,” one
can expect that there will be long-term consequences “if same-sex marriage
becomes widely accepted.”905 This discussion, however, does not take place in
his exposition of the rationales for DOMA, but in his characterization of the
stance of Windsor and the United States as seeking recognition of “a very new
right.”906 Strikingly, after first stating that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee
the right to entire into a same-sex marriage,” Justice Alito observes: “Indeed, no
provision of the Constitution speaks to the issue.”907 Of course, no provision
speaks to marriage of any sort, and yet the Court has long held that Due Process
liberty includes a fundamental right to marry.908 Justice Alito concedes, without
mentioning the right to marry cases, that the Court “has sometimes found the
Due Process Clauses to have a substantive component” of liberty, beyond
physical restraint, but insists “it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex
marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”909 In any
event, this federal constitutional interpretation question is beside the point:
Windsor’s challenge to DOMA did not raise the question of whether the federal
constitution required that same-sex couples be allowed to marry, for she was
validly married under state law. By framing the inquiry in terms of the scope of
due process liberty under the federal constitution, Alito delves into the very issue
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion avoids in focusing on the evolving definition

902.
903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.

Id.
Id. at 2720.
Id.
Id. at 2715–16.
Id. at 2715.
Id. at 2714.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
133 S. Ct. at 2715.
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of marriage in state law. But Justice Alito, in turn, avoids giving an adequate
answer to the Equal Protection issue: can Congress constitutionally define
marriage, for purposes of federal law, in a way that denies recognition to a class
of marriages valid under state law?
3. Justice Scalia’s Dissent: Affirming Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval
and Predicting the End of Traditional State Marriage Laws
Justice Scalia accuses the majority of being “hungry” to “tell everyone its
view of the legal question at the heart of this case,” so much so that it leaps over
the “technicality” that it does not have Article III power because there is no
proper “case and controversy” before the Court.910 I will not address his
jurisdictional argument, because the salient point of Justice Scalia’s
characterization, for purposes of this article, is his charge that the majority has
distorted “our society’s debate over marriage” and “by formally declaring
anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency,” armed
“every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional
definition.”911 Like Justice Alito and various amici supporting BLAG, Justice
Scalia frames the issue as a matter of debate that “we the people” should decide
without interference by the Court. He states: “Few public controversies touch an
institution so central to the lives of so many, and few inspire such attendant
passion by good people on all sides.”912 He stresses that citizens “have seen
victories and . . . defeats,” as the democratic system unfolds, and that (using
Maine as an example), “the question has come out differently on different
occasions.”913 Accusing the majority of lacking the “judicial temperament” to “let
the People decide,” Justice Scalia charges that “in the majority’s telling, this story
is black-and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us.”914
Turning to the merits of the majority’s analysis of Section 3, Justice Scalia
begins by chiding the majority for failing to address the issue of whether more
than “mere rationality” review should be applied to “laws restricting marriage to
a man and a woman.”915 He argues that “rationality” should apply, but charges
that the Court “certainly does not apply anything that resembles the deferential
framework.”916 Similar to Justice Alito, he observes that the majority does not –
and could not – contend that same-sex marriage is “deeply rooted” so that “a
world in which DOMA exists is one bereft of ‘ordered liberty.’”917
Focusing on DOMA as expressing moral disapproval, Justice Scalia quotes
his dissent in Lawrence: “the Constitution does not forbid the government to

910. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
911. Id. at 2710.
912. Id. at 2710.
913. Id. at 2710–11.
914. Id. at 2711.
915. Id. at 2706.
916. Id. at 2706 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993), as supporting the point that “a
classification ‘must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts’ that could
justify it.”).
917. Id. at 2707.
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enforce traditional moral and sexual norms.”918 Like Alito, he then observes that
“the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex
marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault
divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.”919 In other words, moral
disapproval should be a constitutionally sufficient basis for DOMA. Justice Scalia
continues that, “even setting aside traditional moral disapproval of same-sex
marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid – indeed,
downright boring – justifying rationales for” DOMA, which “ought to be the end
of this case.”920 Scalia characterizes the majority’s opinion, instead, as concluding
that “only those with hateful hearts could have voted ‘aye’” for DOMA, and that
“the only motive” for it was “the ‘bare . . .desire to harm a politically unpopular
group.’”921 Justice Scalia counters that, not only should legislative motive – or
what is in “legislators’ hearts”—be irrelevant, but the majority “affirmatively
conceal[s] from the reader the arguments that exist in justification for DOMA,”
contributing to “the illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a
wild-eyed lynch mob.”922 While Justice Kennedy never drew an explicit analogy
to race or racial prejudice, Justice Scalia’s intemperate and inflammatory allusion
to racially motivated violence here is reinforced by his reference to the Court’s
earlier scorn for and condemnation of “some once-Confederate Southern
state.”923 Later, Justice Scalia accuses the Court of “adjudging those who
oppose” change in the definition of marriage as “enemies of the human race.”924
Justice Scalia casts Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that the purpose and effect
of DOMA was to “demean,” “disparage and injure” same-sex couples as saying
that DOMA’s supporters “acted with malice,” and responds that he is “sure these
accusations are quite untrue.”925 Deploying the majority’s rhetoric, Scalia
counters: “To defend traditional marriage is not to condemn, demean, or
humiliate those who would prefer other arrangements, any more than to defend
the Constitution of the United States is to condemn, demean, or humiliate other
constitutions. To hurl such accusations so casually demeans this institution.”926
This is a curious way to frame the issue, since Windsor was asking the federal
government to recognize her marriage, not an alternative arrangement, but on
Scalia’s logic, Congress may defend “traditional marriage” even if states, the
entities empowered to license marriage, now view that definition as unjust and
unjustifiable. Justice Scalia explains that all DOMA did was to “codify an aspect
of marriage that had been unquestioned in our society for most of its existence –
indeed, had been unquestioned in virtually all societies for virtually all of human
history.”927 While Justice Scalia excoriates the majority for characterizing
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2707–08.
Id. at 2707.
Id. at 2709.
Id. at 2708 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 2709.
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DOMA’s purpose in terms injuring and disparaging homosexuals, Scalia’s calm
and minimalist description of DOMA’s purpose simply leaves out the Report’s
heated warnings of an “orchestrated legal assault being waged against
traditional heterosexual marriage.”928 This may simply be the “traditional moral
disapproval of same-sex marriage” that Justice Scalia has stated is not forbidden
by the Constitution.929
Beyond maintaining the traditional definition of marriage or expressing
moral disapproval, Justice Scalia contends that BLAG offered ample arguments
for DOMA. He focuses on just one: “DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law issues
that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of marriage.”930 This is
BLAG’s argument about uniformity of and certainty concerning eligibility for
federal benefits. Justice Scalia offers hypotheticals about problems federal
agencies will face in sorting out whether a migratory couple is eligible for
benefits, and whether the rule will be to follow the law of their “State of
celebration” or their “State of domicile.”931
The majority also fails to mention, Justice Scalia adds, BLAG’s caution
argument: Section 3 “was enacted to ensure that state-level experimentation did
not automatically alter the basic operation of federal law, unless and until
Congress made the further judgment to do son on its own.”932 “That is not
animus,” he asserts, “just stabilizing prudence.”933 Congress, he adds, is capable
of revisiting its judgments, “upon due deliberation,” as the repeal of Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell indicates.934
Perhaps the most scathing part of Justice Scalia’s dissent is the connection
he makes between the majority’s Lawrence and Windsor opinions with respect to
their disclaimers about marriage. Although the majority in Lawrence said its
opinion did not address formal recognition of same-sex relationship, Justice
Scalia famously countered: “Do not believe it.”935 Scalia contended that “if moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state interest’ for
purposes of proscribing that conduct,. . . . what justification could there possibly
be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘[t]he
liberty protected by the Constitution?”936 The Windsor majority, Justice Scalia
observes, now appeals to Lawrence to say that “DOMA is invalid because it
‘demeans the couples, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects.’”937 He charges that the majority has indicated the view it will take “of
state prohibition of same-sex marriage,” asserting that its conclusion that DOMA
928. Compare Windsor v. U.S., 699 F. 3d 169, 191 (2d Cir. 2012) (Straub, J., dissenting) (reporting
that the Report “described Baehr [v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993)] as part of an ‘orchestrated legal assault
being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage.”).
929. 133 S. Ct. at 2707.
930. Id. at 2708.
931. Id.
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. Id.
935. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
936. Id. at 604–05.
937. 133 S. Ct. at 2708.
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“‘is motivated by ‘bare . . . desire to harm”“ can be easily applied to “state laws
denying same-sex marital status.”938 Scalia concludes: “that Court which finds it
so horrific that Congress irrationally and hatefully robbed same-sex couples of
the ‘personhood and dignity’ which state legislatures conferred upon them will
of a certitude be similarly appalled by state legislatures’ irrational and hateful
failure to acknowledge that ‘personhood and dignity’ in the first place.”939
Thus, just as Windsor makes a trio of opinions by Justice Kennedy
elaborating the constitutional protections due to homosexual persons, Justice
Scalia’s dissent joins his Romer and Lawrence dissents to make a trio of blistering
dissents in which he accuses the majority of taking sides in a cultural and
political debate about which the Constitution says nothing and coming down in
favor of the rights of homosexuals and branding defenders of traditional
morality and traditional marriage bigots. In all three, he reaffirms his view that
the constitution permits using law as a vehicle to express moral disapproval.
CONCLUSION: LAW, MORALITY, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND MARRIAGE IN THE POSTWINDSOR LANDSCAPE
This article has looked back at Romer v. Evans and then looked forward to
its deployment in the successful challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act in
United States v. Windsor to study the evolution in constitutional law and in society
concerning using law as a vehicle to express moral disapproval of homosexuality
and to promote and defend traditional heterosexual marriage. The image of a
changed landscape is at risk of overuse, given how dramatic the evolution has
been, but it is still powerful. It gets at the spatial or territorial dimension of the
issue, for example, the enactment of Amendment 2 at the state-wide level to
counteract developments at the municipal level or the enactment of DOMA at
the federal level to ward off a perceived threat by “activist” judges in particular
states. The landscape image also captures, as Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Windsor illustrates, the evolution within a state on the marriage issue, such as
New York’s evolving understanding of the injustice of excluding same-sex
couples from marriage. Further, the landscape image capably includes calls, as in
the Windsor dissents and many amicus briefs filed in support of BLAG, for the
Supreme Court to “let the people decide,” rather than to resolve a robust national
“debate” over marriage.
By focusing on amicus briefs filed in these two constitutional litigations, I
have been able to analyze forms of argument made then, at the time of the Romer
litigation, about the use of law to express moral disapproval of homosexuality
and to preserve traditional morality and traditional heterosexual marriage, and
now, in the recent Windsor litigation. I have focused on how Romer deployed,
and then joined, two significant Equal Protection cases, Cleburne and Moreno, to
become part of a trio of cases supporting a more searching form of rational basis
review warranted when confronting “discriminations of an unusual

938.
939.

Id. at 2709–10.
Id. at 2710.
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character.”940 That trio, along with Lawrence, supported arguments for the
unconstitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Windsor now joins Romer and Lawrence to create a new, significant trio of
landmark cases about the constitutional status of gay men and lesbians and to
identify Justice Kennedy, as Evan Wolfson recently put it, as “the towering giant
in the jurisprudence of freedom and equality for gay people.”941 So, too, Justice
Scalia’s Windsor dissent completes a trio of excoriating dissents that insist upon
the constitutionality of using law to promote traditional marriage and express
moral disapproval of homosexuality and that reject the existence or propriety of
the more careful form of rational basis review that the majority applied.
One take-away message from this article’s retrospective is the usual one
about how significant and outcome-determinative the particular membership of
the Supreme Court is, with the caveat that the development of a particular
justice’s jurisprudence may confound expectations. This observation is
particularly astute given the changing constitutional landscape from Bowers,
decided one year before President Ronald Reagan nominated Justice Kennedy to
the Supreme Court,942 to Lawrence and then to Windsor. As Court-watcher Adam
Liptak recently observed, at the time of Kennedy’s nomination, he had voted
against gay rights claims “every time,” and gay rights advocates considered him
a “‘likely vote against us on most matters to come before the Supreme Court.’”943
On the other hand, one month after Bowers, then-Judge Kennedy expressed
public reservations about the Court’s ruling, contrasting it with a European
Court of Human Rights decision striking down Northern Ireland’s sodomy law –
a decision to which he would later refer in his Lawrence opinion, striking down
Texas’s law.944 The Court might have followed a very different trajectory had the
seat Anthony Kennedy filled gone to Judge Robert H. Bork, Reagan’s initial
nominee, famous as a strict constructionist and as a vocal critic of the Supreme
Court’s precedents about a constitutional right to privacy.945 Indeed, Bork was
among the contributors to the well-known post-Romer First Things symposium,
discussed in Part II, in which he called Romer “indecipherable” and attributed it
to “the newly faddish approval of homosexual conduct among the elite classes
from which the Justices come and to which most of them respond.”946
The trajectory from 1996, the year of both Romer and DOMA, to 2013,
when Windsor struck down Section 3 of DOMA, however, is more than a story
about one fateful nomination battle. The changed landscape image is again apt.

940. Id. at 2693 (quoting Romer).
941. Adam Liptak, Surprising Friend of Gay Rights in a High Place, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013.
942. Id.
943. Id. (quoting contemporaneous statement in the New York Native by Professor Arthur
Leonard, gay rights expert at New York Law School).
944. Id. Liptak is referring to Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981), cited in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003).
945. Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19,
2012;
Mark
Sherman,
Bork
Nomination
Fight
Altered
Judicial
Selection,
http://www.salon.com/2012/12/19/bork_nomination_fight_altered_judicial_selection/
946. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, at 21, 22 (Nov. 1996), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/11/003-the-end-of-democracy-our-judicial-oligarchy-35.
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The Windsor majority avoided reaching the question of whether classifications
based on sexual orientation warranted intermediate scrutiny, or even strict
scrutiny. Such judicial avoidance might have reflected a pragmatic judgment that
Romer provided the necessary template for invalidating Section 3 without the
need to use Windsor as the occasion to announce a new rule about classifications
based on sexual orientation. It could also be there were not sufficient votes for a
majority of the Court to make such a move. It could be that at least a few justices
had some reservations about the “political powerlessness” prong of the test of a
suspect or quasi-suspect class in light of the seemingly rapid pace of societal and
legal change about homosexuality. During oral argument in Windsor, for
example, Paul Clement, arguing for BLAG, referred to the “sea change” on the
issue of gay rights, brought about by the combination of the Court’s precedents
and persuasion in the democratic process.947 He quipped: “Colorado, the State
that brought you Amendment 2, has just recognized civil unions.”948 For that
matter, Colorado, the state where voters approved Amendment 2, now includes
“sexual orientation” as a protected category in its anti-discrimination law.949
Skeptical of the need for heightened scrutiny, Chief Justice Roberts observed to
Roberta Kaplan, counsel for Windsor: “As far as I can tell, political figures are
falling over themselves to endorse your side of the case.”950 Even though
Windsor’s counsel and amici made strong arguments about analogies to other
forms of discrimination and that political successes in some places did not negate
the success in many states of popular initiatives barring marriage equality,951 the
Windsor majority did not go down the road of suspect classification. Instead, it
focused on the evolution, within New York and a minority of states, to marriage
equality and, employing Romer’s important ideas about animus and laws
targeting a particular class because of
moral disapproval,
set up a
constitutionally impermissible contrast between such states attempting to confer
the respect and dignity linked to marital status and DOMA’s denial of that
status. A striking example of the evolution within, and changed landscape, of a
state from 1996 to 2013 comes from Hawaii itself. On November 13, 2013,
Hawaii’s governor signed into law a bill, passed by the state legislature,
extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, commenting that, “Now all those
who have been invisible will be visible to themselves and the world.”952
What will the import of Windsor be for the next stage of the national
“debate” over defining marriage? Notably, even the framing of such a debate
suggests a change from the landscape twenty years ago. To the extent defending
marriage featured as a rationale for Amendment 2, amici supporting Colorado
urged the Court not to take sides in a debate over the moral and legal status of
homosexuality. They did not credit the idea that there was a conscientious or
947. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 875, at 112–13.
948. Id. at 113.
949. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-601 et seq.
950. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 875, at 108.
951. Id.
952. Treena Shapiro, Hawaii Becomes 15th U.S. State to Legalize
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/13/us-usa-gaymarriage-hawaiiidUSBRE9AC15U20131113?feedType=RSS.
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robust debate over visions of marriage itself. To be sure, when some Windsor
amici asserted that there is robust debate over marriage that the Court should not
settle, they also voiced concern about the impact that resolving the debate in
favor of a redefinition of marriage would have on society and on their own
religious understandings of marriage. While the majority and dissenting
opinions made little to no mention of this clash of rights argument about
religious liberty, it seems likely that arguments about religious liberty and the
need to accommodate it will feature prominently in the ongoing struggles for
marriage equality, both in political and judicial fora. That is one reason that it is
unfortunate that Justice Scalia, consistent with his Romer and Lawrence dissents,
deployed the terms “bigots” and “enemies of the human race” to characterize the
majority’s supposed view of defenders of traditional marriage.
Post-Windsor developments have been so rapid and numerous that I can
only mention a few here, in closing. Justice Scalia does have a point about the
majority opinion providing a blueprint for future challenges to state laws; it is
less clear whether his reading of what Justice Kennedy or even the majority of
the Court would do if faced with such a challenge is accurate. On the blueprint
point, news stories after Windsor reported that, although Justice Kennedy “took
pains in his majority opinion to say the ruling applied only to legally married
couples seeking benefits from the federal government,” “judges and lawyers
representing same-sex couples are already using Kennedy’s language and
reasoning in other cases about the right to marry.”953 In the lawsuit brought by
several same-sex couples in Pennsylvania, for example, plaintiffs cite to Windsor
in asserting both that Pennsylvania is excluding them from “a dignity and status
of immense import” and that “tradition” and “moral disapproval of same-sex
relationships of marriage” are insufficient bases for excluding same-sex couples
from marriage.954 Pennsylvania’s Attorney General, Kathleen Kane, announced
that she could not “ethically defend the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s
version of DOMA,” also adopted in 1996, triggering the Governor’s office to
announce it would defend the law.955
In New Jersey, a state superior court judge emphasized Justice Kennedy’s
disclaimer, “This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful
marriages,” in ruling in favor of same-sex couples who asserted that, in light of
Windsor, that New Jersey’s remedy of civil unions instead of civil marriage was
constitutionally inadequate under New Jersey’s Equal Protection clause, since
federal agencies, post-DOMA, were declaring they would give federal benefits to
married same-sex couples but not to couples in civil unions or domestic
partnerships.956 Noting Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer, the court concluded that

953. The Big Story: Gay Marriage Ruling Already in Use in Other Cases,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gay-marriage-ruling-already-use-other-cases.
954. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Deb Whitewood and Susan Whitewood et
al. v. Thomas W. Corbett, Civil Action No. ___, United States District Court, Middle District of
Pennsylvania, at 4, 40.
955. Trip Gabriel, Move for Gay Marriage Gets a Lift in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/us/pennsylvanias-attorney-general-wont-fight-gaymarriage-lawsuit.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
956. Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Garden State Equality et al v. Paula Dow et al.,
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New Jersey could not shift responsibility to the federal government to treat civil
unions as marriages for purposes of federal benefits, when its own domestic
relations law “assigns to same-sex couples a label distinct from marriage,” which
“now directly affects the availability of federal marriage benefits to those
couples.”957 When the trial court denied the New Jersey Attorney General’s
motion to stay the trial court’s order that same-sex couples be permitted to marry
beginning on October 21, 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to lift the
stay after determining that “the State has not shown a reasonable probability it
will succeed on the merits,” while “same-sex couples who cannot marry are not
treated equally under the law today” and suffer “real” harm.958 Subsequently,
Governor Chris Christie, who initially strongly opposed the trial court’s ruling,
announced
that
the
State
would
not
appeal
because
“the Court has now spoken clearly as to their view of the New Jersey
Constitution, and, therefore, same-sex marriage is the law.”959 Even so, Governor
Christie, who had previously vetoed a bill allowing same-sex couples to marry,
could not resist sounding the theme, familiar from the DOMA-era, that judicial
activism thwarts democracy and letting the people decide, noting that he
“strongly disagrees with the Court substituting its judgment for the
constitutional process of the elected branches or a vote of the people,” but that he
would “do his constitutional duty and ensure his Administration enforces the
law as dictated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.”960
Post-Windsor, the demise of Section 3 will make labels matter even more, so
that statutory schemes intended to remedy inequality by providing equal rights,
benefits, and obligations “of” marriage but not the right “to” marry, as New
Jersey initially did,961 will not succeed if those couples are unequal for purposes
of federal law.

Docket No. L-1729-11, Sept. 27, 2013.
957. Id. at 50.
958. Supreme Court Decision on the Motion for a Stay in Garden State Equality Marriage Case, 34, 18 (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/samesex/ Supreme%20Court%
20Opinion%20on%20Stay%20Motion.pdf. All of the court proceedings may be found at:
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/samesex/.
959. James Beattie, Christie’s Vow to Appeal Court-Imposed Gay Marriage Lasts 3 Weeks,
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/james-beattie/christie-s-vow-appeal-court-imposed-gaymarriage-lasts-3-weeks. The New Jersey Attorney General withdrew the appeal on October 21, 2013.
See http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/samesex/ AG%20Withdrawal%20of%20Appeal%20102113.pdf
960. Beattie, supra note 959 (emphasis supplied).
961. Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Garden State Equality et al v. Paula Dow et al.,
Docket No. L-1729-11, Sept. 27, 2013 at 1–4, 6–7. An additional issue is whether civil unions actually
produce equality even for purposes of state law. See id. at 6–8 (noting that Lewis plaintiffs, in
subsequent proceeding, relied on report by Civil Union Review Commission that found separate
category of civil union “invites and encourages unequal treatment”).

